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ABSTRACT 




Filmmaker Chantal Akerman utilizes specific representational devices in her films in 
order to address the film spectator in an ethical manner. The ethical nature of Akerman’s films 
results from the form of character presentation Akerman employs. Approaching the Other as 
Other performs a detailed examination of the presentation of character in Akerman’s films, 
analyzing Akerman’s use of conventions of classical cinema as well as her use of devices 
associated with experimental and avant-garde cinema. Through the systematic avoidance of 
psychological or emotional insights into her films’ characters, while still maintaining a ‘realistic’ 
presentation of character, Akerman presents the characters in her films as ‘unknowable’ and 
opaque individuals to the spectator.  
This treatment of character points to Judith Butler’s discussion of ethics in Giving an 
Account of Oneself (2005). According to Butler, the ethical lies in discarding the belief that the 
other can and should explain themselves; this is because, in Butler’s view, both the self and the 
other are fundamentally unknowable. This thesis uses Butler’s conception of ethics to show that 
Akerman’s presentation of character is ethical, as Akerman’s films ask the spectator to 
contemplate the impossibility of knowing the other. Such contemplation, Butler argues, 
constitutes an ethical resource. Examining various films of Akerman’s, Approaching the Other as 
Other outlines the operation of these films’ ethical address, illustrating the divergences and 
continuities in the address across Akerman’s different styles of filmmaking, and ultimately 
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Introduction: Film, Ethics, and Chantal Akerman 
 
The way in which Chantal Akerman’s films address their spectator points to 
questions about the limits of self-knowledge and related concerns about relations between 
human beings. Akerman’s concerns are ethical in nature and, as such, they present an 
avenue to investigate the following question: “is it possible to establish a parallel between 
our ethical response to people in life and our response to film characters?” The characters 
in Akerman’s films are not psychologically motivated and do not encourage 
identification like those found in classical narrative cinema. Yet they are not Brechtian 
characters either, insofar as they are still representations of human beings existing in a 
‘realistic’ diegesis. These characters have interior worlds, to which, however, the film 
spectator is not given access; spectators receive no information about the characters’ 
internal worlds through narrative or psychological hints, dialogue, voice-over or any 
other avenue. Akerman’s refusal to reveal her characters’ thoughts and feelings to the 
spectator expresses the belief that there is limit to what can be revealed about a character 
in a film, a refusal which refers to the ‘limits of knowability of oneself and others’ as 
discussed in Judith Butler’s book Giving an Account of Oneself (2005). This thesis 
examines character presentation in Akerman’s films from the point of view of ethics, 
with particular reference to the work of Judith Butler. In Giving an Account of Oneself 
Butler argues for the existence of limits to self-knowledge and stresses the ethical 
importance of recognizing and accepting that limit in oneself and others. Butler’s ideas 
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about the limited nature of self-knowledge and knowledge of others will provide an 
interpretive key with which this thesis analyzes Akerman’s films.     
 An application of Butler’s conception of ethics to Akerman’s films will provide a 
productive analysis of these films’ address of their spectator. Akerman’s foregrounding 
of the opacity of her films’ characters – of the fact that they cannot explain their actions 
to us, just as they cannot fully explain those actions to themselves – places the spectator 
in a position in which ethical responsibility rests with the spectator: do we dismiss these 
characters, or can we value them as human beings and confer recognition on them in spite 
of their opacity? Butler writes, 
[W]e must recognize that ethics requires us to risk ourselves precisely at moments 
of unknowingness, when what forms us diverges from what lies before us, when 
our willingness to become undone in relation to others constitutes our chance of 
becoming human. To be undone by another is a primary necessity, an anguish, to 
be sure, but also a chance – to be addressed, claimed, bound to what is not me, but 
also to be moved, to be prompted to act, to myself elsewhere, and so to vacate the 
self-sufficient “I” as a kind of possession.1 
Akerman’s films work to bring the spectator to these ‘moments of unknowingness.’ Her 
films require the spectator to contemplate individual characters at length and ultimately 
recognize them, becoming undone themselves somewhat in accepting the character’s 
unknowability, or to turn away from the character, condemning the character for his or 
her opacity. An examination of the ways Akerman lays out these possibilities, and the 
ways those possibilities function in different films, will constitute the focus of this thesis.    
 
                                                
1 Ibid., 136. 
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Giving an Account of Oneself: Butler’s Ethics 
 
In her discussion of ethics, Butler addresses the post-structural understanding of 
the subject as constituted in and through the operation of social norms, and the disparities 
which arise when this understanding of the subject is aligned with the belief that any 
overarching system of ethics must rely on the notion of individual agency and the 
resulting ability to be held responsible for one’s acts. Her aim is to designate an 
understanding of ethics which emphasizes the importance of relations between human 
beings (as opposed to individualistic or narcissistic notions of morality which take self-
preservation as their highest goal2) while maintaining a conception of responsibility in 
conjunction with the basic assumption of a de-centered self: 
[T]he “I” has no story of its own that is not also the story of a relation – or set of 
relations – to a set of norms. Although many contemporary critics worry that this 
means there is no concept of the subject that can serve as the ground for moral 
agency and moral accountability, that conclusion does not follow.3  
Over the course of Giving an Account of Oneself, Butler outlines a concept of the subject 
which can serve as the ground for moral agency and accountability. This is a subject 
whose self-knowledge is fundamentally limited. Butler illustrates this limited self-
knowledge in her description of the subject’s inability to give a full ‘account of oneself.’ 
Further, by coming to understand the limited nature of self-knowledge, this subject is 
predisposed to shed the demand for exhaustive self-explanation from others; rather, in 
understanding the relationship between human beings, between the ‘you’ and the ‘I’, to 
                                                
2 Butler, Judith. Giving an Account of Oneself. New York: Fordham University Press: 2005, 100. 
3 Ibid., 8. 
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be an inescapable, constitutive facet of oneself, there is an imperative to recognize the 
other. This recognition lies in confronting and accepting both the singularity and essential 
value of the other, as one would like to be recognized themselves. 
When Butler claims that there is no story of the “I” which is not also a story of a 
relation to social norms, she is referencing the work of French philosopher Michel 
Foucault.4 Foucault, in his extensive writing on various Western institutions, has argued 
that power is productive, dispersed and not associated with a specific source. For 
Foucault, power works “through institutionalized and accustomed discourses that open 
up delimited forms of action, knowledge and being. In this way the exercise of power 
constitutes as it simultaneously controls individual subjects.”5 In her discussion, Butler 
retains Foucault’s notion that normative discourses affect subjects while also manifesting 
through the actions of those subjects. She applies this notion to the question of ethics, 
noting that one is “caught up not only in the sphere of normativity but in the problematic 
of power when I pose the ethical question […]: ‘How ought I to treat you?’”6 
Specifically emphasizing the influence of norms upon the relation between individuals, 
Butler continues on to say “If the ‘I’ and the ‘you’ must first come into being, and if a 
normative frame is necessary for this emergence and encounter, then norms work not 
only to direct my conduct but to condition the possible emergence of an encounter 
between myself and the other.”7 As Butler will address further, this constitutive 
influence of norms upon (and through) individuals is beyond the conscious 
                                                
4 Judith Butler’s previous work, particularly her two predominant works on gender performativity (Bodies 
That Matter: On the Discursive Limits of “Sex.” New York: Routledge, 1993 and Gender Trouble (1999) 
New York: Routledge, 2007), has also drawn on Foucault’s writings. 
5 Brooker, Peter. A Glossary of Cultural Theory. New York: Oxford University Press, 2003, 206. 
6 Giving an Account of Oneself, 25. 
7 Ibid., 25. 
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comprehension of human beings; the operation of social norms contributes to limited 
self-knowledge.   
The social norms Butler discusses here are impersonal. As in the example of 
language, these norms are not authored by the individual utilizing them. Butler, however, 
differentiates between the individual and the set of social norms through which one 
encounters an individual (and is encountered themselves). She notes that Foucault’s 
concept of a ‘regime of truth’ – an historically specific set of criterions determining what 
will be acceptable or visible within the current dominant discourses – may sometimes 
change, or be changed, to accommodate an other who is not recognizable under the 
current regime8; it “will not do, then, to collapse the notion of the other into the sociality 
of norms and claim that the other is implicitly present in the norms by which recognition 
is conferred.”9 Because a challenge to dominant norms may issue from the other, the 
other and social norms are not one and the same. In order to illuminate this limit to the 
generic effect of norms upon the individual, Butler looks to the work of Italian feminist 
philosopher Adriana Caverero. 
In Relating Narratives: Storytelling and Selfhood (2000), Cavarero addresses the 
connection between narration and the construction of the self, arguing for a focus on the 
“you,” as there can be no “I” without a “you” to address.10 In Cavarero’s conception of 
identity, a human being’s singularity and uniqueness lies in the unique story (or 
collection of stories) that an other can tell about them; Oedipus, for example, “does not 
embark on any introspective journey into the interior of his self, but rather comes to 
                                                
8 Ibid., 22-26. 
9 Ibid., 24. 
10 Though this notion underlies the entirety of the book, see Relating Narratives: Storytelling and Selfhood. 
Trans. Kottman, Paul A. New York: Routledge, 2000, pages 81-92, particularly. 
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know his identity from the outside, through the story that others tell him.”11 For 
Cavarero, human beings exist in their appearing to others, in their material exposure in 
the social realm.12 Butler focuses on this notion of exposure particularly, arguing that, 
because each individual exists in their singular exposure, we are ‘unsubstitutable.’13 As 
“no one can be exposed for me,” 14 the generic effect of the social upon the individual is 
limited – we are not the same as the other despite our shared operation under and 
through impersonal social norms. Caverero’s discussion of exposure is also important to 
Butler in another sense: “If there is, then, a part of bodily experience as well – of what is 
indexed by the word exposure – that cannot be narrated but constitutes the bodily 
condition of one’s narrative account of oneself, then exposure constitutes one among 
several vexations in the effort to give a narrative account of oneself.”15 In other words, 
this exposure is an element of the unknowability of the self.  
Butler finds another ‘vexation’ in the attempt to give an account of oneself in the 
developmental history of the individual. Through an examination of the writings of 
French psychoanalyst Jean Laplanche,16 Butler argues that primary impressions form the 
self’s psyche – primary impressions which pre-date the self’s consciousness and which 
are thus unavailable to conscious memory or understanding. In Laplanche’s work, these 
primary impressions are caused by the “overwhelming and enigmatic impressions made 
                                                
11 Cavarero, Adriana. Relating Narratives, 11. 
12 Ibid., 20-21.  
13 Butler is careful to emphasize that, for Cavarero, human beings’ singularity is not linked to a ‘claim of 
authenticity.’ This singular exposure is separate from an individual’s life-story (See Cavarero, 34-35). 
Butler explains, “because [singular exposure] is without content, my singularity has some properties in 
common with yours and so is, to some extent, a substitutable term.” Giving an Account of Oneself, 34.  
14 Giving an Account of Oneself, 33. 
15 Ibid., 39. 
16 Butler is particularly referencing Laplanche from the collection Essays on Otherness, ed. John Fletcher 
(London: Routledge, 1999) and his essay “The Drive and the Object-Source: Its Fate in the Transference,” 
in Jean Laplanche: Seduction, Translation, and the Drives, eds. Fletcher and Stanton.  
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by the adult world in its specificity on the child.”17 The result of this impingement of the 
adult other on the infant is, Butler writes, that “we find ourselves besieged from the start 
by an enigmatic alterity that makes the elaboration of an ‘I’ a persistently difficult 
achievement.” Thus, the possibility of self-knowledge is circumscribed by unknowable 
effect of the other upon the self: “I may try to tell the story of myself, but another story is 
already at work in me, and there is no way to distinguish between the ‘I’ who has 
emerged from this infantile condition and the ‘you’ – the set of ‘you’s’ – who inhabits 
and dispossesses my desire from the outset.”18 The self cannot know itself entirely, and 
thus cannot express itself to others entirely, because one’s ‘self’ was never fully one’s 
own.  
 In summary, Butler claims that no one can know themselves totally because, as 
she writes, 
There is (1) a non-narrativizable exposure that establishes my singularity, and  
there are (2) primary relations, irrecoverable, that form lasting and recurrent 
impressions in the history of my life, and so (3) a history that establishes my 
partial opacity to myself emerges. Lastly, there are (4) norms that facilitate my 
telling about myself that I do not author and that render me substitutable at the 
very moment that I seek to establish the history of my singularity. This last 
dispossession in language is intensified by the fact that I give an account of 
myself to someone, so that the narrative structure of my account is superseded by 
(5) the structure of address in which it takes place.19 
                                                
17 Giving an Account of Oneself, 70. 
18 Ibid., 74. 
19 Ibid., 39. 
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Because self-knowledge is thus circumscribed, so is the ability to describe oneself to 
others or to give a full account of and for one’s actions. It follows, then, that an 
expectation that another person should be able to explain themselves completely is 
untenable; demanding an explanation from another regarding their actions would result in 
a partial fiction, at best. Whereas traditional views of ethics rely on a conception of the 
individual as an autonomous agent who can be judged according to the motivations or 
excuses for their behaviour, and who can ultimately be held responsible for their actions, 
Butler’s assertions of the unknowability of the self trouble this conception of the 
individual. If we cannot hold someone accountable by demanding an explanation of the 
‘why’ behind their actions, does that alleviate responsibility? As stated previously, Butler 
does not believe this is the case. She turns to the work of continental philosopher 
Emmanuel Levinas in order to explain how the concept of responsibility must operate in 
the ethical system she is outlining.20 
 In Levinas’ view, individuals are formed through an originary impingement by 
the other upon themselves. This impingement is a persecution of the self by the other 
because it is unilateral and “because it is unwilled, because we are radically subject to 
another’s action upon us, and because there is no possibility of replacing this 
susceptibility with an act of will or an exercise in freedom.”21 While the understanding of 
a subject as affected by the other has some relation to Laplanche’s conception of the adult 
world’s influence upon the infant, for Levinas subject formation occurs at a primary level 
                                                
20 Butler is particularly referencing the 1968 version of Levinas’ “Substition,” in Basic Philosophical 
Writings, eds. Adriaan T. Peperzak, Simon Critchley, and Robert Bernasconi. Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 1996, Otherwise than Being, or beyond Essence, trans. Alphonso Lingis, The Hague: 
Martinus Nijhoff, 1981, and Difficult Freedom: Essays on Judaism, trans. Sean Hand. Baltimore: The John 
Hopkins University Press, 1990, originally published as Difficile Liberté: Essais sur le judaïsme. Paris: 
Albin Michel, 1976. 
21 Butler, Judith. Giving an Account of Oneself, 88. 
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in which “we are acted upon by others in ways over which we have no say, and that this 
passivity, susceptibility and condition of being impinged upon inaugurate who we are;” 
this impingement is not diachronically limited to childhood but is a condition which “is, 
rather, understood as synchronic and infinitely recurring.”22 For Levinas, it is this 
defining predisposition of humans as ‘subjects being acted upon’ which makes us 
responsible.   
 Our position as beings always subject to the actions of others makes us 
responsible for those actions, according to Levinas. This position of openness to the other 
is a fundamental aspect of humanity, and it is the inescapable quality of this relation to 
the other which places us in a responsible relation to the other. Levinas reverses the idea 
that human can only be held responsible for acts committed of our own free will, and 
instead ties responsibility to human’s lack of freedom, our inability to choose to be free 
of the other. This understanding of responsibility for the other does not mean that we 
must blame ourselves for others’ behaviour towards us, or attempt to find cause in our 
own action for others’ actions. As Butler explains, 
We do not take responsibility for the Other’s acts as if we authored those acts. On 
the contrary, we affirm the unfreedom at the heart of our relations. I cannot 
disavow my relation to the Other, regardless of what the Other does, regardless of 
what I might will. Indeed, responsibility is not a matter of cultivating a will, but of 
making use of an unwilled susceptibility as a resource for becoming responsive to 
the Other.23 
                                                
22 Ibid., 90. 
23 Ibid., 91 (italics in original). 
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For Butler, this ‘resource of unwilled susceptibility’ is of great ethical importance. We 
may not be able to demand an account from the other in order to make them responsible, 
but, in Levinas’ view, they are always already responsible, just as we are. Of course, we 
can only affirm this responsibility ourselves, without speaking for others, and so our 
responsibility lies in how we react to other’s actions towards us: “[r]esponsibility thus 
arises as a demand upon the persecuted.”24 For Butler, this understanding of human 
relationship maintains responsibility while relinquishing the demand for individuals to 
create a narrative25, unifying, and falsified account of themselves – relinquishing the 
expectation that humans perform this ‘ethical violence’ upon themselves.26 
 This ethics that Butler is putting forward asks us to consider the possibility of 
refusing to reciprocate violence or other wounding actions; that, in the limit case of 
whether we should kill in response to murder, we must ultimately consider that perhaps 
self-preservation should not be “the highest goal.”27 In a general sense, the ethical 
approach Butler lays out encourages one to bring to their encounters with the other this 
sense of the fundamental importance of the other to oneself. For Butler, reacting to the 
other’s inability to justify themselves by condemning the other or disavowing their 
humanity is only a futile attempt to deny our inescapable relation to that other.28 Instead, 
we must work to recognize the other in their value as a specific, unique individual – an 
individual as radically open to and dependent upon us as we are upon them.  
                                                
24 Ibid., 20. 
25 While Butler argues that a narrative account of the self must be at least a partial fiction, she 
acknowledges that understanding one’s self narratively is not an entirely negative thing – it satisfies a wish 
for self-knowledge (51) – as long as it does not take the aim of ‘hyper-mastery’ of the self (52).  
26 These ideas are of course related to Butler’s earlier works on gender performativity (Gender Trouble and 
Bodies That Matter) and the belief, discussed in those works, that normative views of gender enforce 
similarly false accounts of the self. 
27 Ibid., 100. 
28 Ibid., 44-46. 
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This thesis will examine the connections between Butler’s claims regarding ethics 
and the films of Chantal Akerman. The following section outlines some of the different 
ways critics have applied ethical rubrics to the study of film. This section also situates 
Butler’s discussion of ethics in relation to other ethical approaches. 
 
Ethics and Film Studies 
 
In the application of ethical questions to film, one approach has been to examine 
the behaviour of characters in narrative realist films under a moral rubric. This 
examination, in turn, enables further investigation of the influence, positive or negative, 
of these characters’ ethical actions upon the spectator. This is the general approach Jane 
Stadler takes in her work Pulling Focus: Intersubjective Experience, Narrative Film, and 
Ethics (2008). Stadler examines a number of films in order to show that film enables 
spectators to engage in ‘thought experiments’ concerning ethical behaviour, enabling 
spectators to analyze moral dilemmas and their own viewpoints toward such quandaries. 
Stadler takes the view that film is a particularly useful tool in examining ethical relations 
because it allows spectators to consider particular instances of human interaction in 
relation to ‘universal’ ethical codes; “narration and moral deliberation both involve 
drawing together the particular and the general, situating specific circumstances within 
the broader context of a life and a culture and considering abstract, general principles 
[…] against the concrete particulars of human lives.”29 Stadler’s work underlines the 
                                                
29 Stadler, Jane. Pulling Focus: Intersubjective Experience, Narrative Film, and Ethics.  New York, NY: 
Continuum, 2008, 26. Much of Stadler’s book works to distinguish film from other narrative mediums; 
taking a phenomenological approach, she claims that film is a particular ethical resource because of its 
affective influence on the spectator. 
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idea that spectators may consider film characters ethically, as they might consider other 
human beings – that a film spectator, despite recognizing a difference between film 
characters and real people, will bring to bear upon a film a similar level of analysis and 
moral interest that they utilize in their day to day lives.     
 Stadler’s consideration of ethics in Pulling Focus departs from Butler’s work. 
Stadler’s approach to ethical consideration of film characters relies on an understanding 
of relations between individuals that Butler explicitly denies. Stadler sums ups the 
relation between ethics and narrative as follows:  
Understanding […] takes root at the points where the viewer is most closely 
connected to the story, where empathic and imaginative activity assist in 
generating ideas and insights. Since ethical understanding (which involves 
understandings of human behavior, aspirations, values, and relationships) 
inescapably involves narrative and narration on some level, and often overly takes 
the form of a story in which we develop an account of motives and mitigating 
circumstances, actions, events, and their consequences, I’ve sought it in the 
strictures of narratives.30 
While Butler would likely agree with Stadler that a description of the self or other takes a 
narrative form, she would disagree that this necessarily partially fictive narrative would 
lead to a productive ‘ethical understanding.’ As Stadler explicitly points out, the kind of 
ethical understanding she is expounding relies on an account of the other’s reasons. 
Butler would not only caution that demanding or creating an account for the other 
inevitably produces a fictional account but further, that, as some individuals have 
diminished access or are less recognizable under the dominant social norms which 
                                                
30 Ibid., 4. 
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support such an account, it is fundamentally unethical to use such an account to 
determine the value of an individual, or whether they are worthy of ‘ethical 
understanding.’ As Akerman’s films resolutely trouble any attempt to ‘develop an 
account’ of the motives of her characters, it is clear that these films are operating in a 
different ethical realm than that which Stadler describes.  
Another ethical approach to the study of film is located in the work of American 
philosopher Stanley Cavell. As part of his larger body of philosophical writing, Cavell 
has published various books and essays on film. In works like The World Viewed (1971) 
and Pursuits of Happiness: The Hollywood Comedies of Remarriage (1981), Cavell 
analyzes film, working from the belief that films ‘do philosophy.’31 Cavell feels that 
films perform philosophy in various ways, but there is one aspect of Cavell’s work which 
is particularly relevant to a consideration of ethics: his belief that films’ narratives, 
particularly the behaviour of characters, present material to spectators with which to think 
about the major philosophical questions of human life. Addressing this aspect of Cavell’s 
beliefs about films and other narrative mediums, Stanley Bates writes that, for Cavell, 
“these structures [of narrative texts] do not provide us with rules, or even examples to 
emulate, but rather with exemplars of wit, courage, cowardice, grace, skepticism, hope, 
success, and failure. They don’t answer our questions about how to live our lives, but 
they do give us means by which we can think about these issues.”32 Cavell approaches 
characters in film as though they were human beings, and thus examines characters’ 
behaviour as evidence of human ethical quandaries and aims. 
                                                
31 For one example among many of Cavell’s notion than films perform philosophy, see Cavell’s Pursuits of 
Happiness: The Hollywood Comedies of Remarriage. Cambridge, MA; London: Harvard University Press, 
1981, 10-11. 
32 Bates, Stanley. “Stanley Cavell and Ethics.” Stanley Cavell. Ed. Richard Eldridge. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2003. 15-47. p. 43. 
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In Pursuits of Happiness, Cavell delineates a set of Classical Hollywood films – 
films he terms the ‘comedies of remarriage’ – which present material with which to 
analyze a philosophical concern of great importance to Cavell’s work. Cavell explains, 
[The comedies of remarriage] may be understood as parables of a phase of the 
development of consciousness at which the struggle is for reciprocity or equality 
of consciousness between a woman and man, a study of the conditions under 
which this fight for recognition (as Hegel puts it) or demand for 
acknowledgement (as I have put it) is a struggle for mutual freedom, especially of 
the views each holds of the other. This gives the films of our genre a utopian cast. 
[…] Showing us our fantasies, they express the inner agenda of a nation that 
conceives Utopian longings and commitments for itself.33 (17-18) 
In the comedies of remarriage, characters that were once married but are now divorced or 
separated come together again a second time. The second time around, they are able to 
acknowledge things about the other that they had not been able to previously, and, 
because of this, they can remarry and find happiness with the other.34 For Cavell, these 
films enact the common human desire for acknowledgement and the ethical necessity of 
bestowing such acknowledgement. 
Cavell’s form of acknowledgement entails understanding and accepting the 
other’s separateness from the self, and seeing that, because the other is not the self, it is 
not knowable as we know ourselves. Such acknowledgement of the other enables the 
                                                
33 Pursuits of Happiness, 17-18. 
34 In Pursuits of Happiness, Cavell discusses many different films that contain variations of this pattern. 
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achievement of ‘personhood’ for the self and the creation of the social, as the individual 
sees that they must act in the world to connect with others.35 In Cavell’s words, 
[T]he existence of others is something of which we are unconscious, a piece of  
knowledge we repress, about which we draw a blank. This does violence to  
others, it separates their bodies from their souls, makes monsters of them; and  
presumably we do it because we feel that others are doing this violence to us. The  
release from this circle of vengeance is something I call acknowledgement. […] 
You have to act to make things happen, night and day; and to act from within the 
world, within your connection with others, forgoing the wish for a place from 
which to view and direct your fate.36 
In his foregrounding of acknowledgement, Cavell is referencing the philosophical 
problem of the ‘existence of other minds.’ This problem of other minds arises from the 
commonly held belief that the minds and inner lives of other individuals are similar to 
our own; however, no philosophical argument can be made to justify this belief.37 As 
such, we can never be sure that the mind and sensations of the other are similar to our 
own. Cavell discusses this problem as part of humans’ desire to withdraw from the social 
world into privateness and narcissism, as the social world is unknowable in its 
separateness from ourselves. Cavell believes that “acknowledgement of otherness [… is] 
the final condition for individual and for social happiness, namely the achieving of one’s 
                                                
35 See Rothman, William and Marian Keane. Reading Cavell’s The World Viewed: A Philosophical 
Perspective on Film. Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 2000, 260.  
36 Pursuits of Happiness, 109. 
37 Alec Hyslop, “Other Minds,” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.  
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/other-minds/ Accessed on Feb 23, 2010. 
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adult self and the creation of the social” 38 and finds the enactment of such 
acknowledgement in the interactions between characters in the films he discusses.  
The form of acknowledgement Cavell sees between the characters in the 
comedies of remarriage is a “reconciliation of a genuine forgiveness; a reconciliation so 
profound as to require the metamorphosis of death and revival, the achievement of a new 
perspective on existence.”39 Cavell’s notion of acknowledgement has commonalities with 
Butler’s concept of ‘recognition,’ in which one realizes the innate value of the other, the 
dependence of the self on the other for reciprocal recognition, and the responsibility of 
the self to the other. There are, however, some important differences between Cavell and 
Butler’s respective understandings of individuals and ethics. Butler argues that there are 
limits to what one can know about the other because there are limits to what the other can 
know about themselves. Cavell does not present the self as fundamentally unknowable; 
likewise, he does not treat the other as unknowable in the sense that one cannot accept 
another’s explanation of their desires, motivations, or thoughts. The problem of the 
existence of other minds is primarily concerned with how we know that the nature of the 
other mind is similar to the nature of our own mind, not whether we can know 
information about how the other feels as expressed through the other’s actions.40 Cavell 
separates knowledge from acknowledgement. In Cavell’s paradigm, we can have 
knowledge of the other and still not be able to acknowledge them.41  
                                                
38 Cavell, Stanley. Pursuits of Happiness, 102. 
39 Ibid., 19. 
40 “There is general agreement among philosophers that the problem of other minds is concerned with the 
fundamental issue of what entitles us to our basic belief that other human beings do have inner lives rather 
than whether we are able in specific cases to be sure what is happening in those inner lives.” Alec Hyslop, 
in “Other Minds,” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/other-minds/ 
Accessed on Feb 23, 2010. In “Section 1: What is the Problem of Other Minds?”  
41 See Cavell, Stanley. The Claim of Reason: Wittgenstein, Skepticism, Morality, and Tragedy. Oxford; 
New York: Clarendon Press; Oxford University Press, 1979. 329-338. Particularly, Cavell writes, “If I say 
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Butler’s conception of the relations between individuals does not encompass the 
problem of other minds; Butler works from the premise that the self is unknowable and, 
because the shape of the other’s mind is fundamentally similar, the other is unknowable 
as well, to both its self and others. To clarify, just as Cavell claims that we can gain 
knowledge of others through their actions and words, Butler does not disparage the aim 
to address others’ self-accounts or to attempt to understand what others want to tell us 
about themselves (such an attempt would likely partially fulfill the other’s desire for 
recognition). She does caution, however, that the moment the desire to comprehend 
another’s self-account becomes a demand for that account an act of ethical violence has 
been performed on that other. Cavell’s work addresses the other’s desire for 
acknowledgement, but not the ethical necessity of relinquishing the demand for account 
of the other as a pre-condition for acknowledgement. Both the unknowability of the self 
and the unethical nature of the demand for an account of the other are integral to 
Akerman’s films, as will be explored throughout this thesis. As such, despite the apparent 
similarities between Cavell and Butler’s respective understanding of human relations, 
Cavell’s approach is, by and large, not applicable to Akerman’s films (Cavell’s 
considerations are somewhat more pertinent to Akerman’s classical narrative films, 
particularly Un divan à new York, and will be addressed in Chapter 2). For this project, 
the importance of Cavell’s work on film is found in his understanding that film characters 
constitute an ethical resource for spectators – film characters can provide means with 
which to think about our day-to-day relations to other people.     
                                                                                                                                            
[…] that the slack of acknowledgement can never be taken up by knowledge, I do not mean to say that the 
imagination can never be fired by information, rather that you cannot always know when the fire will 
strike.” (338) 
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As will be argued throughout this thesis, Akerman’s films not only supply means 
for spectators to contemplate their feelings about the world – the films actually prompt 
spectators to consider specific beliefs about their relationship to that world and the other 
people in it. Akerman’s films point out to the spectator the belief that both self-
knowledge and knowledge of others is limited and, therefore, the presumption that we 
will ever fully know another is false. Further, Akerman’s films illustrate the ways in 
which relating to other people, either by sympathizing with them or caring for them, 
while discarding the expectation that we can know them, can have beneficial results for 
interpersonal relationships. The beliefs Akerman’s films express show similar sentiments 
to those found in Butler’s ethical model. As such, Butler’s approach provides the most 
pertinent ethical framework to bring into conjunction with Akerman’s films, and through 
which to draw out the ethical nature of those films.   
One further point of explanation is required concerning both Butler’s notion of 
ethics and the way I will be discussing Akerman’s films. In Giving an Account of 
Oneself, Butler does not specifically address questions of identity in relation to either 
gender or sexual orientation; this does not mean, however, that she has departed from the 
concerns of her earlier work. As Butler points out, the act of giving an account of oneself 
is inextricably tied up in the various social norms which regulate human discourse and 
which thus dictate the intelligibility of the subject and her account. This area of Butler’s 
argument clearly references her earlier investigations, in Gender Trouble and Bodies That 
Matter particularly42, into both the performative nature of gender and identity and the 
means by which social norms preclude the recognizability of subjects who threaten the 
                                                
42 See Butler, Judith. Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity. (1990) New York, NY: 
Routledge, 1999, and Bodies That Matter: On the Discursive Limits of “Sex.” New York, NY: Routledge, 
1993. 
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accepted binary division of gender or presumed naturalness of heterosexuality. Butler’s 
concern with the representability of subjectivities which could be deemed marginal or 
‘unnatural’ can already be seen to fall in line with Akerman’s concerns as a filmmaker.  
Akerman’s films, as Gwendolyn Audrey Foster points out, are marked by 
“considerations of alterity, sexuality, subjectivity, performativity, mother-daughter 
relationships, Belgianicity, Jewish diasporic identity, female subjectivity, lesbian identity 
and other concomitant issues.”43 The films of Akerman’s that will be discussed here 
include every one of these multifarious aspects of identity. Yet the focus here is to bring 
Butler’s conception of ethics into conjunction with Akerman’s films in order to describe 
what I see as a paradigm that Akerman sets up in her presentation of character; a 
paradigm which works to encourage the spectator to confront and possibly accept the 
‘limits of knowability’ of the human figure. The aim is to outline what this paradigm 
consists of and how it might work. As such, if the focus of this work departs somewhat 
from a consideration of the fact that many of Akerman’s main characters are women, it is 
with the hope not to flatten out or ignore Akerman’s concern with gender.  
Indeed, this thesis views the form of character presentation found in Akerman’s 
cinema as the result of a remarkable dedication to exploring, in film, the representation of 
identity in all its forms. While many of Akerman’s films, particularly her 1970s’ films, 
are indisputably concerned with female subjectivity, the premise of this thesis is that 
Akerman’s form of character presentation is not tied to a specific notion of female 
identity or subjectivity, but instead can be marshaled in the service of a multiplicity of 
                                                
43 “Introduction,” Identity and Memory, 8 
20 
identities, or else the multifariousness of one subjectivity.44 The following section will 
explore the concept of identification in film, providing necessary background for further 
discussion of the form of character presentation Akerman employs in her films. 
 
 Character Identification 
 
 Film spectators may experience their interaction with film characters as a form of 
‘identification.’ The vernacular understanding of the term ‘identification’ connotes, in the 
cinematic context, a spectator’s active conscious consideration of a character and our 
emotional responses to that character. Murray Smith, in Engaging Characters: Fiction, 
Emotion, and the Cinema (1995), explains that the ‘everyday notion of identification’ 
describes a particular experience:  
We watch a film, and find ourselves becoming attached to a particular character 
or characters on the basis of values or qualities roughly congruent with those we 
possess, or those we wish to possess, and experience vicariously the emotional 
experiences of the character: we identify with the character.45  
As Smith himself points out, this informal understanding of identification simplifies a 
number of different complicated processes which occur while watching a film.46 In order 
to clarify these processes, Smith lays out a model in Engaging Characters which 
proposes three ‘levels’ of engagement which may occur between spectators and 
characters. These three levels of engagement between a spectator and character comprise 
                                                
44 This set-up of character is certainly not limited to Akerman, although she presents an exemplary form of 
this structure. Exploration of these aspects in the work of filmmakers like Todd Haynes and Apitchatpong 
Weerasethakul, for example, would no doubt present interesting results.    
45 Engaging Characters: Fiction, Emotion, and the Cinema. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995, 2. 
46 Ibid., 3.  
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a ‘structure of sympathy’ which, Smith argues, accounts for the various responses often 
grouped under the notion of identification. 47 The following exploration of the ‘structure 
of sympathy’ will reveal why Smith’s understanding is relevant to analyzing Chantal 
Akerman’s films. 
In Smith’s model, the first level of character engagement is recognition. Here, 
spectators deem a character to fit with their schema of what constitutes a human agent. In 
Smith’s words, the spectator recognizes the character as “a discrete human body, 
individuated and continuous through time and space.”48 When the spectator recognizes a 
character as a ‘discrete human body’ and as having other markers of human perceptual 
activity and awareness, the character becomes a candidate for sympathetic engagement.49 
The second level of the structure of sympathy is alignment. A spectator is aligned with a 
character if the film is ‘attached’ to that character spatially and temporally. As the 
spectator follows that character through the film’s diegetic time and space, he or she 
receives information about the character’s state of mind, history, goals, etc. Smith 
describes alignment as such, “[t]he term alignment describes the process by which 
spectators are placed in relation to characters in terms of access to their actions, and to 
what they know and feel.”50 In Smith’s model, alignment does not necessarily entail 
‘identification’ with a character, but it is necessary for the level of engagement which 
does entail identification, allegiance.  
                                                
47 Smith utilizes this term in order to avoid the myriad implications of the term ‘identification.’ (2) Smith 
feels that the three levels of engagement, when taken together, may provide a “comprehensive theory of 
‘identification.’” (73) 
48 Ibid., 21. 
49 Ibid., 20-35 and 82-83. 
50 Ibid., 83. 
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The final level of Smith’s model, allegiance, describes the process in which a 
spectator assesses a certain character’s moral stance and, as a result, possibly develops an 
emotional connection to that character. In Smith’s words,  
[t]o become allied with a character, the spectator must evaluate the character as 
representing a morally desirable (or at least preferable) set of traits, in relation to 
other characters within the fiction. On the basis of this evaluation, the spectator 
adopts an attitude of sympathy […] towards the character, and responds 
emotionally in an apposite way to situations in which this character is placed.51 
This level is, according to Smith, the closest in nature to the popular conception of 
identification, “where we talk of ‘identifying with’ both persons and characters on the 
basis of a wide range of factors, such as attitudes and relations to class, nation, age, 
ethnicity, and gender.”52 Smith’s ‘structure of sympathy,’ then, is comprised of three 
levels, recognition, alignment, and allegiance, which work together as interlocking 
structures to create the possibility for emotional sympathy from a spectator to a character. 
Smith’s model of character engagement departs dramatically from the theoretical 
model most closely associated with the notion of ‘identification’ in film studies, the 
psychoanalytic approach. Arising largely from the 1970s work of Christian Metz,53 Jean-
Louis Baudry,54 and Stephen Heath,55 the psychoanalytic conception of film holds that 
identification is central to film spectatorship, and that there are two levels of cinematic 
                                                
51 Ibid., 188. 
52 Ibid., 84. 
53 Metz, Christian. Psychoanalysis and Cinema: The Imaginary Signifier. (1975) Trans. Celia Britton […et 
al]. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1982. 
54 Baudry, Jean-Louis. “Ideological Effects of the Basic Cinematographic Apparatus” (1970) and “The 
Apparatus: Metaphysical Approaches to Ideology” (1975) in Narrative, Apparatus, Ideology. Ed. Rosen, 
Philip. New York: Columbia University Press, 1986, 286-298, 299-318. 
55 Heath, Stephen. “Narrative Space,” and “On Screen, In Frame,” in Heath, Stephen. Questions of Cinema. 
London: Macmillan, 1981, 19-75, 1-18. 
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identification. In the first, the spectator identifies with himself and his own ability to look 
as a “pure act of perception,”56 and, in the act of looking, also identifies his or her look 
with the look of the camera. The spectator’s identification with the camera/projector 
further enables the spectator to identify with the fictional world of the film, both at the 
level of narrative and character. As the spectator experiences a film’s narrative, the film 
draws the spectator in by playing on the spectator’s desire to know, to see how it all turns 
out: “there is the desire for narrative itself as the wish to know.”57 This movement of 
narrative “sets out a becoming”58 for the spectator; the spectator becomes what the film 
wants through the act of identifying with both the movement of the story and the desires 
of the characters in the story.  
The psychoanalytic understanding of cinematic identification rests on the idea that 
the spectator is drawn into a film because the filmic apparatus59 plays on the 
subconscious desires of the spectator. The spectator is conceived as a subject effectively 
created by the operation of the film – a subject who mistakes itself for the transcendental 
“centre of representation”60 of the film. The psychoanalytic approach to film claims that 
cinema “is ideological in that it creates an ideal, transcendental viewing subject […] The 
apparatus ensures ‘the setting up of the “subject” as the active centre and origin of 
                                                
56 Metz, Christian. Psychoanalysis and Cinema: The Imaginary Signifier. (1975) Trans. Celia Britton […et 
al]. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1982, 49. 
57 Cowie, Elizabeth. Representing the Woman: Cinema and Psychoanalysis. Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 1996, 116.  
58 Ibid., 117. 
59 Describing the cinematic ‘apparatus’, Metz explains “[t]he cinematic institution is not just the cinema 
industry […] it is also the mental machinery – another industry – which spectators ‘accustomed to the 
cinema’ have internalized historically and which has adapted them to the consumption of films.” 
Psychoanalysis and Cinema: The Imaginary Signifier (1975) Trans. Celia Britton […et al]. Bloomington: 
Indiana University Press, 1982, 7.  
60 Creed, Barbara. “Film and Psychoanalysis.” The Oxford Guide to Film Studies. Eds. Hill, John and 
Pamela Gibson. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998. 77-90, p. 80. 
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meaning.’”61 This perception of the spectator as constituted solely by the action of a film 
is very different than Smith’s treatment of the spectator. Smith explicitly delineates his 
‘structure of sympathy’ from the psychoanalytic approach:  
The concepts of recognition, alignment, and allegiance denote not just inert 
textual systems, but responses, neither solely in the text nor solely in the 
spectator. This caveat is in part designed to distinguish my model of spectatorial 
engagement from ‘hypodermic’ models, in which the spectator is conceptualized 
as the passive subject of the structuring power of the text.62 
Smith objects to overwhelming power the psychoanalytic approach accords to films. 
Instead, he opines that ‘texts produce or deny the conditions conducive for various levels 
of engagement, rather than […] enforce them.”63 Smith’s model of character engagement 
envisions the film spectator as a conscious, active participant in the act of film spectating; 
from this perspective, film spectators brings their own intelligence and history to bear 
upon a film. 
Akerman’s films similarly treat the spectator as a thinking, intelligent individual. 
As will be explored throughout this thesis, Akerman’s avoidance of reverse shots, and the 
resulting clear division between the space of the fiction and the space of the spectator, is 
a defining aspect of Akerman’s films: Janet Bergstrom writes, in Akerman’s films, “A 
choice has been made, and is continually manifested as we watch her films, not to draw 
the viewer into the psychological depths of dramatic verisimilitude. Instead, there is a 
                                                
61 Ibid., 79. Creed is quoting Jean-Louis Baudry’s “Idealogical Effects of the Basic Cinematographic 
Apparatus,” (1970) in Narrative, Apparatus, Ideology. Ed. Rosen, Philip. New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1986.   
62 Smith, Murray. Engaging Characters: Fiction, Emotion, and the Cinema, 82. 
63 Ibid., 82. 
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split between what is represented and who is doing the representing.”64 Akerman’s choice 
to divide the space of the spectator from the space of the fiction allows the spectator to 
maintain his or her own distinct vantage point on the film – the spectator is not ‘taken in’ 
by the film. The pace and action of Akerman’s films do not overwhelm the spectators’ 
ability to think about what they are watching. However, while this aspect of Akerman’s 
cinema is perhaps most clearly witnessed in the static camera placement, consistent 
medium shots, and lack of reverse shots found prominently in her 1970s films, the notion 
of allowing the subjectivity of her spectator to remain separate from the film is common 
to all of her films. Discussing Un divan à New York (1996), likely Akerman’s most 
classically constructed film, Jerry White writes that there is  
[A]n ambiguity, discontinuity, and alienation effect born of the film’s 
cinematographic style. [… Therefore,] it becomes possible to see how the 
cinematography in A Couch in New York works against closure, stability, and 
viewer passivity. Akerman thus retains space for the subjectivity of the spectator 
even as she co-opts classical Hollywood forms.65  
Akerman’s films treat spectators as separate subjects who bring their own thoughts to the 
films. Because Akerman’s films view the spectator as a thinking, active subject, Smith’s 
model of character engagement provides a useful paradigm with which to analyze the 
ways Akerman presents her characters to the spectator of her films. Smith’s framework 
delineates three different levels of identification, providing a vocabulary with which to 
discuss a spectator’s conscious consideration of and emotional reactions to a character; 
                                                
64 Bergstrom, Janet. “Invented Memories” in Identity and Memory: The Films of Chantal Akerman. 
Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 2003, 94-118, p. 101. 
65 White, Jerry. “Chantal Akerman’s Revisionist Aesthetic.” Women and Experimental Filmmaking. Eds., 
Petrolle, Jean and Virginia Wright Wexman. Urbana: University of Illinois, 2005, 47-68, pp. 63-64. 
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his concept of alignment will prove particularly helpful in examining Akerman’s form of 
character presentation.  
Smith’s analysis of the three levels of character engagement in classical realist 
cinema66 is important to this work in another way: Smith points out that allegiance is 
contingent upon character transparency. He writes that “[a]llegiance depends upon the 
spectator having what she takes to be reliable access to the character’s state of mind, on 
understanding the context of the character’s actions, and having morally evaluated the 
character of the basis of this knowledge.” 67 In other words, in order to judge a character 
as worthy of attachment – as worth feeling for – the spectator must be able analyze the 
thoughts, feelings and desires of a character against that character’s actions. In order for a 
character to be a candidate for allegiance, the spectator must be given access to the inner 
life of a character.  
There are various ways in which this access may be given to a spectator. The two 
most obvious avenues through which a film may dispense this information are dialogue 
and character action. Characters may directly explain their immediate feelings, their 
hopes for the future, or their memories of the past to another character or to the spectator 
through voice-over narration. Likewise, the way characters behave often provides 
information about how they feel about their goals, or else about other characters. Both 
                                                
66 Though Smith does address films which, to different extents, fall outside of the realm of classical cinema, 
his understanding of character is based in classical realist films, and is most generally applicable to those 
films. Robert Stam concisely describes the conventions of classical realist film as utilizing “an etiquette for 
introducing new scenes (a choreographed progression from establishing shot to medium shot to close shot); 
conventional devices for evoking the passage of time (dissolves, iris effects); conventional techniques to 
render imperceptible the transition from shot to shot (the 30 degree rule, position matches, direction 
matches, and inserts to cover-up unavoidable discontinuities); and devices for implying subjectivity 
(interior monologue, eyeline matches, empathetic music).” Film and Theory: An Anthology. Malden, 
Mass.: Blackwell Publishing, 2000, 259. This set of standards will constitute what I refer to as classical 
realist cinema throughout this work.  
67 Engaging Characters, 84. 
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dialogue and action are delivered to the spectator through the auspices of the third 
avenue, performance style. An expressive and emotive performance style utilized by an 
actor can provide much knowledge about that character’s state of mind; as Smith notes, 
“it seems clear that the function of performance has remained constant in classical 
cinema: the revelation of the interior states of the characters.”68 These three aspects of 
classical cinema work with and through the final two to give access to the subjective 
states of film characters. 
A spectator may also gain information about characters from the relationships 
between characters, and the situations in which characters find themselves.69 These 
narrative instances offer the spectator knowledge about characters’ ‘types’ or roles (for 
example, the relations between a mother or a daughter, husband or wife, pursuing lover 
and his or her object of desire, hero and villain, etc.). This knowledge enables the 
spectator to attribute a character with characteristics, motivations, and goals that the 
spectator deems appropriate to the character’s typology (for example, unconditional love 
between mother and daughter, romantic love between lovers, etc.). Finally, a film may 
allow access to a character’s subjective viewpoint through the use of point of view, shot 
reverse-shot structures. By showing a shot of a character looking at something offscreen, 
followed by a shot of the object being looked at, and a final shot showing the initial 
character’s reaction to the observed object, a film gives the spectator not only a chance to 
‘see’ the object from the character’s point of view, but also gives the spectator 
information about how that character feels about the object, as deduced from the 
                                                
68 Ibid., 151. 
69 Describing what is necessary for a spectator to become involved in a film scene – or, in Smith’s 
terminology, aligned with a character(s) – Aumont et al state that “all the audience requires to become 
inscribed within a scene is a structured network of relation, a situation.” Aesthetics of Film. Trans. Neupert, 
Richard. Austin: University of Texas Press, 1992, 223. 
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character’s reaction. These five devices70 – dialogue, character action, performance style, 
character’s situational placement, and POV shot structures – work together to reveal the 
internal world of characters to film spectators. 
It is important to note here that, for every device mentioned above, excluding 
dialogue, information about a character’s internal world is not given directly to the 
spectator. Instead, these devices function to allow the spectator to take his or her own 
interpretation of the character’s behavior – either of the look on the character’s face as 
she witnesses an event, the reason why she performed a certain action, or what it means 
that she is married – as true knowledge about that character’s feelings or beliefs.71 Even if 
a film does not explicate a character’s thoughts or feelings clearly, it must give the 
spectator the opportunity to guess the character’s state of mind so as to entice allegiance 
between spectator and character. Bringing Judith Butler’s understanding of ethics to bear 
here, it seems that the characters of classical realist cinema are under a demand to give an 
account of themselves (or to allow an account to be given on their behalf) – that such an 
account is a necessity for these fictional human beings to become ‘individuals’ we care 
about. The characters in Chantal Akerman’s films diverge sharply from this set-up. 
Smith’s model of character engagement and Butler’s ethical model will provide the 
means with which to outline this divergence. 
 
Akerman, Film, and Ethics 
                                                
70 There are, of course, aspects of classical realist film that contribute further to the construction of 
character’s subjectivity which I am not addressing – for example, Smith discusses the impact of music on 
the possibilities for character allegiance. (151-152) The five aspects listed here are those most relevant to 
Akerman’s filmmaking. 
71 Smith writes that the spectator “uses cultural models and stereotypes to ‘fill out’ the information 
provided by the text [; because far] from being a hermetically closed system, the text relies upon 
assumptions and expectations brought to it by the spectator.” Engaging Characters, 19. 
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Chantal Akerman’s filmmaking style includes a remarkable variety of aesthetics 
and focuses. Concordantly, various theoretical schools and critical approaches to film 
have examined different aspects of her films. A brief outline of Akerman’s filmmaking 
and the critical responses to her films will provide necessary context for exploring 
character treatment in Akerman’s films from the vantage point of ethics. Specifically, this 
outline of Akerman’s work will supply context for Ivone Margulies’ discussion of 
Akerman’s ‘aesthetic of homogeneity,’ a concept which will be central to my analysis of 
Akerman’s presentation of character. 
Akerman’s 1970s films are marked by the insistent use of a static camera, the 
avoidance of POV and shot reverse-shot structures and, as achieved through her use of 
long takes, a dramatic emphasis on duration. As such, Akerman’s early films are 
generally considered avant-garde works, or more specifically, films expressing the 
influence of both North American Structuralist filmmaking and European modernist 
cinema. Ben Singer, for example, argues that what is perhaps Akerman’s best known 
film, Jeanne Dielman, 23 Quai du Commerce, 1080 Bruxelles (1975), is distinct in that it 
expresses features of both the American and European filmic avant-gardes. He writes, 
“like the American avant garde, it makes revelations about the physical and temporal 
basis of the medium, and like the European modernist cinema, it analyzes and 
undermines conventional codes of narrative form and meaning construction.”72 Similarly, 
Ivone Margulies, in her study of Akerman’s work, Nothing Happens: Chantal Akerman’s 
Hyperrealist Everyday, notes that some of the influences on Akerman’s work include 
                                                
72 Ben Singer. “Jeanne Dielman: Cinematic Interrogation and ‘Amplification.’” Millenium Film Journal 22 
(Winter/Spring 1989-1990): 56-75, p. 57. 
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both American Structuralist filmmaking and European modernist filmmaking, 
particularly the work of Andy Warhol, Michael Snow, and Jean-Luc Godard.73  
Akerman’s films La Chambre 1 (1972), La Chambre 2 (1972), Hotel Monterey 
(1972) and News from Home (1977) clearly display a distinctive feature of the 
Structuralist exploration of cinema, an interest in the physical and temporal materiality of 
the cinematic medium. In return, the modernist influences in Akerman’s films come more 
to the fore in Jeanne Dielman, Saute ma ville (1968), Les rendez-vous d’Anna (1978), 
and Je tu il elle (1976). These modernist influences perhaps indicate why another critical 
school deeply invested in Akerman’s work, feminist film criticism, has also claimed these 
latter films, along with News from Home. Much of the feminist discourse on Akerman’s 
work has focused on her subversion of both classical cinema and the representation of the 
female form which has been traditionally presented in that cinema. For example, 
Margulies states that Jeanne Dielman’s importance for feminist criticism lies in the fact 
that the film “is a paradigm of the much-desired alliance of two politics: that of feminism 
and that of anti-illusionism.”74 The predominance of female characters in Akerman’s 
1970s films and the attention these films give to questions of female subjectivity further 
explain the attraction of feminist critics to these films.75 
Many of Akerman’s films have been labeled ‘experimental’ or ‘feminist,’ but 
much critical work on Akerman instead contends that Akerman’s films resist being 
critically categorized at all. Addressing his “inability to firmly categorize” Akerman’s 
                                                
73 For Margulies’ discussion of Snow’s influence, see pages 80-88 of Nothing Happens: Chantal 
Akerman’s Hyperrealist Everyday. For Margulies’ discussion of Warhol’s influence, see pages 36-41; for 
Godard, see pages 19-20 and 54-64. 
74 Nothing Happens, 5. 
75 For an example of this kind of criticism, see Sandy Flitterman-Lewis’ article, “What’s beneath her smile? 
Subjectivity and desire in Germaine Dulac’s The Smiling Madame Beudet and Chantal Akerman’s Jeanne 
Dielman, 23 quai du Commerce, 1080 Bruxelles.” In Identity and Memory: The Films of Chantal Akerman. 
Ed. Foster, Gwendolyn Audrey. Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 2003, 27-40. 
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film D’Est, Michael Tarantino asserts that the emphasis on vision in Akerman’s films 
“renders traditional generic categories [like ‘fictional’ or ‘diaristic’] increasingly tenuous 
as one examines [Akerman’s] oeuvre.”76 Jonathan Rosenbaum, in his analysis of 
Akerman’s film Night and Day (1991), puts forward the notion that Akerman’s films are 
best described in terms of interacting oppositions, rather than static categories. 
Rosenbaum proposes the oppositions of ‘Painterly vs. Narrative,’ ‘France vs. Belgium,’ 
‘being Jewish vs. being French and Belgian,’ and ‘the commercial vs. the 
experimental.’77 The apparent difficulty of pinning down Akerman’s style or series of 
concerns is a common aspect of the critical discussion of Akerman’s work. Akerman’s 
famous resistance to being labeled herself – something which Margulies refers to as 
“Akerman’s resistance to neatly fitting “natural” (female, lesbian) or programmatic 
(feminist) categories” – reflects and extends this quality of her films as unclassifiable.78 
A brief illustration of the directions Akerman’s cinema has taken since the 1970s 
will further underline the difficulties of applying rigid binaries or classifications in an 
analysis of Akerman’s films. While early films like Jeanne Dielman and Je tu il elle are 
minimalist – a fact seen in Akerman’s use of very few sets and little dialogue – her 
fictional films of the 1980s and 90s turn toward forms associated with excess and cliché: 
musicals (Les années 80 [1983], Golden Eighties [a.k.a. Window Shopping, 1985]); 
romance (Toute une nuit [1982]); and comedy (Nuit et jour [1991], divan [1996], J’ai 
faim, j’ai froid [1984]). Akerman has also produced a series of documentaries which 
resemble both travelogue and diary films; these are D’Est (1993), Sud (1999), De l’autre 
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77 Rosenbaum, Jonathan. Movies as Politics. Berkeley; Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1997, 
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côté (2002), and Là-bas (2006). Recently, Akerman has begun to work in the arena of 
visual art, producing installation pieces (D’Est: Bordering on Fiction [1995], Women 
from Antwerp in November [2008]). The combination of Akerman’s typical subject-
matter – Jewishness, domesticity, mother-daughter relationships, the relation between 
history and geography, sexuality, subjectivity – and her varied aesthetic approaches 
produce films which may seem to fall more or less within specific categories, but which 
ultimately resist conventional categorization.  
The blurring of divisions between different cinematic styles in Akerman’s work is 
important to this thesis in one specific way: Akerman’s simultaneous straddling of the 
stylistic territories of both classical realist film and avant-garde film. Margulies discusses 
this aspect of Akerman’s style in Nothing Happens: Chantal Akerman’s Hyperrealist 
Everyday. Here, Margulies argues that although Jean-Luc Godard’s films have greatly 
influenced Akerman’s filmmaking, Akerman is, nonetheless, ‘post-Godardian.’79 
Whereas modernist filmmakers like Godard, Hans-Jurgen Syberberg, Yvonne Rainer, 
Jean-Marie Straub and Danièle Huillet utilize a heterogeneous style which assumes, in 
Margulies’ terminology, a ‘didactic’ stance towards the spectator,80 Margulies illustrates 
how Akerman departs from the didactic stance by employing an ‘aesthetic of 
homogeneity.’ This aesthetic of homogeneity is more in line with the films of Robert 
Bresson, Yasujiro Ozu, and Carl Theodore Dreyer.81 According to Margulies, “Akerman 
insists on simplified forms and singular characters and actors, as well as minimal 
variation in sets and locations. The tools with which she constructs an alternative to the 
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Brechtian/Godardian model are duration, accumulation, sobriety, and sameness.”82 For 
Margulies, Akerman’s aesthetic of homogeneity includes a “refusal to mediate between 
herself and others from within the film”; in other words, Akerman diverges from a 
Godardian aesthetic not only in her avoidance of a ruptured, juxtapositional film style 
but, concordantly, in the non-didactic nature of her films’ address.83  
The non-didactic nature of Akerman’s cinema is relevant to understanding both 
her relation to classical cinematic form and her form of character presentation. While 
Akerman’s 1970s films are certainly not classical Hollywood films, they are not entirely 
dissimilar from those films either. Margulies points out that Akerman’s homogenous 
aesthetic subtly undermines the conventions of classical cinema through their shared 
stylistic techniques:  
[Akerman’s] twisting of narrative takes place through the selection and 
amplification of devices usually associated with conventional Hollywood 
narrative. She hyperbolizes perspective, linear chronology, ellipsis, and the 
naturalistic conventions of having single actors perform single characters. 
Insisting on, indeed amplifying narrative elements, Akerman defines a 
homogenous texture that subverts the codes of cinematic transparency from 
within.84 
Akerman’s cinema is superficially similar to classical cinema; the ways in which she 
actually undermines the conventions of classical cinema vary across Akerman’s different 
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films, but a homogenous, uniform nature remains a consistent element of her films’ 
aesthetic.85 
Margulies’ description of Akerman’s filmic style is essential to discerning the 
function of character in Akerman’s films. Margulies, in aligning Akerman with a post-
Godardian aesthetic sets Akerman’s stylistic approach apart from a Brechtian style.86 A 
Brechtian mode of representation calls for the production of a “critical and self-conscious 
distance – by which art [draws] attention to its own construction, and thus the 
construction of ‘reality’.”87 In terms of character presentation, this distance is produced 
through techniques which both create and continually disrupt identification between a 
spectator and character. By offering characters who are “incoherent, fissured, interrupted, 
multiple, and self-critical,”88 works produced in this mode aim to constantly remind the 
spectator that characters are constructions, and not ‘real’ individuals. Such a description 
cannot be applied to character treatment in Akerman’s films. While Akerman’s characters 
are often ‘odd,’ and, if considered as real people, would likely be deemed unusual 
individuals, they are nonetheless coherent – they are continually recognizable as 
representation of individual human beings. This presentation of character is an effect of 
Akerman’s aesthetic of homogeneity.  
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Akerman’s presentation of character, like her films’ homogenous aesthetic, is not 
identical to that found in classical realist cinema. The fact that Akerman presents 
characters which appear similar to those found in classical realist cinema – in other 
words, they seem ‘realistic’ – but which are not the same as those characters is of key 
importance to the ethical address of her films; Akerman’s characters differ from those 
typically found in classical cinema, because their interior worlds remain opaque. As will 
be explored throughout this work, Akerman employs various stylistic devices in her films 
in order to present characters which, dissimilarly from those of classical realist cinema, 
have interior worlds of thoughts and feelings that are not transparent to the spectator. 
Departing from those classical Hollywood characters described by Smith as candidates 
for emotional identification because of their transparent subjectivities, Akerman’s films 
often closely follow main characters whose desires and feelings are entirely opaque to the 
spectator. The following chapters will outline the different ways in which Akerman 
achieves this presentation of character in her films.  
 
Akerman’s Films: Aspects of the Ethical 
 
In her films, Akerman provides characters which have interior worlds that are 
unknowable and opaque, often to the characters as well as the spectator. This provision 
expresses the idea that there are limits to what can be known of a human being’s internal 
world of emotions and memories. In other words, Akerman’s opaque characters reference 
the ‘limits of knowability’ described by Judith Butler. In Butler’s opinion, accepting the 
limited nature of available knowledge about ourselves and others provides an ethical 
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resource; a resource which may enable human beings to recognize one another without 
the precondition of explaining one’s subjectivity, or ‘giving an account of oneself.’ This 
work argues that Akerman’s films, by presenting characters which seem ‘real’ but are yet 
unknowable, accord the spectator just such a chance to bestow recognition. This 
recognition is an opportunity to both apprehend the ‘limits of knowability’ of the 
characters, as representations of human beings, and to recognize and appreciate the 
singular value of those characters in spite of their limited knowability. This thesis will 
examine the connections between Akerman’s films and Butler’s arguments in order to 
further express the ethical nature of recognition, and how such recognition functions in 
Akerman’s films. 
The first chapter of my thesis, titled “Akerman’s Ethics of Spectatorship: 
Recognizing the Other in Jeanne Dielman, 23 Quai du Commerce, 1080 Bruxelles and 
Les rendez-vous d’Anna,” develops an extensive analysis of these films and their 
respective protagonists, Jeanne Dielman and Anna Silver. The chapter outlines the ways 
in which, in these films, Akerman denies the spectator access to Jeanne and Anna’s 
interior world of thoughts and emotions; Akerman deploys devices in order to impede 
any sort of psychological understanding or interpretation of characters’ motivations or 
feelings. Akerman achieves this using very little dialogue, by developing characters with 
contradictory and confusing desires, by maintaining visual distance from the characters 
through a systematic use of median or long shots and, finally, by having her actors utilize 
a minimalist and inexpressive performance style. At the end of these films, Anna reveals 
strong emotions and Jeanne performs a violent action, confronting the film spectator with 
narrative evidence of the existence of these characters’ thoughts and desires. This 
37 
reminder of the fact that Anna and Jeanne do have interior worlds unsettles the spectator, 
making him or her ponder the impossibility of knowing the other. By presenting Anna 
and Jeanne as dependent on the spectator for recognition, Akerman also gives the 
spectator the opportunity to feel for the characters without knowing exactly what the 
characters feel. Examining these aspects of the films in conjunction with Butler’s work 
will illuminate the ethical nature of Akerman’s address of the spectator.  
Chapter 2, “Demain on déménage, Un divan à New York, and La captive: 
Akerman’s Ethical Hollywood,” investigates the nature of ethical address through the 
analysis three films by Akerman, Demain on déménage, Un divan à New York, and La 
captive. These films employ conventions traditionally associated with illusionist classical 
cinema and, thus, appear to stylistically depart from Akerman’s minimalist 1970s cinema. 
Akerman’s “realistic” films still present opaque, unknowable characters, however, 
through a repetitive use of dialogue, a specific presentation of social norms, and a focus 
on subject matter concerned with questions of how individuals come to know one 
another. The chapter will outline how Akerman, in these films, emphasizes the 
characters’ unknowability to themselves as well as the spectator. These films, in their 
reminder to the spectator that their characters do have interior desires, hopes, and 
thoughts, ask the spectator to recognize the similarity between self and other – that, as 
one hopes for recognition as a valuable, singular human being, so does the other. These 
films provide the spectator the opportunity to recognize their characters as valuable and 
specific; a form of recognition characterized by Butler as ethical. In the process of 
bestowing such recognition, the spectator must abandon the demand to fully know the 
other, a demand which Butler shows to be fundamentally unethical. As will be shown in 
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Chapter 2, Akerman’s divan, Demain, and La Captive provide the means, to varying 
degrees, for this type of ethical relation between spectator and character. 
The concluding chapter, “Akerman and Ethical Cinema” positions the conceptual 
framework adopted in this thesis within the larger critical discussion of ethical 
philosophy and film studies. The chapter also addresses the question of Akerman’s self-
presentation as a character within some of her films through a close reading of Là-bas 
(2006), a film in which Akerman “performs” as an offscreen character, audible through 
voice-over dialogues. In Là-bas, Akerman presents herself in a similar manner to the 
characters in her other films; utilizing cliché and repetition in her dialogue, as well as 
attributing contradictory personality traits to herself, Akerman presents herself to the film 
spectator as unknowable. Through a detailed analysis of Akerman’s self-presentation in 
this film, I examine how Akerman’s presence in her films affects her spectatorial address 
as I have discussed it thus far, as well as the ethical nature of her films.  
Characters in Akerman’s films have interior worlds of thought and feelings that 
are private and unavailable to interpretation. In this respect, Akerman presents characters 
in, paraphrasing Butler, an ethical way, respecting the unknowable and private 
subjectivities of the self. This thesis will demonstrate how Akerman’s creation of 
unknowable characters, by showing the spectator the impossibility of knowing the other, 
enables the film spectator to approach these characters in a similarly ethical manner, 
shedding the demand for the other to explain themselves. 
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Chapter 1: Akerman’s Ethics of Spectatorship: Recognizing the Other in Jeanne 
Dielman, 23 Quai du Commerce, 1080 Bruxelles and Les rendez-vous d’Anna 
 
The characters in Chantal Akerman’s films resist being known. The reasons 
behind their actions, feelings, plans, desires are pieces of information that Akerman 
denies to her spectator. Akerman’s denial of this information intimates that, as human 
beings, our ability to know another is limited, constricted, in some way. This intimation 
aligns Akerman’s films with Judith Butler’s recent claims about ethics, outlined in 
Butler’s work Giving an Account of Oneself (2005). Here, Butler argues that recognizing 
and acknowledging that we can never fully know another human being provides an 
ethical resource; Butler claims that shedding the impossible demand for the other to 
explain themselves to us constitutes an ethical act, and presents new, positive possibilities 
for interactions between self and other. This chapter lays the claim that Akerman’s films 
Jeanne Dielman, 23 Quai du Commerce, 1080 Bruxelles (1975) and Les rendez-vous 
d’Anna (1978)89 address their spectators in a manner which is ethical; an analysis of the 
connections between Akerman’s films and Butler’s writing will draw out the ethical 
nature of these films’ spectatorial address. 
 
The Ethics of Accountability 
 
 In the aforementioned book Giving an Account of Oneself, Butler outlines the 
need for a new conception of ethics, which takes into account the post-structural view of 
human subjectivity as decentered and ungrounded.  Butler delineates her consideration of 
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ethics from the vernacular understanding of prescriptive morality, which relies on an 
assumed relation between personal agency, or freedom, and a resulting capacity to be 
held responsible for one’s actions. Butler points out that to be held responsible is to be 
asked why one has done something, and to be asked that is to be asked to give an account 
of oneself – an account of one’s thoughts, history, desires, and motivations. This view of 
the human subject as an accountable, unified and free agent clashes with the conception 
of the decentered subject as proposed in post-structural theory. Butler argues that giving 
the sort of account demanded by the question ‘why did you do that?’ is, in effect, 
impossible. Surveying recent critical theory and continental philosophy, she gives the 
following reasons for one’s inability to describe one’s subjective, inner world: 
There is (1) a non-narrativizable exposure that establishes my singularity, and  
there are (2) primary relations, irrecoverable, that form lasting and recurrent 
impressions in the history of my life, and so (3) a history that establishes my 
partial opacity to myself emerges. Lastly, there are (4) norms that facilitate my 
telling about myself that I do not author and that render me substitutable at the 
very moment that I seek to establish the history of my singularity. This last 
dispossession in language is intensified by the fact that I give an account of 
myself to someone, so that the narrative structure of my account is superseded by 
(5) the structure of address in which it takes place.90 
Butler asserts that this limited ability to describe oneself is a common, defining aspect of 
humanity. Acknowledging this commonality is, for Butler, an ethical act; such 
acknowledgment lies in discarding the expectation that the other can and should explain 
themselves. 
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 If we recognize that we cannot know and, therefore, cannot explain ourselves 
completely, Butler writes, “we cannot reasonably expect anything different from others in 
return.”91 That we cannot demand an explanation from the other presents a problem for 
responsibility: are individuals not responsible for their actions if they need not elucidate 
the reasons behind their actions? Butler, through a turn to French philosopher Emmanuel 
Levinas, claims that this is not the case. One’s dependence on the other for recognition 
and sociality, and the influence of the other upon oneself from the beginning of one’s life, 
indicates that we are fundamentally tied to the other; the self cannot escape from the 
other. According to Levinas,92 our dependence on the other means that we are responsible 
for that other, regardless of how the other acts towards us. For Butler, the ethical lies in 
both accepting this responsibility towards the other and that, perhaps, self-preservation 
should not be our highest goal93; an ethical understanding sees that we are always-already 
responsible, separate from any question of agency, in our fundamental relation with the 
other: 
[We] are in our skins, given over, in each other’s hands, at each other’s mercy. 
This is a situation we do not choose. It forms the horizon of choice, and it grounds 
our responsibility. In this sense, we are not responsible for it, but it creates the 
conditions under which we assume responsibility. We did not create it, and 
therefore it is what we must heed.94 
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There is no need to demand an explanation from the other to make them responsible, as 
they are already responsible towards us. Ethical action is found in the understanding that 
we can only control our own actions, and we must bear the weight of responsibility 
toward the other.  
For Butler, the ethical acceptance of our relation with the other is manifested in 
the act of ‘bestowing recognition’ on the other. Recognition here constitutes the moment 
in which we understand our need for the other, and the value of that specific unrepeatable 
individual, in spite of our inability to know that other. Akerman’s cinema presents 
opportunities for the spectator to consider these aspects of humanity which Butler 
describes – our inability to fully know ourselves and others, and our dependence on the 
other in our need for recognition – and to possibly perform the ethical act of bestowing 
recognition on unknowable characters. In the two films under discussion here, Jeanne 
Dielman and rendez-vous, Akerman presents the characters of Jeanne Dielman and Anna 
Silver. These are characters that are in every scene of their respective films, and yet their 
motivations and internal workings remain unknown to the spectator. Though Jeanne and 
Anna are constantly onscreen, Akerman emphasizes their strangeness to the spectator 
through the characters’ silence, visual distance from the camera, odd behaviour, and lack 
of interaction with other characters. In the paradigm Akerman presents in these two films, 
the spectator is prevented from knowing or understanding Anna and Jeanne for the 
majority of the film and then, in the final minutes, is confronted with the question of his 
or her feelings towards that character. Akerman achieves this confrontation through the 
presentation of Anna and Jeanne performing extremely unusual acts – acts which imply 
that Anna and Jeanne do have interior worlds of thoughts and feelings – followed by a 
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prolonged period in which Anna and Jeanne, in close-up, sit silently, staring. As will be 
discussed in the next section, this model of character presentation differs greatly from 
classical realist cinema, in which spectators may judge the worth or value of a character, 
delineating the character as a candidate for identification, in the characters’ display of 
feelings, motivations, or goals. In Akerman’s ethical presentation of character the 
question becomes whether the spectator can confront the unknowability of the other, see 
the innate value in that other, and bestow recognition on that individual, or not.    
 
Character and Identification in Classical Realist Film 
 
 Butler’s ethical model places great importance on the interaction between self and 
other; for Butler, the ‘ethical’ lies in the possibility of bestowing recognition on the other 
in spite of that other’s unknowability. Applying this model to film requires a critical 
framework which explains the interaction between spectator and film character. In 
Engaging Characters (1995), Murray Smith outlines just such a framework. Working 
from the perspective of cognitive-anthropology, Smith argues that, in the different ways 
spectators think about and react to characters, there are three levels of ‘character 
engagement.’ These are ‘recognition,’ ‘alignment’ and ‘allegiance.’95  
 Smith’s understanding of the interaction between spectator and character is useful 
to this study of Akerman’s work in different ways: unlike the psychoanalytic conception 
of the spectator, in which the spectator is thought to be subject to the structuring power of 
the text, Smith’s model envisions the spectator to be a thinking, feeling individual, an 
individual who brings their own history and intelligence to bear upon a film. This 
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provides a productive conception of the spectator of Akerman’s films, as Akerman’s 
films work to “[retain] space for the subjectivity of the spectator”96 rather than 
overwhelm or distract the spectator from contemplating the film. Further, a conception of 
the spectator as a thinking, active participant is a necessary component for a discussion of 
ethical film-viewing, as ethical spectatorship requires conscientious and considerate 
spectators. Finally, Smith’s discussion of the nature of allegiance is useful here. Smith, 
by and large addressing characters of classical realist cinema,97 points out that, in this 
cinematic mode, emotional identification with a character is dependent on character 
‘transparency.’ Smith’s concept of allegiance underlines how the spectator requires 
“reliable access to the character’s state of mind” in order to evaluate the character’s 
thoughts, feelings and goals against the character’s action; in this way the spectator 
determines whether the character is worth ‘feeling for.’98 In other words, the subjective 
interior world of a character must be made transparent to the spectator in order for the 
spectator to consider the character as worthy of empathy. Further outlining this notion of 
character transparency will be necessary to fully address Akerman’s approach to 
character. 
    In classical realist cinema,99 the use of dialogue constitutes the predominant 
avenue though which characters are presented as transparent. Characters, in their relation 
                                                
96 White, Jerry. “Chantal Akerman’s Revisionist Aesthetic.” Women and Experimental Filmmaking. Eds., 
Petrolle, Jean and Virginia Wright Wexman. Urbana: University of Illinois, 2005, 47-68, pp. 63-64. 
97 Though Smith does address some films which, to different extents, fall outside of the realm of classical 
cinema, his understanding of character is based in classical realist films, and is most generally applicable to 
those films. 
98 Smith, Murray. Engaging Characters, 84. 
99 Robert Stam concisely describes the conventions of classical realist film as utilizing “an etiquette for 
introducing new scenes (a choreographed progression from establishing shot to medium shot to close shot); 
conventional devices for evoking the passage of time (dissolves, iris effects); conventional techniques to 
render imperceptible the transition from shot to shot (the 30 degree rule, position matches, direction 
matches, and inserts to cover-up unavoidable discontinuities); and devices for implying subjectivity 
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to other characters in the film, often clearly state information about their interiority; these 
statements may take the form of expressing current desires, motivations or goals, or 
describing a history that implies information about their current mental state. While 
provision of such dialogue presents the most direct explication of a character’s interior 
world, the following methods of implying transparent character subjectivity rely on the 
spectator’s interpretation of information concerning the character’s internal state. These 
methods include the use of point of view shot structures and expressive acting styles to 
indicate and express character subjectivity: if a spectator is presented with a shot in which 
two characters embrace, followed by a close-up of another character breaking down into 
tears, the spectator would interpret the crying character as desiring the affections of one 
of the embracing characters, and as heartbroken by the event they are witnessing. If the 
crying character then acts in such a way to gain the affections of the character, the 
spectator would further interpret the crying character’s actions as representative of that 
character’s interior desire. Thus, character action constitutes a fourth avenue through 
which a character’s subjective world may be made transparent to the spectator.  
A final aspect of a transparent presentation of character requires emphasis here. 
This aspect is the way in which information about a character’s subjectivity is expressed 
through their placement in different situations within the diegesis. Discussing the 
spectator’s attraction to character and narrative, Aumont et al state that “all the audience 
requires to become inscribed within a scene is a structured network of relation, a 
situation.”100 This immediate inscription occurs because, in encountering a situation 
                                                                                                                                            
(interior monologue, eyeline matches, empathetic music).” Film and Theory: An Anthology. Malden, 
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100 Aesthetics of Film. Trans. Neupert, Richard. Austin: University of Texas Press, 1992, 223.  
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onscreen, the spectator is confronted with very clear categories or ‘types’ of identity 
which that situation inscribes – mother and daughter, husband and wife, pursuing lover 
and object of desire, hero and villain, etc. These categories of identity allow the spectator 
to attribute the character with characteristics, motivations, and goals which the spectator 
deems appropriate to that type of character. In this conception, the spectator, Smith notes, 
“uses cultural models and stereotypes to ‘fill out’ the information provided by the text [; 
far] from being a hermetically closed system, the text relies upon assumptions and 
expectations brought to it by the spectator.”101 The spectator may be given very little 
diegetic information about a character’s psychological make-up, but the placement of 
characters in categories which reference the spectator’s extra-filmic knowledge can, 
again, allow the spectator to take, uncritically, their own interpretation or understanding 
of the situational position of a character as information about the internal state of that 
character.  
According to Smith’s model of character engagement, this use of dialogue, point 
of view and close-up shots, performance style, character action and situational placement 
is necessary to align and possibly ally a spectator with a character. Returning to Judith 
Butler’s arguments, it is clear that the characters of classical realist cinema are under a 
demand to ‘give an account of themselves’: in Smith’s description, the spectator allies his 
or herself with a character according to the spectator’s analysis of where that character 
fits in the moral universe of the film. Such an analysis and judgment depends on the 
spectator’s access to the subjectivity of that character. This access is required, in effect, to 
judge the value of that character, to assess whether the character is worth the relation of 
allegiance. The spectator’s relation to a character – the way they consider this character 
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consciously after the film or during – is based on an assessment of value according to the 
account that character gives of themselves. An application of Butler’s notion of the 
ethical here reveals the fundamentally unethical nature of such a relation: the value of the 
other, the character, and the spectator’s inescapable relation to the social and that other, is 
denied unless the demand for an account of the other is met. This assessment of the 
relation between character and spectator in classical realist cinema will provide a 
necessary backdrop for the following analysis of Akerman’s cinema.   
The relation between Akerman’s filmmaking and classical realist filmmaking will 
be explored in the next section, yet it is important to address the notion of ‘realistic’ 
character here.  As Smith points out, the spectator must recognize a character as “a 
discrete human body, individuated and continuous through time and space”102 in order for 
the character to become a candidate for sympathetic identification. This recognition of a 
character as a representation of a ‘real’ human being is dependent on conventions of film 
realism. These conventions, which “[evoke] the reconstitution of a fictional world 
characterized by internal coherence, plausible causality, psychological realism, and the 
appearance of a seamless spatial and temporal continuity”103 allow the spectator to treat 
fictional characters as representative of individuals they would encounter in their day to 
day lives. This consideration of film characters as having a representative relation to 
actual human beings returns us to the arena of ethics. If a spectator conceives of their 
contemplation of a film character as in any way similar to their contemplation of actual 
individuals, then a consideration of a film character may be just as ethically charged as an 
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encounter between individuals in the real world.104 The relevance of classical realist 
conventions to Akerman’s filmmaking and an ethical presentation of character will 
become clear in the following section; this section addresses the way in which Akerman’s 
cinema negotiates a distinctive path between the divergent discourses of mainstream and 
avant-garde cinema. 
 
Akerman and the Avant-garde(s) 
  
 Akerman’s films of the 1970s seem in many ways radically different from films 
produced in the classical realist mode. Her insistent use of a static camera, avoidance of 
POV and shot-reverse shot structures and her emphatic use of long takes are particularly 
noticeable departures from classical cinema. Because of this, Akerman’s early work has 
often been critically placed in the category of avant-garde filmmaking. This critical 
placement was often performed by feminist film critics, a critical school which has 
always been particularly invested in Akerman’s work. Her films Je tu il elle (1974), News 
from Home (1976), and rendez-vous have all been discussed under a feminist rubric, but 
it is Jeanne Dielman that has been especially taken up by feminist critics. This has some 
relation to the film’s subject matter – the film presents a female character borne down by 
the social forces and expectations working on her. Carina Yervasi, in her article 
“Dislocating the Domestic in Chantal Akerman’s Jeanne Dielman” writes that “[t]he 
film, thus, is a feminist critique of both women’s everyday experiences of domestic 
                                                
104 See Stadler, Jane. Pulling Focus: Intersubjective Experience, Narrative Film, and Ethics. New York, 
NY: Continuum, 2008. Stadler’s work underlines the idea that film spectators may consider film characters 
in an ethical way, and this consideration may have an impact on the spectators’ everyday lives. 
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oppression and of the systems of representation and of society.”105 Akerman’s almost 
exclusive focus on female characters in her 1970s films emblematizes this critical 
feminist interest in her work.  
Beyond subject matter, the feminist interest in Akerman’s films lay specifically in 
their subversion of classical cinematic forms, most notably her avoidance of reverse 
shots. As Janet Bergstrom notes,  
Jeanne Dielman was seen as a model for a cinema of the future in which film-
makers would embrace women-centred means of expression as well as content. 
One of the aspects of Akerman’s visual style that was most noted was the 
separation she maintained between the visual field occupied by the camera…and 
the field observed by the camera. There is an absence of the conventional 
shot/reverse rhetoric of editing.106  
In her book Women’s Cinema: The Contested Screen, Alison Butler outlines how 
Akerman’s films have been taken up in the critical project of demarking a feminist 
counter-cinema. This is a cinema which, like avant-garde cinema, gains its meaning in 
both its opposition to and negation of dominant cinematic practices.107 In both feminist 
and formalist discourses, then, Akerman’s early work has been discussed in relation to 
the categories of avant-garde and counter-cinematic practices. 
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Recent scholarship on Akerman’s cinema, however, has moved to point out that 
Akerman’s work does not fit so easily into the categories of avant-garde, modernist, or 
counter-cinematic feminist film, but instead challenges the borders of those categories.  
This critical work which places Akerman’s work in a space between the two poles of 
classical film style and counter-cinema, a space in which she utilizes techniques from 
both styles simultaneously, destabilizing those techniques as she does so. In terms of 
Akerman’s allegiance to feminist filmmaking, for example, both Ivone Margulies and 
Veronica Pravadelli argue for the inclusion of multifarious approaches to Akerman’s 
cinema, pointing out that analyzing Akerman’s work through a solely feminist approach 
cannot account for all the aspects of her films.108 Similarly, discussing “Akerman’s place 
in the avant-garde,”109 Jerry White illuminates how the distinct combination of distance 
and emotion that Akerman employs in her films upsets any wholesale appropriation of 
her work by the categories of avant-garde or experimental film. Discussing this question 
in specifically feminist terms, Teresa de Lauretis also notes that Akerman’s early films 
cannot be aligned with the “aesthetic of modernism or the major trends in avant-garde 
cinema” found in the films of Stan Brakhage, Michael Snow, or Jean-Luc Godard, 
because of, among other things, Akerman’s construction of a form of female address.110 
These examples point to the fact that although Akerman’s 1970’s films may appear to be 
radically different from classical realist cinema, and therefore in line with the cinematic 
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avant-garde typified by a filmmaker like Godard, such a clear alignment is not 
forthcoming. 
The necessity of underlining the problematic association of Akerman with 
modernist or avant-garde cinemas lies in the association between those cinematic modes 
and the theories of Bertolt Brecht. In a representational approach informed by Brecht’s 
writings, the goal is the exposure of the processes at work in the presentation of fiction in 
order to make clear the ideologies at work in so-called transparent, realistic 
representations. In terms of character presentation, these goals often take the form of 
manipulating a spectator’s emotional identification with a character, sometimes abruptly 
disrupting that identification, in order to perpetually remind the spectator that he or she is 
watching an actor participating in a fiction, disallowing any confusion of that actor with 
an autonomous, independent person. Discussing this technique as used in the films of 
Godard, Peter Wollen points out that for the spectator, “it is impossible to maintain 
“motivational” coherence when characters themselves are incoherent, fissured, 
interrupted, multiple, and self-critical”111 – in other words, the spectator does not 
conceive of characters presented in a Brechtian format as representations of ‘real’ people.  
Wollen’s description of characters presented in a Brechtian mode clearly diverges 
from the coherent, singular characters of Anna and Jeanne. Unlike Brechtian self-
reflexive characters, these are figures that are assimilable to the narratively and 
psychologically coherent characters of classical cinema, even though they are also, to 
some extent, sharply divergent from those characters. In order to explain further the 
double nature of character presentation in Akerman’s films, it is necessary to look more 
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closely at some of the claims Ivone Margulies makes concerning Akerman’s approach to 
filmmaking. 
In Nothing Happens: Chantal Akerman’s Hyperrealist Everyday (1996), 
Margulies astutely describes Akerman’s filmmaking style as employing an ‘aesthetic of 
homogeneity.’ While acknowledging filmmaker Jean-Luc Godard’s influence on 
Akerman, Margulies ultimately claims that Akerman is post-Godardian112: whereas 
filmmakers like Godard and Yvonne Rainer utilize an ‘aesthetic of heterogeneity,’ which 
foregrounds rupture and Brechtian reflexive strategies, Akerman, in line with filmmaker 
Robert Bresson, “insists on simplified forms and singular characters and actors, as well as 
minimal variations in sets and locations. The tools with which Akerman constructs an 
alternative to the Brechtian/Godardian model are duration, accumulation, sobriety and 
sameness.”113 Margulies’ discussion of the homogenous texture of Akerman’s films here 
illuminates both Akerman’s distance from a Brechtian approach and her relation of 
similitude to classical illusionism. Rather than providing a cinematic form whose 
meaning is constructed in its constant, obvious critique and deconstruction of cinematic 
realism, Jeanne Dielman and rendez-vous’s departures from classical cinema are far more 
subtle; in a cosmetic sense, Akerman’s films share similarities with classical realist 
cinema. In fact, Margulies notes that it is Akerman’s over-compliance with the demands 
of classical cinema which produces the unsettling excess in her films.114 She writes,  
Her twisting of narrative takes place through the selection and amplification of 
devices usually associated with conventional Hollywood narrative. She hyperbolizes 
                                                
112 Nothing Happens. See 54-64 particularly. 
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transgression – with classical cinema’s demand for linearity and for uniformity of texture.” Ibid, 58. 
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perspective, linear chronology, ellipsis, and the naturalistic conventions of having 
single actors perform single characters. Insisting on, indeed amplifying narrative 
elements, Akerman defines a homogenous texture that subverts the codes of 
cinematic transparency from within.115 
As the overall structures of Akerman’s films present a superficial similarity to classical 
realist filmmaking practices, so as well does that contingent element of the overall 
structure, her presentation of character.  
Akerman’s characters are distinct from the Brechtian characters of some modernist, 
counter or avant-garde cinema, sharing an affinity with the individuated, continuous 
characters of realist narrative cinema which populate ‘realistic’ film worlds. But this 
affinity between Akerman’s characters and characters of classical realist cinema is a 
surface level similarity – it is the differences which are of utmost importance to the 
question of ethics in Akerman’s films. Unlike the characters of popular narrative cinema, 
the value and importance of which are determined, for the film and spectator, by the 
characters’ transparency and openness to the spectator’s interpretation, the characters of 
Anna and Jeanne are radically opaque. As will be explored further in the following 
sections, Akerman deploys a number of devices which instead deprive the film spectator 
of any psychological insight into characters’ motivations, feelings or thoughts. Such 
devices include avoidance of any dialogue which would reveal or point to a character’s 
subjective viewpoint, the use of an inexpressive performance style, the lack of subjective 
POV shots, and supplying contradictions and inconsistencies in terms of the characters’ 
narrative or psychological goals and actions (preventing the spectator from categorizing 
the characters). In Jeanne Dielman and rendez-vous, Akerman both utilizes and upsets 
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spectators’ expectations of classical film structure in order to present characters that, 
while still recognizable as representations of ‘real’ people, deny spectators’ expectations 
of transparency. That Akerman, in the final moments of these films, presents the 
spectator with the opportunity to consider the characters as worthy of feeling in spite of 
the characters’ opacity constitutes evidence of the ethical nature of Akerman’s films.  
Much of the ongoing critical discussion of Akerman’s filmmaking has been 
concerned with the nature and representation of identity in Akerman’s films. Analyzing 
Akerman’s representation of identity is important here again, however; a discussion of 
the ways in which Akerman’s presentation of character utilizes the conception of realistic 
characters (characters who meet the conventional criteria of realistic representation and, 
thus, can be seen as analogues of human beings) has been downplayed in favour of 
addressing the way Akerman’s use of the aforementioned techniques subverts the notion 
of realistic character. Akerman creates a certain tension in putting forward characters 
which seem recognizable from the perspective of classical cinema (that is, which follow 
that cinema’s rules of diegetic plausibility) but which yet deny us the subjective access 
we expect from characters which occupy a homogenous, coherent diegesis. It is this 
tension that I wish to illuminate and explore here for the purpose of outlining the ethical 
aspects of Akerman’s character presentation. The following section consists of an 
extensive examination of Jeanne Dielman and rendez-vous. This analysis will lay out the 
various ways in which Akerman presents her characters as opaque, and, finally, the 
potential of this type of character presentation for an ethical understanding of 
identification processes in film. 
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Jeanne and Anna: Presenting the Unknowable 
 
In Jeanne Dielman, the spectator witnesses three days in the life of Jeanne, a 
widowed Belgian housewife. Jeanne keeps house and performs domestic duties within a 
ruthless, self-imposed routine which accounts for every minute of her day. In the 
afternoon, while her teenage son Sylvain is at school, she works as a prostitute in order to 
support herself and her son. During the afternoon of the second day, Jeanne’s order starts 
to break down; she begins to make mistakes, burning her potatoes, leaving lights on in 
unoccupied rooms, and mis-buttoning her clothing. This unraveling culminates on the 
third day, when the spectator witnesses Jeanne having sex with a male client (the first 
time the film has shown us this act) and she appears to experience an orgasm.116 
Afterwards, Jeanne picks up a pair of scissors and stabs the male client to death. In the 
final scene, Jeanne sits at her dining room table, immobile, for many minutes, staring.    
 The main character in rendez-vous is Anna Silver, a film director traveling across 
Europe with her most recent film. Anna travels from Cologne to Brussels to Paris by 
train, staying in various hotels. As she travels, she meets with five other characters: 
Heinriech, a German teacher; Ida, an old friend of Anna’s family; a man on the train, who 
has traveled the world; her mother; and Daniel, her boyfriend. These characters, 
particularly the first three, speak at length about various things, and Anna listens quietly. 
This state of affairs changes during the last two visits, however, as Anna becomes more 
expressive. Anna finally returns to her own apartment and, at the end of the film, listens 
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to the numerous messages left on her answering machine. One of the messages belongs to 
an Italian woman with whom Anna has had a brief affair, and whom Anna has been 
trying unsuccessfully to contact over the course of the film.  
During the first two-thirds of Jeanne Dielman and rendez-vous, Anna and Jeanne 
are similarly presented as opaque and inscrutable characters. Reviewing rendez-vous, 
Marsha Kinder writes,  
Conventional dramatic features have trained us to expect to meet protagonists 
early in the narrative and immediately love them, partly by identifying them with 
ourselves or other loved ones from our personal past. This means that we really 
don’t have to get to know the protagonists, for we can project qualities onto a 
two-dimensional figure in conventional situations and feel that we’ve known her 
for ages! But in this film we are forced to get to know Anna in an unusual way – 
partly because she is onscreen alone so much of the time…and partly because her 
qualities are revealed very gradually.117 
As Kinder aptly conveys, Akerman denies the spectator any easy identification with 
Anna. Instead, the film spectator ‘get[s] to know Anna in an unusual way.’ This unusual 
access to Akerman’s characters results from a spatial and temporal alignment which 
simultaneously disallows the spectator any diegetic information concerning Anna or 
Jeanne’s interior worlds. Akerman creates this alignment through the use of various 
devices. This section will outline and describe these devices individually in their relation 
to Anna and Jeanne.  
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The first and the most pervasive strategy of character presentation in Akerman’s 
films has to do with camera distance and movement. In her films, Akerman generally 
places her camera at a distance and avoids subjective point of view shots, close-ups, or 
shot reverse-shot structures. This filmmaking style avoids, as Ben Singer suggests, any 
inflection of the surface of the film’s world with meaning.118 In rendez-vous, Akerman 
does move the camera into the diegetic space in the final third of the film (the 
implications of which will be discussed in the following section), but otherwise Akerman 
is rigorous in maintaining a distanced view on the fictional space of her films. The 
spectators’ enforced distance from characters denies them any possibility of using Anna 
or Jeanne’s facial expressions or body language to produce meaning (in this case, to 
‘understand’ these characters’ state-of-mind). Akerman’s camera usage is the first of the 
many devices she employs in order to present opaque characters. 
 Another strategy of character presentation found in rendez-vous and Jeanne 
Dielman is the narrative foregrounding of scenes in which Anna and Jeanne are alone. In 
classical cinema, a character’s interactions with other characters may diegetically provide 
information to the spectator about the character’s feelings about the interaction, either 
through dialogue or performance. However, as Kinder points out, in rendez-vous Anna 
spends much of her time alone. This is even truer of Jeanne, as she rarely leaves her 
house. That Akerman privileges the moments in which the women do not interact with 
others undermines the spectator’s ability to quickly ‘read’ Anna or Jeanne’s place in the 
film’s world and glean information from that categorization. Akerman emphasizes Anna 
and Jeanne’s isolation by eliding moments when the plot would call for Anna and Jeanne 
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to interact with other characters. In Jeanne Dielman, this elision is most explicit in the 
absent bedroom scenes with Jeanne’s male clients. In rendez-vous, Akerman denies the 
spectator access to any instances of Anna ‘at work;’ we never see Anna in a movie 
theatre as she presents her films. As such, we cannot gather any information about what 
‘kind’ of director Anna is, among other things. Akerman’s insistence on presenting her 
characters in solitary situations disallows the spectator the ability to identify Anna or 
Jeanne with either the spectator’s self, other individuals, or other sorts of individuals they 
may have encountered elsewhere. 
 Anna and Jeanne do, however, come into contact with other characters over the 
course of the films’ narratives. Anna spends time with five different characters whom she 
encounters, and Jeanne spends her evenings with her son, interacts with shopkeepers, and 
babysits the infant child of a female neighbor. Anna and Jeanne’s meetings with other 
characters hint to another device Akerman employs in her approach to character 
presentation. This device is the attribution of contradictory personality characteristics to 
Anna and Jeanne. In her analysis of rendez-vous, Angela Stukator argues that Akerman’s 
film works against the ‘logic of identity:’ “a logic which dictates that the critic emphasize 
elements (textual or extra-textual) of coherence, unity and wholeness.”119 Stukator points 
out that one avenue which upsets this logic is the promotion of “internal differences, 
contradictions and tensions which could potentially blur the boundaries of a category.”120 
Akerman employs such tensions and contradictions to prevent either Anna or Jeanne 
from being placed in any category which might enable a spectator to ‘fill in’ information 
concerning the subjective interior world of that character. 
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 There are numerous aspects of the character of Anna which make it difficult for 
the film spectator to categorize her. In part, Anna’s resistance to categorization is the 
result of Akerman’s distanced camera: while watching the film, it is difficult for the 
spectator to gain a sense of Anna’s identity through physical or cultural connotations. 
Anna seems graceful in one scene and frumpy and awkward in the next. As such, 
Akerman discourages any attempt to attach even basic categories of physical appearance 
– such as ‘beautiful’ or ‘plain’ – to Anna early in the film. Another difficulty the film 
spectator encounters in identifying Anna is the character’s constant travelling. Anna’s 
peregrination preempts any attempt to label her as having a specific national identity. Her 
persistent travelling further denies the spectator the sight of Anna in any sort of inhabited 
space; as such, we receive none of the information about Anna’s habits or preferences 
that her traces on a lived-in space might otherwise reveal to us. 
Akerman’s presentation of Anna’s desire also contributes to the difficulty of 
categorizing Anna. Anna’s interactions with other characters do provide evidence of her 
desires, which could be taken as an expression of Anna’s interiority. Instead of clearly 
illuminating the character’s interior state, Anna’s contradictory actions again only 
problematize any undertaking to place Anna in a simplistic category of identity. This is 
particularly clear in Anna’s expression of sexual desires, which involves various sexual 
preferences, as well as tentative or confused sexual drives. Early in the film, Anna 
actively engages in an affair with Heinrich, inviting him back to her hotel room. Minutes 
later, she just as actively ends the affair, citing the fact that “we don’t love each other,” as 
though this information has more bearing on the situation now than it had when Anna 
invited Heinrich home. Anna’s mother’s friend Ida, upon meeting Anna, complains of 
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Anna twice breaking an engagement with Ida’s son; clearly Anna’s desire is oscillating 
and transitory in nature.  
Any understanding of Anna’s desire is further complicated when, later on, Anna 
meets her mother. As they lie together in a hotel bedroom, Anna recounts her affair with 
an Italian woman, adding that, ‘for some reason,’ she thought of her mother during the 
encounter. Anna’s comment, implicitly hinting at incestuous fantasies, serves the purpose 
of problematizing the reading of these characters as traditional figures of ‘mother’ and 
‘daughter.’ Anna’s ephemeral and contradictory desires again prevent any easy 
categorization of Anna, disallowing the spectator the means to ‘understand’ Anna or 
predict her behaviour. This is underscored in Anna’s final meeting with Daniel. Anna’s 
involvement with this man, who is presumably her boyfriend, appears to the spectator as 
rather inexplicable. A petulant man who demands attention from Anna while 
simultaneously rejecting her, Anna’s choice to spend time with Daniel is confusing to the 
film spectator, at best. It is also difficult to think of Anna as someone who wishes to 
remain single and unattached – for instance, her remarks to the hotel clerk that she would 
have named her daughters Judith and Rebecca, if it had been the right time to have them, 
suggests that Anna would not be completely opposed to having a family or domestic life.   
In Jeanne Dielman, Akerman assigns Jeanne blurred and contradictory aspects of 
identity in a manner which differs from her presentation of Anna. This difference is most 
obvious in the fact that Akerman never gives the spectator any indication that Jeanne 
harbours desire for or attraction to any other character in the film. But just as Anna’s 
desires only further deny the spectator an understanding of her interiority, Jeanne’s 
relation to the space she inhabits produces a similar effect. 
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Unlike Anna, Jeanne spends the majority of her time in a domestic space. In the 
first half of the film, the spectator might likely surmise that, from Jeanne’s imposition of 
a strict order on that apartment, Jeanne has a compulsive personality. However, as the 
film continues, this easy understanding of Jeanne is undone. As Judith Mayne notes, there 
is a quality of narration in the film separate from Jeanne’s behaviour, and this often takes 
the form of the film’s representation of the rest of the apartment;121 Jayne Loader writes 
that “the apartment seems to have a life of its own, to have needs and demands which 
manipulate Jeanne.”122 As it becomes evident to the spectator that Jeanne’s routine is 
slowly breaking down, our assessment of Jeanne’s personality fails us. Jeanne cannot 
perform her routine perfectly anymore. Is this because of some external force, some drift 
of the apartment towards disorder, which Jeanne has been fighting against? The film 
never gives a specific reason for the disintegration of Jeanne’s order, leaving the 
spectator to wonder. Akerman’s refusal to provide clear reasons for the breakdown of 
Jeanne’s routine only underlines the audience’s complete lack of access to Jeanne’s 
subjective viewpoint. Any understanding that a spectator may have attributed to Jeanne 
based on an early assessment of her relation to the space around her – that she is 
‘compulsive,’ for example – is disrupted by the revelation that we have no easy 
understanding of why Jeanne’s routine breaks down. There are also other aspects of 
Jeanne’s personality that indicate ‘internal differences, contradictions and tensions,’ thus 
keeping Jeanne resistant to any attribution of a subjectivity characteristic of a certain 
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category, and these aspects inform the next two techniques that Akerman employs in the 
service of safeguarding the opacity of her characters.  
 Referencing the aforementioned reliance of classical realist cinema on dialogue as 
a tool to reveal character subjectivity, Stukator notes that another way in which a 
filmmaker may work against the logic of identity is by avoiding dialogue altogether: 
While the questions [of identity] are raised primarily through stylistic and formal 
strategies, it is crucial to note that they may also emerge in elements such as 
gestures, silences, or pauses. These elements constitute a challenge to the 
representational norm inasmuch as they have remained unrepresented within the 
legitimized and available circuit of images and sounds.123 
Anna and Jeanne’s silence presents a direct refutation to the expectation that, as the main 
character in a film, they will make their inner feelings available to the spectator. This is 
particularly evident in the scenes where Anna and Jeanne remain silent in the presence of 
others. When Anna listens silently as others speak, or else when Jeanne sits silently in the 
company of her son, the spectator is deprived of knowing what either character feels 
about the situation they are in, and if they feel anything at all. In Jeanne’s case 
particularly, Akerman’s presentation of Jeanne as largely silent in the company of her son 
upends stereotypical notions of family and domesticity (as spaces of openness or safety 
and security), pointing out the possibly isolating and repressive effects of such structures. 
Anna and Jeanne’s silence contributes to these characters’ opacity. Akerman, 
however, also utilizes dialogue to serve the same function. Anna and Jeanne are not silent 
for the length of their respective films – Anna speaks to a hotel clerk early in the film and 
more and more in the last two meetings, and Jeanne speaks at length to a store clerk in 
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the latter half of Jeanne Dielman. At the most basic level, these examples again prevent 
the spectator from identifying Jeanne or Anna simply as ‘quiet people,’ but Akerman’s 
work is more complex than that. As Margulies discusses,124 the instances in which Anna 
speaks to the hotel clerk and Jeanne to the store clerk indicate an excess of information 
and a seeming lack of social awareness and propriety; these instances are “easily read as 
signs of some psychological disability.”125 As Akerman’s use of both silence and 
dialogue prevent any easy identification with Anna or Jeanne as ‘listeners’ or ‘observers,’ 
we cannot attach our own understanding of those categories to Anna or Jeanne’s 
subjectivity.  
 In classical cinema expressive acting style provides another fundamental aspect of 
alignment, in which a spectator may read the ‘internal’ emotions of a character through 
information the actor reveals physically. In terms of performance style, Akerman’s 1970s 
films depart radically from classical realist cinema. In Jeanne Dielman, Delphine Seyrig, 
as Jeanne, does not use (for the majority of the film) any gestural or facial expression 
which might indicate or depict her mental state – the exception being the orgasm Jeanne 
(possibly) experiences with the third male client, in which Jeanne’s reaction cannot be 
definitively understood as either pleasure or pain.126 Aurore Clément performs Anna as 
inscrutable for the first two-thirds of the film; her face is consistently blank, 
expressionless. Meg Morley remarks that “Aurore Clément has chosen a certain 
retreating camera presence;” as well, “a certain awkwardness in the acting is allowed to 
appear – Aurore Clément looks unused to the high heels she is wearing, she speaks 
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woodenly at first, her face is quite blank.”127 Anna and Jeanne’s blank faces, and the 
restriction of their gestures to activities with an obvious diegetic function in the film, 
clearly deny the spectator any moments of insight into Anna or Jeanne’s subjective 
viewpoint. The performance style Clément and Seyrig employ maintains the opacity of 
the two characters against any inferential attribution of subjectivity. 
That Anna and Jeanne do not articulate identifiable emotions on either their face 
or through their bodies is again emphasized and supported by the distance of Akerman’s 
camera from Anna and Jeanne. The visual track of these films, however, does not 
comprise the entirety of the characters’ inexpressiveness: the flat, monotone way in 
which Anna and Jeanne speak also voids their few comments of any emotional inflection. 
In Jeanne’s case particularly, the flat nature of her speech destabilizes the referential 
quality of her dialogue, adding again to the contradictory nature of Jeanne’s character. 128 
During dinner on the first night, as Sylvain discusses his goal of being able to speak 
Dutch without a French accent, Jeanne replies, “no one forced you to go to a Flemish 
school.” Any notion that Jeanne has a preference concerning Sylvain’s schooling is 
removed from this statement, however, by the absolutely flat tone in which Seyrig 
delivers the line, leaving the spectator to wonder why Jeanne made the remark at all. In a 
similar vein to Anna’s expressions of desire, Jeanne’s seeming preference cannot so 
easily be linked to the expression of an identifiable, internal state of mind, and hence 
does not provide the material basis for an identification with Jeanne.      
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Delphine Seyrig and Aurore Clément perform the characters of Anna and Jeanne 
in such a way as to deny the spectator any access to their subjective state of mind. And 
yet, the characters do not lose or fully depart from their function as analogues of human 
beings. In her discussion of the performance style of the actors in Akerman’s 1970’s 
films, Laleen Jayamanne applies the terminology of ‘matrixed’ acting (fully integrated, 
illusionist melding of actor and character) vs. ‘non-matrixed’ acting (Brechtian, with the 
aim of disallowing any fusion between actor and character) to Seyrig’s performance, and 
concludes that “Seyrig constructs the character of Jeanne Dielman in a mode of 
performing which is close to the non-matrixed end of the continuum, though it cannot be 
reduced to non-matrixed acting because we do perceive Seyrig as Jeanne Dielman; she is 
matrixed.”129 Jayamanne is particularly discussing Jeanne here, but she further notes that 
there are shared aspects and a ‘continuity’ between Seyrig’s performance and Aurore 
Clément’s performance as Anna.130 Jayamanne’s distinction is an important one: the 
inexpressive performances of Clément and Seyrig do undermine the total, illusory fusion 
of character and actor a spectator would find in classical cinema, but this destabilization 
does not erase or destroy our understanding of Anna or Jeanne as characters/analogues of 
human beings. Jeanne and Anna may be excessively inexpressive, but they do not 
disintegrate into ‘the actresses Aurore Clément and Delphine Seyrig’ playing ‘Anna’ and 
‘Jeanne’ – they remain Jeanne and Anna, unassailable in their opacity.  
 The characters of Anna Silver and Jeanne Dielman are not aligned, or allied, with 
the spectator in the sense Murray Smith describes, that is, as an identification between 
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spectators and characters in classical narrative cinema. Akerman categorically troubles 
any avenue by which spectators could assess the internal state of mind of a character and 
then use that information to ally themselves with that character. According to Smith, 
identification or engagement with characters ranges from brief, even momentary 
alignments to possible allegiance. Allegiance occurs if a spectator develops a particular 
preference for, or attraction to, a character, of which he or she may be more of less aware. 
Before exploring the function of allegiance in terms of the ethical address of Akerman’s 
early films, an examination of one more aspect of identification and character 
presentation – that of narrative identification – is in order.  
Psychoanalytic approaches to film claim that identification with characters is only 
one aspect of the pleasurable nature of identification in classical cinema.131 Another 
aspect, relevant here, is the notion that the spectator may identify with the narrative 
movement of the film: with the position of ‘coming to know’ how the story ends, with the 
pleasure of seeing the narrative return to its originary stasis.132 This point is germane to 
Akerman’s films because Jeanne Dielman and rendez-vous are narrative films, albeit 
with narratives which are far less dramatic and overt than those found in classical cinema. 
Akerman’s use of narrative again reflects the permeable border between Akerman’s films 
and the conventions of classical realist film. As Ben Singer writes, “[Jeanne Dielman] is 
an unusual example of a film depicting a fictional, chronological, coherent, single 
diegesis – the staple of conventional cinema – that nevertheless manages to exploit its 
narrative as a reflexive element.”133 Both of these films present narrative action with 
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which the spectator may identify (Anna’s journey towards her home and the slow 
disintegration of Jeanne’s domestic routine, among other things), but this does not 
alleviate the tension of the opacity of Anna and Jeanne. Rather, the narratives exacerbate 
it. These films are completely tied to Anna and Jeanne: their narratives may serve to 
allow the identification which has been denied in terms of character – keeping the 
spectator from disengaging from the films completely – but they do not present any major 
distractions from the fact that the spectator only spends time with Anna and Jeanne, and 




 Akerman’s presentation of the characters of Anna and Jeanne as described so far 
does not remain entirely opaque for the length of these films. The spectator’s relationship 
to Anna and Jeanne is altered during the final third of rendez-vous – when Anna spends 
the night with her mother and then Daniel – and the final minutes of Jeanne Dielman, 
when Jeanne quietly and methodically stabs her final male client to death. Prior to these 
events, it may have seemed reasonable to conclude that the characters of Anna and 
Jeanne had no subjectivity or interiority at all, that Akerman was presenting merely the 
surface of characters. However, as will be explored in greater detail, the actions of the 
characters at the end of these films confront the spectator with the fact that Anna and 
Jeanne, in correspondence with the human beings they represent, do have an interior 
world, an impenetrable world of desires, motivations, and emotions. Patrick Kinsmen 
reflects this realization in his discussion of Jeanne Dielman: “the film’s most fictive 
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moment (the murder, which is obviously not “real” but which is still registered in the 
same minimalist camera style) both breaks the naturalist “spell” of the film’s first three 
hours and seems desperately to need interiority so as to become comprehensible.”134 
While spectators may, if they so choose, ignore or de-emphasize Akerman’s denial of 
access to Anna and Jeanne’s subjective viewpoints for the majority of these films, the 
inaccessibility of these characters’ interior worlds becomes unavoidably central in the 
latter parts of Jeanne Dielman and rendez-vous. This is because these films’ final 
moments confront spectators with the knowledge that they have no recourse to the 
characters’ interior worlds in order to understand or judge those characters and their 
actions.  
As will be explored in the following sections, Akerman’s confrontation of the 
spectator with Jeanne and Anna’s unexplainable actions at the end of these films points to 
Judith Butler’s discussion of ethics. Up until this point in the films, Akerman’s characters 
have, unlike the transparent characters of classical cinema, refused the spectator’s 
demand to give an account of themselves. It is these final moments of Jeanne Dielman 
and rendez-vous which make the spectator aware of the fact that he or she is making that 
demand in the first place, and which also put the spectator in a position to examine what 
might happen when that demand will not or cannot be answered. Jeanne Dielman and 
rendez-vous’s endings point at a crucial issue: the ethical imperative implicit in the film 
spectator’s efforts to understand character’s psychology. The hermeneutic “need” to 
make sense of a character’s behavior or actions is, ultimately, an ethical demand that the 
film spectator makes to characters as “Others.” By denying access to such understanding, 
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Akerman puts the film spectator in a position equivalent to what Butler describes as the 
breakdown of ethical relations. Butler writes, 
[T]he question of ethics emerges precisely at the limits of our schemes of 
intelligibility, the site where we ask ourselves what it might mean to continue in a 
dialogue where no common ground can be assumed, where one is, as it were, at 
the limits of what one knows yet still under the demand to offer and receive 
acknowledgement: to someone else who is there to be addressed and whose 
address is there to be received.135 
This ‘site where we ask ourselves’ is what Akerman lays out in the final moments of her 
films – moments in which Jeanne sits at her dining room table for seven minutes after 
killing a man and Anna sings a song. 
 
 Jeanne Dielman: The Unknowable Character 
 
 In her article “What’s beneath her smile? Subjectivity and desire in Germaine 
Dulac’s The Smiling Madame Beudet and Chantal Akerman’s Jeanne Dielman, 23 Quai 
du Commerce, 1080 Bruxelles,” Sandy Flitterman-Lewis analyzes Akerman’s films from 
a perspective very similar to what has been under discussion here. Discussing Akerman’s 
withholding of information about Jeanne’s subjectivity, Flitterman-Lewis argues that 
spectators must construct Jeanne’s ‘mental universe’ from their own guesses concerning 
Jeanne’s state of mind; that Akerman’s long takes recording Jeanne’s actions “invite the 
viewer’s speculation about Jeanne’s thoughts – she has to be thinking something – as she 
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accomplishes each task.”136 Flitterman-Lewis notes that, as the film reaches its apex, this 
process becomes more central: 
This character, who is only seen in surfaces, suddenly gains incredible depth by 
virtue of the viewer’s attributions. We imagine “what she’s thinking”, put 
ourselves inside her head […] and no response is posed [….] A depth of 
experience and feeling is attributed to this character whose interiority the film had 
worked so hard to deny.137 
Flitterman-Lewis’ assessment of the spectator’s drive to guess at what could be going 
through Jeanne’s mind is accurate and useful here; however, for the purpose at hand, it is 
necessary to emphasize one aspect of Flitterman-Lewis’ account in particular – the fact 
that ‘no response is posed’ to the spectator’s guesses. The radicalism of this moment of 
Jeanne Dielman lies not in its encouragement of the spectator’s guesses, but in the way 
this scene completely denies any attempt to uncritically attach those guesses to Jeanne’s 
subjectivity as a ‘true’ understanding of her interior world. When Jeanne stabs her client, 
there is nothing we can attribute to Jeanne as a certain reason for that action and, as such, 
we are left to decide how we feel about Jeanne without that certainty. The spectator has 
no recourse to Jeanne’s desires, wishes, or feelings to mediate her horrific action; we 
cannot examine Jeanne’s reasons in order to judge or mitigate her behaviour.  
 Akerman’s emphasis on this ambivalent moment becomes very clear in the last 
seven minutes of Jeanne Dielman, when the spectator ‘sits’ with Jeanne. During one long 
take, Akerman places the spectator in a position in which they sit, face-to-face with 
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Jeanne, as Jeanne sits at her dining room table in the dark, unmoving. Jeanne is a woman 
with whom the spectator has become familiar and in whose company the spectator has 
spent the last three hours, and yet there is no question for the spectator to ask but the one 
which could possibly receive an answer: how do I, the spectator, feel about this woman? 
Am I worried for her? Am I repelled by her? If I have been thinking of this character as a 
person up until this point, as an analogue for a human person like myself, can I continue 
to think of her that way? (or, is she now no longer human?) Jeanne’s recent actions have 
made evident the presence of her interior world and thus reminded the spectator that 
Jeanne can feel everything that the spectator can feel; as Jeanne sits at the table, her need 
for recognition – for acknowledgement of her specificity and value as a unique human 
being, dependent on us for such acknowledgement as we are dependent on her – weighs 
on the spectator. Jeanne, sitting at the table, makes, in Butler’s phrasing, a demand on the 
spectator to offer recognition; Jeanne is there to be addressed, just as she addresses the 
spectator. 
The desire to turn away from such a confrontation is clearly evident in some of 
the critical discussion of the film, in the desire to take this part of the film as fiction, to 
separate the Jeanne who kills from the Jeanne who cooks and cleans and who could be a 
real person; Jayne Loader’s reaction to Jeanne Dielman emblematizes such a desire.138 
By decrying the fictionality of the film’s ending, condemning its violence, and 
denouncing Jeanne in a number of ways – notably as a monstrous ‘castrating mother’139 – 
Loader presents the indignation of a spectator who turns away from Jeanne in the end, 
denying any relation of affinity between herself and Jeanne. 
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 Conversely, in the fact that Akerman presents the murder of Jeanne’s client in the 
same filmic style as the rest of Jeanne’s ‘realistic’ behaviour, there is the option (which 
Flitterman-Lewis clearly takes) to consider what it might mean if we take Jeanne at the 
end of the film as we have taken her up until that point – as representing a person, and, as 
such, as having a relation of similarity to the spectator’s self. To continue to think of 
Jeanne this way would produce a dissonance between our ‘conferring recognition’ on this 
person, as Butler terms accepting the unsubstitutability and value of the person, and our 
aversion to the action she has just performed. This dissonance is significant to Butler’s 
conception of ethics, in that any ethics must begin from an understanding that one is 
always-already imbricated in a relation with the other, even if we cannot ask them to 
explain themselves to us and make them accountable for their actions: 
[W]e must recognize that ethics requires us to risk ourselves precisely at moments 
of unknowingness, when what forms us diverges from what lies before us, when 
our willingness to become undone in relation to others constitutes our chance of 
becoming human. To be undone by another is a primary necessity, an anguish, to 
be sure, but also a chance – to be addressed, claimed, bound to what is not me, but 
also to be moved, to be prompted to act, to myself elsewhere, and so to vacate the 
self-sufficient “I” as a kind of possession.140  
The seven minutes at the end of Jeanne Dielman constitute such a chance to be moved by 
the figure of Jeanne, to examine our relationship to a figure whose value we cannot 
judge, as we cannot demand an account in order to evaluate her reasons, and whose 
innate value we must either accept, or deny. In this way, Akerman’s address of the 
spectator has direct ethical implications. 
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 Anna: Unfathomable Emotions 
 
In Jeanne Dielman, the stakes of considering our feelings about Jeanne are very 
high. The spectator must reckon with the abhorrent fact that, in the world of the film, 
Jeanne has just killed someone. In rendez-vous, however, the connotations of such a 
consideration of Anna are lighthearted in comparison. As mentioned earlier, Akerman’s 
opaque presentation of Anna begins to change when Anna meets her mother at a train 
station in the latter half of the film. Here, the spectator’s access to Anna’s interior world 
begins to increase, but does not become full, unrestricted access. When Anna sees her 
mother the first time, the spectator sees Anna in a medium close-up, and Anna’s face 
brightens – she almost smiles. As Anna and her mother embrace, however, Akerman’s 
camera still remains at a distance. The scene which follows, in which Anna and her 
mother sit in the train station restaurant, constitutes a dramatic departure from Akerman’s 
usual stylistic choices; the scene is filmed in such a way to be reminiscent of a shot-
reverse shot pattern. Akerman’s camera does move back and forth between shots of the 
two women, but the cutting does not correspond to showing who is speaking, rather 
lingering on each woman for long periods as they both speak and listen.  
This shot-reverse shot set-up implies something of a breakdown in Akerman’s 
guardianship of the privacy of Anna’s interiority through specific strategies of 
representation: we, as spectator, see what Anna sees for the first time in the film – her 
mother. Again, though, this does not lend itself to an easy identification with Anna and 
her minimally indicated pleasure at seeing her mother; any information the shot reverse-
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shot structure provides is undercut by the fact that Anna’s countenance and dialogue are 
no more expressive now than earlier in the film, and confuse any clear picture of Anna’s 
feelings. Any idea that Anna has an idyllic relationship with her mother is undone, for 
example, when her mother mentions missing Anna ‘because she has no one to talk to’ 
and Anna replies ‘but you never used to talk to me, never.” Finally, Anna and her mother 
lie next to each other in a hotel room bed that evening, and Anna speaks at length about 
her affair with an Italian woman. Here, although Anna’s description of the event itself is 
characteristically vague (“I didn’t know it could be like that with a woman”), the event of 
the affair itself, when taken with her description, presents the first instance in which, like 
Jeanne’s action of stabbing her client, the spectator is confronted with the fact that Anna 
does, indeed, have an interior world which causes her to act. And again, like the 
presentation of Jeanne, Akerman is able to confirm Anna’s interior world without 
inviting the spectator into that world. 
The insistent use of long shots and camera distance which has occurred 
throughout the film is emphasized upon Anna’s following, final meeting. The spectator’s 
inaccessibility to Anna reappears when Daniel, Anna’s current, long-term lover, picks her 
up from the train station. In the scenes that follow, compared to the scene between Anna 
and her mother, the spectator’s visual access to Anna is greatly diminished – we see only 
the back of her head for the length of their car trip to a hotel, and when the characters 
reach the hotel, Anna either looks away from the camera out the window or disappears 
into the washroom. She becomes quiet again as well, listening as Daniel talks at length 
about his unhappiness with his life. This retreat of Anna into herself is interrupted, 
however, when Daniel, self-absorbedly musing about the ‘beauty of a woman’s voice,’ 
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asks Anna to sing to him. Anna protests, claiming she sings off-key, but Daniel replies 
that she had ‘wanted to be a singer.’ And, so, Anna steps closer to the camera and sings. 
It is this sequence which is comparable to the scene in which Jeanne sits at her dining 
room table for seven minutes.  
 As she sings an Edith Piaf song with a lighthearted melody and tragic lyrics, 
Anna’s face lights up. As the camera never cuts to a reverse shot of Daniel watching 
Anna sing, Anna sings to the spectator. As she moves back and forth between a smiling 
face and a contemplative look, we can suddenly see the expanse of Anna’s interior world 
and are invited to delight in her happiness, although we have no avenue to understand 
why she is so happy to sing to Daniel. This invitation, to delight in Anna’s presence, 
again presents a moment in which we are being asked to consider our feelings towards a 
character when we have no certain recourse to their reasons and motivations; we cannot 
evaluate Anna’s worth based on who she desires, or where she wants to live, or whether 
or not she wants to have children, or for some other reason. Because this moment of 
consideration arrives without any actions which could encourage the sort of judgment an 
action like Jeanne’s might, the spectator here can simply come face to face with the 
pleasure of conferring recognition on Anna, of accepting her singularity and value, in all 
her opacity and without a demand for her to explain herself. Kinder opportunely notes 
that “those who stay [for the entirety of the film] learn to recognize [Anna’s] warmth and 
vitality, which make her more lovable. We see how she loves by watching the 
expressions on her face and the movement of her eyes as she watches her mother, or by 
the way she sings a song and smiles at Daniel.”141 Margulies echoes this sentiment when 
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she notes that rendez-vous’s “emotional and intellectual core lies in Anna’s singing.”142 
Anna’s singing presents a chance to be moved, to realize that we need not know why 
Anna is the way she is in order to recognize her irreducible worth.  
 In an inverse of Anna’s singing, Anna leaves a few minutes later to find medicine 
for the suddenly ill Daniel and, in the cab, begins to cry. Like Anna’s happiness at 
singing, we may guess as to the reason for Anna’s tears, but no clear answers are made 
available to us. The spectator is, again, left to wonder at the interiority of Anna – in 
Butler’s parlance, the spectator is left to continue in a silent dialogue with Anna “where 
no common ground can be assumed”143 and in which we might consider who Anna is 
without “expect[ing] an answer that will ever satisfy.”144 As Butler continues, “by not 
pursuing satisfaction and by letting the question remain open, even enduring, we let the 
other live, since life might be understood as precisely that which exceeds any account we 
may try to give of it.”145 In leaving Anna her life, and seeing her as an individual with a 
life to be recognized, as we would hope for our own lives to warrant such recognition, 
there is a different sort of identification or allegiance at work here – one which does not 
demand an account of the other. In this way, we can see the ethical at work in Akerman’s 
treatment of character and her presentation of those characters to her spectator. 
 
Identifying with Anna and Jeanne 
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Akerman utilizes certain conventions of classical narrative cinema (Margulies 
writes of Akerman’s “[hyperbolic] perspective, linear chronology, ellipsis, and the 
naturalistic conventions of having single actors perform single characters”) in order to 
present characters that are singular, continuous and coherent. Through Jeanne Dielman 
and Les rendez-vous d’Anna’s affinities with classical realist cinema, Akerman presents 
the characters of Jeanne and Anna as ‘realistic’. In this way, Anna and Jeanne constitute a 
representation of human beings, not self-reflexive, Brechtian characters. In contrast to 
classical narrative cinema, however, Akerman entirely circumvents the processes that 
usually enable the spectator to rapidly and uncritically gain information about these 
characters’ psychology or identity. In circumventing these processes, she produces 
characters that are entirely opaque to the spectator. Denying the spectator the kinds of 
alignment Murray Smith describes, Akerman puts forward the possibility for a specific 
kind of conscious, prolonged identification very different from the type of identification 
Smith terms allegiance (a mode of identification in which a spectator utilizes the 
information they have been given about a character’s subjectivity in order to judge how a 
character fits into the moral universe of a film, and to assess the character’s attractiveness 
or worth based on that judgment).  
The type of identification activated through Akerman’s strategy of address denies 
the spectator the possibility of judging the worth of a character against reasons or excuses 
provided in and by the character’s interior world. In the final minutes of Jeanne Dielman 
and rendez-vous, Akerman shows the spectator that, despite the impossibility of coming 
to know Jeanne or Anna’s world of thoughts and feelings, these characters do have such a 
world. They, like the spectator, have emotions and needs which make them dependent on 
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those around them.  In this presentation of character, the spectator is given the 
opportunity to identify his or herself with Anna and Jeanne as human beings who 
fundamentally require recognition as human, and who are dependent on others for that 
recognition. If one does identify with Anna and Jeanne this way, it is because one feels an 
ethical imperative to do so. To feel for these characters as fellow human beings, without 
knowing what they feel, and without asking what they feel, expresses the possibility of an 
ethical identification: an identification that renounces the demand for an account of 
oneself. Such an identification between oneself and the other would defer to the fact that 
we are all in ‘one’s another’s hands,’ as Butler says, and would necessarily discard the 
belief that someone’s ability to explain their subjectivity to one’s liking, and to place 
their identity in categories that are easily understood, is what makes them worth feeling 
for in the first place. That Akerman provides spectators with these possibilities for 
engaging with characters, and contemplating their interactions with the wider world, 
aligns Akerman’s filmmaking with the ethical project Judith Butler lays out in Giving an 
Account of Oneself. Butler’s work in turn illuminates Jeanne Dielman and rendez-vous 
by emphasizing the fundamentally ethical nature of Akerman’s presentation of character 
and Akerman’s address, through those characters, to her spectator.    
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Chapter 2: Demain on déménage, Un divan à New York, and La captive: Akerman’s 
Ethical Hollywood 
 
  The understanding of ethics discussed in Judith Butler’s Giving an Account of 
Oneself (2005)146 provides an enlightening framework for Chantal Akerman’s films 
Jeanne Dielman, 23 Quai du Commerce, 1080 Bruxelles (1975) and Les rendez-vous 
d’Anna (1978).147 Through her presentation of the main characters in these films, Jeanne 
and Anna, as opaque and unknowable by the spectator, Akerman illustrates the belief that 
there are limits to what we can know about another person. These characters behave 
oddly and Akerman gives no information to the spectator explaining why Jeanne and 
Anna behave as they do. As discussed in the previous chapter, Akerman, confronting the 
spectator with evidence of the existence of Jeanne and Anna’s interior worlds of thoughts 
and feelings, addresses the spectator in an ethical manner. She presents Anna and Jeanne 
to the spectator as human beings who cannot be known; Akerman gives the spectator the 
choice of either confronting and accepting the characters as (a representation of) human 
beings, singular and invaluable, feeling empathy towards them, or condemning and 
abandoning the characters. The spectator cannot demand an account from the character, 
but they can choose to confer recognition on Jeanne and Anna in spite of, and because of, 
this. In this way, Jeanne Dielman and rendez-vous promote an ethical view similar to that 
which Butler lays out when she argues that there is an ethical need to recognize the 
‘limits’ of knowability of both oneself and others. 
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The vernacular conception of ‘ethics’ conceives of the individual as having 
personal freedom and agency; this agency enables the individual to be held responsible 
and (thus) punishable for their actions. The notion of responsibility found here entails a 
questioning of the individual being held accountable for their actions: “Why did you do 
that?” Being held accountable thus demands that the individual explain their history, their 
desires and goals, and gives an account of themselves as a justification for their 
behaviour. In her approach to Ethics, however, Butler troubles the connection between 
agency and accountability. Butler works from the post-structural view that identity is 
influenced in ways not available to conscious analysis and, further, that identity is not 
necessarily a coherent, sustaining, self-identical structure. In Giving an Account of 
Oneself, Butler aims to bring together these two concepts of an ethical belief system and 
the post-structural concept of the ungrounded self. She does this in order to show that an 
acceptance of the unknowability of human self need not abandon ethics or result in a 
cynical freedom from responsibility.  
Butler, utilizing the work of various twentieth century philosophers,148 argues that 
explaining oneself categorically, or ‘giving an account of oneself,’ is impossible. The 
possibility of fully describing one’s subjectivity is precluded by the fact that one’s own 
history, including one’s primary relations to others, partially predates one’s 
consciousness. One’s own history is not, therefore, available to one’s understanding or 
interpretation. Further, we operate through social norms and systems which are general 
and, as such, cannot address the specificity of individuals. These norms include the 
system of language, through which an account of the self can be demanded, and through 
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which an account of the self must be given; Butler writes that such norms are vehicles 
which I, the individual, “do not author and that render me substitutable at the very 
moment that I seek to establish the history of my singularity.”149 Moreover, these norms 
not only dispossess the individual of their singularity to some extent, they also ensure that 
some accounts are more acceptable and visible than others.  
Butler concludes that because giving a full account of oneself is impossible, 
giving such an account cannot be taken as the basis for a system of ethics. As a 
replacement for the demand of such an account, Butler offers another conception of 
ethics. The basis of this conception is the understanding that we are all inevitably affected 
by our primary relations with others from the beginning of our lives, and that this relation 
with the other is a universal and inescapable fact of human existence.150 Accepting this 
aspect of human life as a basis for ethical relations would, in Butler’s view, provide a 
great ethical resource. This is because such acceptance would affirm the need to ‘confer 
recognition’ on others, or accept their value and singularity, without the demand for them 
to explain themselves.151 Akerman’s films, in their presentation of character, both show 
the limits of knowability Butler describes and offer the spectator the ethical opportunity 
to bestow recognition on an unknowable other. A discussion of how Akerman’s 
presentation of character constitutes this ethical address will comprise this chapter.  
 
The Ethical in Akerman’s Classical Cinema  
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 The filmic style of Jeanne Dielman and rendez-vous contributes to Akerman’s 
ethical mode of character presentation. As Ivone Margulies describes in the 
aforementioned book, Nothing Happens: Chantal Akerman’s Hyperrealist Everyday, the 
nature of Akerman’s filmmaking places her work in a space between the two poles of 
classical realist cinema and avant-garde cinema. Akerman’s films use techniques and 
conventions from both extremes simultaneously, destabilizing the (perceived) border 
between them. Margulies names this aspect of Akerman’s cinema her ‘aesthetic of 
homogeneity.’ This aesthetic downplays ruptures in the film’s structure and, by utilizing 
a “hyperbolic privileging of linearity [and] Renaissance perspective,”152 instead 
emphasizes “duration, accumulation, sobriety, and sameness.”153 This ‘aesthetic of 
homogeneity’ to some degree mimics the style of classical Hollywood film. Such a 
stylistic approach enables Akerman to present characters which, through their similarity 
to classical cinema’s characters, seem ‘real;’ yet by having her actors employ a 
minimalist performance style and allotting very little dialogue to her characters (the 
dialogue Akerman does provide often serves to upset assumptions the spectator may have 
made about the character’s subjectivity), Akerman is able to make her character’s interior 
worlds opaque, unlike the ‘transparent’ characters of classical Hollywood cinema.   
 In the films Un divan à New York (1996), La captive (2000), and Demain on 
déménage (2004),154 Akerman maintains this aesthetic of homogeneity. However, while 
this aesthetic, as described by Margulies, references the avant-garde nature of Akerman’s 
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1970s films,155 these three more recent films largely exchange the devices common to 
Akerman’s 1970s films (long static shots, a distanced camera, and an overall minimalist 
approach) for conventions traditionally associated with classical Hollywood cinema. For 
example, where Akerman’s 1970s films display a refusal to move the camera into the 
space of the fiction, these films regularly follow classical film’s shot-order, dictating a 
movement from an establishing shot to a medium shot to a close-up of a character in a 
scene. Unlike her 1970s films, these films utilize non-diegetic music, point-of-view shot 
structures and shot reverse-shot structures – stylistic practices which, in classical cinema, 
often function to reflect or underline the subjectivity of a character.156 Here, Akerman’s 
characters speak often, sometimes explicitly describing their state of mind. Finally, the 
actors in these films, particularly divan and Demain, employ an expressive, emotive 
performance style. Because the ethical aspects of Akeman’s 1970s films rely on a 
presentation of character which avoids many of these conventions, Akerman’s use of 
these stylistic aspects would seem to imply an abandonment of her previous ethical 
concerns in these films. This is not the case.  
This chapter will analyze divan, La Captive and Demain in order to outline the 
way in which Akerman presents her characters in these films, and the ethical effects of 
that presentation. In divan, La Captive and Demain, Akerman uses different devices to 
present characters that do not know themselves and, thus, cannot be known by the 
spectator. These devices include repetition of dialogue among characters, denial of 
narrative justification for characters’ actions (or lack of action), and narrative allusions to 
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classical Hollywood films such as The Shop Around the Corner (Ernst Lubitsch, 1940) 
and Vertigo (Alfred Hitchcock, 1958). Examining Akerman’s use of these devices, this 
chapter will show that the characters in divan, La Captive and Demain seem, to the 
spectator, as subject to the whims of social norms, continually at a loss to understand 
their own behavior and desires. However, as we will explore, in these films Akerman also 
reminds the spectator that the characters have thoughts and feelings, desires and hopes – 
though they are not always able to understand those feelings. In divan, La Captive and 
Demain, Akerman shows the spectator that characters have their own interior worlds in 
different ways: in Demain, Akerman uses prolonged scenes of character’s silent 
contemplation to hint at the characters’ thoughts; in divan Akerman presents a conception 
of love in which characters fall in love with the unique and irreplaceable subjective world 
of the other (even though they do not fully know that world); finally, in La Captive, 
Akerman utilizes a subtle switch in character alignment to illustrate to the spectator that 
the characters, which may have seemed without feelings, do in fact have desires and 
hopes, unknowable to the spectator.  
Exploring each of these devices and films in detail, this chapter will argue that 
Akerman’s presentation of character in these films constitutes an ethical address. This 
chapter will illustrate the respective ways Demain, divan and La Captive prompt 
spectators, in spite of the films’ presentation of the characters as unknowable to 
themselves and others, to think of these characters as human by reminding them that 
these characters have their own world of feelings and desires, just as the spectators do. 
(Akerman’s employment of conventions of classical illusionistic film here presents 
characters which, to a greater degree than those of her 197s films, seem ‘realistic’ to the 
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spectator; this is opposed to using, for example, Brechtian devices to undercut the realism 
of the representation. That the spectator has the means to think of characters as though 
they are actual human beings is a necessary prerequisite for creating a space for ethical 
reflection.) As will be discussed individually in relation to each film, the ethical nature of 
Demain, divan and La Captive is found in the opportunity Akerman gives the spectator to 
feel for the characters in these films. Identifying with these unknowable characters 
requires an acceptance of both the limits of knowledge about the self and other; such 
acceptance is, according to Butler, an ethical resource. Akerman prompts the spectator to 
identify with these characters by emphasizing their specific and unique humanity and 
their need for recognition from others. In this way, Akerman points to Butler’s argument 
that, because all human beings are dependent on one another for recognition, it is an 
ethical act to bestow recognition and feeling on another in spite of the impossibility of 
knowing that other. As Butler writes, “[i]n a real sense, we do not survive without being 
addressed, which means that the scene of address can and should provide a sustaining 
condition for ethical deliberation, judgment, and conduct.”157 The ethical nature of these 
films lies in Akerman’s address of the spectator as someone who can feel the value of 
another without being able to know that other. The individual examinations of Demain, 
divan, and La Captive that constitute this chapter will further outline Akerman’s ethical 
address, and the specific way it functions in each film. 
 
Demain on déménage 
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Demain begins with Charlotte (Sylvie Testud), a young writer, moving into a new 
apartment with her mother Catherine (Aurore Clement) – possibly as a result of the recent 
passing of Charlotte’s father. The film follows the eccentric lives of the two women: 
neither woman can sleep; despite the women’s attempt to keep it clean, their apartment is 
cluttered, dirty, and smoky to an absurd extent; Charlotte is under a deadline to produce 
an erotic novel, but cannot seem to write anything but comedy. The two women decide to 
move again, which leads to a series of encounters with other people searching for new 
real estate. The film ends with Charlotte living with a young mother she meets in this 
process, finally writing her own novel, having abandoned the erotic novel.  
In Demain, Akerman presents characters which behave in contradictory ways, 
rebuffing any clear categorization of their identities and disallowing the spectator the 
feeling that he or she may ‘know’ a character through such a categorization. Further, 
Akerman emphasizes the conventional nature of language – and the emotions, feelings, 
and beliefs language purportedly expresses – in order to portray characters that are 
influenced by social norms operating externally to them; this portrayal produces 
characters who cannot fully understand their own behavior.  
This chapter will explore how Akerman’s treatment of character functions to 
exhibit characters whose subjectivities are unknowable both to themselves and the 
spectator. And yet, as the following sections will argue, Akerman presents the characters 
in Demain as having interior, subjective worlds – though the characters may not know 
them fully, they still have private thoughts and desires. Akerman creates this presentation 
of character through her use of silent, still moments (inserted in a film otherwise filled 
with rapid-fire dialogue and action) and her implication that the characters’ individual 
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histories, particularly the impact of the Holocaust upon those histories, have shaped their 
subjective viewpoints. The next sections will illustrate how, in the use of these quiet 
moments and references to the characters’ pasts, Akerman reminds the spectator that 
these characters are similar to the spectator, in that the characters are ‘people’ who have 
feelings and memories. Akerman asks spectators to ally themselves with the characters of 
Charlotte and Catherine, regardless of the fact that the spectators cannot know exactly 
how Charlotte and Catherine feel. Akerman’s address of the spectator here points to 
Butler’s claim that recognizing the value of the other, even though the other cannot 
explain themselves, is an ethical act. The next two sections will explore in detail the 
ethical aspects of Demain and examine the specific connections between Akerman’s 
presentation of character here and Judith Butler’s discussion of ethics. 
 
Contradictory and Confused Characters 
 
In her article “Critical Categories and the (Il)logic of Identity,” Angela Stukator 
details how Akerman’s film rendez-vous works to undo the ‘logic of identity,’ “a logic 
which dictates that the critic emphasize elements (textual or extra-textual) of coherence, 
unity and wholeness” in order to support the understanding of identity as a continuous, 
closed, fixed thing.158 Akerman’s construction of the character of Anna, Stukator argues, 
disrupts this notion of identity through, among other things, the promotion of “internal 
differences, contradictions and tensions [in the character of Anna] which could 
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potentially blur the boundaries of a category.”159 The presentation of characters that 
cannot easily be placed in reductive categories is a common feature of Akerman’s 1970’s 
filmmaking; this presentation supports the opacity of the characters’ subjectivity in those 
films, as the spectator cannot apply a stereotypical personality category in order to make 
assumptions about the character’s interior world. This aspect of Akerman’s character 
construction is clearly at work in Demain, albeit in a different way than in her earlier 
films.  
Akerman’s provision of characters which behave in ways that confound any 
interpretation or categorization of identity is extremely pronounced in Demain. The 
rapid-fire pace of the film supplies many instances of confused and contradictory 
characters in different subplots and vignettes:  ‘La Femme Enceinte’ (Natacha Régnier) is 
a young, pregnant newlywed. She speaks perpetually of her desire to be away from her 
dull, sexually over-active husband and avoid becoming a mother, and yet she docilely 
follows her husband away whenever he appears. Mrs. Delacre, one half of an unhappily 
married couple who  comes to look at Charlotte’s apartment, describes how she is 
completely unable to decide if she hates her husband and wants to leave him, or if she 
loves him and always will. Throughout the film Charlotte and her mother behave in ways 
which spill over and destabilize any label or category which the spectator may attempt to 
attach to them – Charlotte is a writer who seems unable to write, and her mother is a 
piano teacher whose vibrancy and comedically implied sex life troubles the stereotypical 
classification of her as ‘elderly.’ As Stukator describes in her analysis of rendez-vous, 
Akerman is here emphasizing ‘internal differences, contradictions and tensions’ in her 
presentation of Catherine and Charlotte. As such, the spectator is unable to glean 
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information about the characters’ thoughts and feelings by simplistically categorizing 
either character.   
There is more to Akerman’s presentation of opaque characters, however, than the 
confused and contradictory qualities she attributes to them. To fully address the operation 
of character in Demain, it will be worthwhile to examine Akerman’s use of dialogue, in 
which she, at times, divests the characters’ words of meaning and instead emphasizes the 
materiality and rhythm of the dialogue. Discussing Akerman’s use of dialogue in her 
films, Margulies states that Akerman, “[e]xploring language at the border of its 
referential power, […] wants her verbal tracks to end up ‘as a bla, bla, bla, as 
psalmody’.”160 Through repetition of words and phrases, Akerman “transmut[es] content 
into rhythm.”161 This aspect of Akerman’s cinema is prominent in Demain: characters 
speak constantly, and yet express very little diegetic information – the majority of the 
information they express is redundant. This effect, at least partially, results from the 
repetitive nature of the dialogue in the film; compared to the characters in Akerman’s 
1970s films, the characters here speak a lot, but they often say the same thing over and 
over again. They also continuously speak of things which are evidently unrelated to either 
the situation at hand or which seem inappropriate or excessive to the social boundaries of 
that situation. Margulies describes this aspect of Akerman’s cinema as another avenue 
through which Akerman divorces dialogue from its “conventional narrative purpose.”162 
In rendez-vous, for example, “Anna’s lack of understanding of the amount of information 
appropriate in different social contexts is one example of how Akerman introduces excess 
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content” – content which disrupts the idea of dialogue as directly revelatory.163 These 
elements, as in Akerman’s other films, work to downplay the ‘referential power’ of the 
dialogue in Demain. 
The idiosyncratic use of language typical of Akerman’s dialogue is especially 
pronounced in Demain: characters in this film have an uncanny habit of repeating and 
sharing sentences spoken by other characters. They spout these phrases – which they may 
or may not have heard from other characters – over and over again until the sentences 
become both comical and meaningless. The following odd simultaneities in the film 
provide examples. Whenever a character in Demain inspects an apartment for possible 
rental, they open the fridge and remark, shocked, “It’s empty!”, and another character 
always responds, friendlily, “It can be filled.” Every character in the film seems to know 
a horrible story about a woman microwaving her cat, and they mention it of their own 
accord regularly. During their apartment-showing, Charlotte and her mother seem to have 
memorized the exact same sales speech, and repeat phrases like, “no load-bearing walls, 
all electric!” ad nauseam. La Femme Enceinte, Charlotte, and Catherine all share the 
same reaction to chicken made with thyme at various moments throughout the film: they 
remark on how it reminds them of nature and memories, and they begin to cry.  
This odd repetition and sharing of lines of dialogue, and the feelings those lines 
purportedly describe, reaches its apex in the figure of Charlotte. Charlotte is struggling to 
finish her erotic novel; following her mother’s suggestion, she spends much of her time 
listening to other people, in order to gain inspiration from the eroticism ‘all around her.’  
She only succeeds in repeatedly stringing together series of wholly unerotic remarks, 
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however, which she copies directly from other people’s conversations. This results in 
writing like (as her mother vacuums in the background) “he leans over the sex of the 
young woman, who is limply hoovering. The hoover stops dead. She screams. The fuses 
have blown.”  
Charlotte’s parroting of verbal phrases she hears from other characters, and the 
sharing of phrases and reactions amongst all the characters, evidences a trait of 
Akerman’s cinema which is best described by Steven Shaviro in his article “Clichés of 
Identity: Chantal Akerman’s Musicals.”164 In his analysis of Akerman’s film Golden 
Eighties (aka Window Shopping, 1986) Shaviro comes to the conclusion that in the way 
“the characters in Window Shopping always seem to be trying on their moods and desires, 
in the same way they try on clothes and hairstyles,” the film,  
suggests an equation between three things: first, deadpan postmodern irony; 
second, the ubiquitous commodification not just of necessities, nor even also just 
of luxury goods, but of all forms of self-expression; and third, the conventional 
nature of the signs that indicate and communicate feelings, that is to say, that 
represent our feelings not only to others, but also (and even perhaps most 
crucially) to ourselves.165  
Although Demain and Window Shopping are films with very different aims, Shaviro’s 
description of the ideological underpinnings of the earlier film is particularly useful in 
uncovering the effects of the character construction in Demain.  
Discussing Window Shopping, Shaviro argues that Akerman presents characters’ 
emotions and affects through stereotypes, thus showing the “everything is a conventional 
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sign.”166 This argument, for the most part, applies to Demain as well. Characters in the 
film express a gamut of emotions and affects: love, heartbreak, jealousy, 
oppression/suffocation, pain, grief, joy. Yet these emotions are often expressed so 
suddenly and inexplicably by the characters that it is difficult for the spectator to treat 
them as revealing some interior state the character is experiencing. They seem instead, 
like the phrases every character repeats, to have come to the characters from an external 
source. Emotions, affects, phrases, and desires which appear on the characters of Demain 
seem to belong to a collective, extrinsic pool; a pool through which each character moves 
and through which they are moved.  
Window Shopping, like much of Akerman’s 80s cinema, is a film (particularly 
when taken in conjunction with its partner film, Les Années 80 [1983]) which is very 
much committed to exploring and revealing the workings of the illusionistic film. 
Demain, however, is a film whose aims are much more in line with those of illusionistic 
film than not. When placed in this milieu of illusionist cinema, Akerman’s treatment of 
affect and emotion that Shaviro is discussing does not so much function as a critique 
within the film of, as Shaviro puts it, the ‘commodification’ of everyday life, but instead 
constitutes part of the reality of the film. As such, a spectator is confronted with 
characters who exist in the ‘realistic’ world of a classical Hollywood film but which yet 
behave and speak in a way which indicates that their words and emotions come to them 
from an external source.  
The externality of the characters’ emotions and words in Demain illustrates 
something: mechanisms like language – which are thought to express our individual, 
singular, interior world – are in fact not unique to an individual, do not originate from 
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that individual, and, in their conventional nature, actually work to massify the individual. 
In Butler’s conception of subjectivity, this influence of social norms upon the individual 
is one cause of our limited ability to know ourselves. Butler notes that there are “norms 
that facilitate my telling about myself that I do not author and that render me substitutable 
at the very moment that I seek to establish the history of my singularity.”167 Social norms 
constitute “a domain of unfreedom and substitutability within which our ‘singular’ stories 
are told.”168 Akerman’s characters in Demain operate in just such a domain of unfreedom 
and substitutability, speaking words which do not belong to them and expressing feelings 
which do not always seem to issue from within themselves. Because one must submit to 
the operation and limits of the norm when one uses it, Butler argues that, “indeed, it 
seems that the “I” is subjected to the norm at [that] moment”. 169 Charlotte, Catherine, 
and the other characters in Demain embody this understanding of human beings as, at 
least partially, subject to the operation of external, social norms – norms whose operation 
are beyond the knowledge of that human being. 
Because Akerman presents the characters in Demain as subject to the operation of 
social norms, the characters cannot know fully themselves. The spectator sees that these 
characters cannot know completely why they feel and behave as they do – Charlotte, for 
example, does not really seem to understand why the smell of chicken makes her cry, and 
she certainly does not understand why she cannot write erotic fiction. The characters 
cannot fully understand the ‘why’ of their actions because the ‘why’ does not come 
entirely from them, but from shared external norms. The proximate, loud, open, 
expressive characters Akerman’s puts forward in Demain present a radical departure 
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from the distant, quiet, inexpressive characters of her 1970s films. Yet, despite this 
movement from inexpressivity to expressivity, the spectator does not understand why 
these characters behave as they do, why they fall in love, what they desire, what they 
hate. The character’s interior worlds are not transparent to the spectator as those worlds 
are not entirely transparent to the characters themselves. Butler writes “[t]he very terms 
by which we give an account, by which we make ourselves intelligible to ourselves and to 
others, are not of our making. They are social in character.”170 The social nature of the 
norms by which these characters would make themselves known precludes real 
individual expression – Akerman presents language as an impediment to the self-
knowledge of the characters in Demain. Akerman thus presents Demain’s characters as 
the fictional expression of Butler’s claim that one’s own subjectivity is not entirely 





Of all the characters in Demain, Charlotte is the most opaque. Her strange behaviour 
goes beyond her parroting of phrases spoken by other characters. For example, in her 
quest to write something erotic Charlotte does, occasionally, overhear something sensual 
in nature and, yet, can still make no use of it: early in the film she eavesdrops on a 
conversation between two women in a coffee shop who are talking explicitly about 
sexual encounters, but Charlotte loses interest and instead copies down the phone 
conversation of a man who turns out to be talking about real estate. Later, when Charlotte 
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is sharing a studio apartment with another woman, her novel begins to materialize. Both 
Charlotte and the spectator eventually realize, however, that this is because the other 
woman is writing the novel for her – Charlotte cannot tell her own writing from someone 
else’s. As moments like this in the film add up, it begins to seem to the spectator of the 
film that Charlotte has no interior world at all – she cannot take things into herself and 
interpret them, she can only repeat back to the world what she has heard from it. This 
aspect of Charlotte’s character may seem to imply that Akerman is presenting an 
understanding of subjectivity in which human beings have no interior world at all, or that 
our subjectivity is constituted entirely in the actions we perform.  
In his aforementioned article, Shaviro notes that Les Années 80 “proposes a radically 
constructivist and performative account of subjectivity”171 and that, in Window 
Shopping’s presentation of subjectivity, “there is no correspondence between inner and 
outer, or between experience and its expression.”172 Demain, however, does not present 
an account of subjectivity in which the social forces of the world compose or control the 
entire constitution of a human being, or one in which there is only a surface and no 
internal desires or drives to contend with those social forces. As Jerry White notes 
regarding Akerman’ films,  
[W]hile remaining resolutely subjective, as any good modernist should, Akerman 
ultimately balances her explorations of interiority with awareness of external 
pressures shaping interior experience. High modernism almost fetishizes the interior; 
Akerman does not.173 
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In the three films under discussion in this chapter, Akerman puts forward a view of 
identity in which humans do have an interior world of thoughts and emotions, but that 
this world is not hers to represent. This view will appear in different forms throughout 
divan, La Captive and Demain, but in order to describe how Akerman makes clear this 
view of identity here, we must review the film’s references to the Holocaust.  
 Throughout the film, there are hints that both Catherine and her deceased mother 
survived internment in a concentration camp. At one point in the film, Charlotte and a 
friendly real estate agent discuss what it means to be a child of a Holocaust survivor – a 
discussion which links Charlotte and Akerman herself, as Akerman’s mother is a survivor 
of Auschwitz. The nature of Jewish identity is an over-arching thematic concern of 
Akerman’s films.174 She has produced films which deal explicitly with the Jewish 
Diaspora and which address the impact of Jewish traditions and history upon her own life 
and others’; these films include rendez-vous, Histoires d’Amérique (Food, Family and 
Philosophy, 1988), the installation Bordering on Fiction: Chantal Akerman’s “D’Est,” 
(1995), and Là-bas (2006). Margulies notes that “Akerman’s structured repetitions in 
narrative films like Meetings with Anna, and in personal documentaries like News from 
Home and D’Est, echo the rhythm and affect of Jewish Eastern European tales, songs, 
and jokes but radically abstract them.”175 Margulies’ remarks make it clear that 
Akerman’s interest in representations of Jewish identity can be seen in the very structure 
of many of her films. 
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 Akerman’s interest in the ramifications of the Holocaust upon the contemporary 
world can be seen as ethical in nature. The events of the holocaust have had a definitive 
impact upon 20th century philosophy, particularly informing understandings of ethics. 
The horrors of the Holocaust have so fundamentally affected our conception of human 
beings’ capacity for destruction of other human beings that, “therefore, we must speak of 
post-Holocaust ethics.”176 The philosophers Emmanuel Levinas, Theodor Adorno, and 
Hannah Arendt have particularly examined the nature of post-Holocaust ethics.177 Judith 
Butler’s approach to ethics reveals the influence of these philosophers, as her work is also 
concerned with ethics and the responsibility to the other in the post-Holocaust world. 
Akerman’s cinematic explorations of the echoes of the Holocaust upon day-to-day life 
connect her work to the larger ethical response to the Holocaust addressed by these 
philosophers and developed in Butler’s discussion of ethics. 
To return to the specific ethical nature of Demain, this aspect of the film is best 
expressed in a scene which occurs at the mid-point of the film. Charlotte and her mother 
sit at the kitchen table late one night. Catherine reads aloud from her own mother’s long-
lost diary, written while she was interned in a concentration camp. As Catherine reads her 
own mother’s words, “I am a woman. As I am a woman, I cannot say all that I feel, my 
memories, my secrets, my thoughts, aloud”, there is first a close-up of Charlotte and then 
her mother; neither of their faces clearly express a specific emotion; rather, both imply a 
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vague sense of sadness and melancholy. Once Catherine has read this line – a line 
describing the inability to speak of one’s inner life – the camera pulls back, revealing a 
prolonged medium shot of the two women sitting at the table, smoking and staring. The 
film’s pace changes here dramatically, moving from rapid dialogue and characters’ 
perpetual movement to a prolonged quiet, still scene. 
In his work Engaging Characters, Murray Smith argues that ‘identifying’ with a 
character – in the sense that a spectator identifies his or herself with the character, 
empathizing with and feeling for that character – requires the spectator to feel allegiance 
to that character; allegiance requires access to a character’s thoughts and feelings, so the 
spectator may analyze a character’s moral code.178 Breaking with this function of 
identification in classical cinema, as Smith describes it, Akerman here presents the 
spectator the opportunity to identify with and feel for characters without having access to 
the characters’ thoughts and feelings. In this scene, Akerman reminds the spectator that 
Catherine and Charlotte do feel. As these characters stare quietly, we assume that they 
must be thinking something; these characters do have their own thoughts, and loves, and 
pains, but they are not for us to know. Seeing Catherine’s face after reading her mother’s 
words and seeing Charlotte gaze at Catherine, the spectator feels the burden of feelings 
on these two characters, how it has formed them, and how it is too big to speak. Akerman 
reminds the spectator that these two characters have a history and series of interactions 
which has made them who they are – they do have an interior world – but it is more than 
they and we can understand or explain. In other words, if the spectator feels for Catherine 
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and Charlotte, thinking that they are worth feeling for, the spectator must do so without 
knowing what these characters feel themselves.   
Feeling for a character without being able to ‘know’ that character can be read, using 
Butler’s conception of ethics, as an ethical act. Feeling for Charlotte and Catherine 
requires the spectator to think of these characters as human beings and accept them as 
individuals of unique value, in spite of both the characters’ inability to completely 
understand themselves and our resulting inability to understand them as well. In Butler’s 
view, this acceptance is a ‘recognition’ of the other. By providing spectators this 
prolonged quiet moment in which to think about Catherine and Charlotte’s unknown and 
unknowable feelings, Akerman gives them the option to bestow recognition on these 
characters: in this moment, we think that Catherine and Charlotte must have emotions, 
desires, and thoughts as we know we do ourselves; they think and feel in the same way 
we think and feel. By identifying ourselves with these characters, we are identifying the 
similarities between ourselves and the characters. We identify ourselves with characters 
that cannot know themselves, who are partially subject to the operation of social norms 
external to themselves, and, as such, consider that we are the same as that character – that 
perhaps we cannot know ourselves. In Butler’s view, considering oneself this way is an 
ethical act, with ethical consequences. Butler argues that “an acceptance of the limits of 
knowability in oneself and others”179 constitutes an ethical resource, a resource which 
will help us to shed the demand for an account of the other. In Demain, Akerman 
provides the ethical opportunity to recognize an other from whom we cannot demand an 
account, as they cannot demand that account from themselves; in the process, she gives 
us a chance to consider the [im]possibility of giving that account ourselves. 
                                                
179 Butler, Judith. Giving an Account of Oneself, 63. 
100 
 
Un divan à New York 
  
 Of all Akerman’s films, divan most consistently employs the conventions of 
classical Hollywood cinema. Like Demain, Akerman here employs conventions like shot 
reverse-shots, movement from establishing shots to close-ups, point of view shots and 
non-diegetic music in order to tell the seemingly clichéd story of two characters who fall 
in love, and must overcome obstacles in order to end up together. Discussing the film’s 
similarity to classical Hollywood cinema, Amy Taubin calls divan “a flat-out commercial 
endeavor;”180 Jonathan Romney writes that “Akerman seems to have in mind the sort of 
brittle, urbane comedy that might once have starred Grant and Hepburn (Katherine) in the 
1940s, or even Astaire and Hepburn (Audrey) in the 1950s.”181  
Utilizing the conventions of classical Hollywood romantic comedies, Akerman 
constructs divan’s dialogue, plot and characters in such a way as to present a specific 
conception of ‘love.’ This conception presents characters that are unable to fully know 
both themselves and others; and yet, the characters in the film care for and love one 
another seemingly because of this unknowability. The opacity of Akerman’s characters, 
that fact that they are unknowable both to themselves and others, references Judith 
Butler’s arguments about the limited nature of self-knowledge. The following sections 
bring Butler’s work into conjunction with divan, particularly Butler’s understanding of 
the ‘exposed’ human body, in order to show the ethical connotations of Akerman’s film. 
                                                
180 Taubin, Amy. “Too Late Smart.” (1997, February 4). Village Voice. 70. 
181 Romney, Jonathan. (1996, August 26). “Tepid Souffle of Love and Psychoanalysis Misfires Badly.” The 
Guardian. 2. 
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These connotations stem from Akerman’s illustration of a conception of love which 
accepts the other without the demand to know that other. 
At the beginning of divan, Dr. Henry Harriston (William Hurt), a psychoanalyst 
living in New York, places an advertisement for a Parisian apartment swap. Beatrice 
(Juliette Binoche), a dancer living in Paris, hounded by male suitors, takes up Henry’s 
offer. When Beatrice arrives in Henry’s upscale apartment, Henry’s patients mistake 
Beatrice for his replacement and, with no qualms, she begins to treat them. Henry, 
dismayed by Beatrice’s run-down apartment, returns to New York early; he is, however, 
too charmed by Beatrice to confront her about her usurpation of his practice. He assumes 
a false identity and sees Beatrice as a patient. They fall in love, though neither is able to 
profess this to the other. Ultimately, however, the couple overcomes all of the 
miscommunications and other hitches; they finally meet in Paris and confess their love.  
 Jerry White’s article “Chantal Akerman’s Revisionist Aesthetic” provides one of 
the few academic considerations of divan. Commenting on Akerman’s predominant use 
of long takes in the film, White argues that this aspect of the film presents the subversive 
qualities of Akerman’s cinema perhaps more easily observed in Akerman’s explicitly 
avant-garde films:  
When we remind ourselves of Bazin’s three claims for the effects of long 
take/depth of focus and recall the slow pace and carefully composed mise-en-
scène of Akerman’s film…it becomes possible to see how the cinematography in 
A Couch in New York works against closure, stability, and viewer passivity. 
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Akerman thus retains space for the subjectivity of the spectator even as she co-
opts classical Hollywood forms.182 
White’s description of Akerman’s ability to both utilize the conventions of classical 
Hollywood filmmaking and simultaneously disturb those conventions and their effects is 
also very much applicable to the way in which Akerman structures character in this film. 
 The two main characters of divan, Dr. Henry Harriston and Beatrice Saulnier, 
likely constitute the closest approximations of classical Hollywood characters to be found 
in Akerman’s films: they speak of having emotions, desires, and goals; the actors perform 
the characters in such a way as to express those desires and emotions; and the characters 
(eventually) behave in such a way as to obtain their goals. And yet, Beatrice and Henry 
also, like Charlotte in Demain, seem often mystified by their own behavior. Both 
characters make careers (real and pretend) out of explaining other people’s behavior, and 
yet Beatrice and Henry often cannot explain their own actions. Like Demain, Akerman 
presents these characters as subject to external forces of generic social norms, forces 
which Beatrice and Henry cannot always comprehend, and one of the ways Akerman 
achieves this presentation is, again, through her use of dialogue. 
 In divan, Akerman uses language in a similar manner to Demain, having 
characters share and repeat lines of dialogue, often when discussing other characters. 
There are various examples of this use of dialogue throughout the film: describing 
Beatrice, various characters remark “she’s unbelievably frank!”; attempting to describe 
what makes the other special, both Henry and Beatrice can only repeatedly remark that 
the other is “different”; when trying to find words to confess his love to Beatrice, Henry 
                                                
182 White, Jerry. “Chantal Akerman’s Revisionist Aesthetic.” Women and Experimental Filmmaking. Eds., 
Petrolle, Jean and Virginia Wright Wexman. Urbana: University of Illinois, 2005, 47-68, p. 63-64. 
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realizes he can only re-produce lines that he has read in Beatrice’s love letters from 
previous suitors. By having the characters repeat a limited number of verbal lines, 
Akerman emphasizes here the general, non-individual nature of language. She illustrates 
that, as the systems we use to express ourselves are impersonal, so, to some extent, are 
we made impersonal. The fact that the characters in divan are made impersonal – that 
they seem un-unique – is something Akerman emphasizes further in her depiction of the 
characters’ relations to one another.  
The characters in divan often react to one another as though they are 
indistinguishable from and interchangeable with every other character. A major plot point 
of the film, for example, hinges on the notion that Henry’s patients do not, initially, 
notice that Beatrice is not Dr. Harriston – they all enter Henry’s apartment and begin their 
appointments, oblivious to any change (when one patient does notice Beatrice, he 
assumes, without asking, that she must be Harriston’s replacement). In Paris, as Henry is 
addressed by Beatrice’s answering machine as Beatrice, he is simultaneously assumed by 
one of Beatrice’s suitors to be a fellow competitor for her affections, and is punched as a 
result. Through these sorts of contrivances, Akerman constructs characters influenced by 
impersonal norms; Beatrice and Henry are defined less by their interior desires, feelings, 
and goals, than by how others see them, and how they are affected by, and express 
themselves through, norms like language. To understand how this character formation 
works in ethical terms, it is necessary to address the presentation of the concept of ‘love’ 
in divan. 
 
  Love, Exposed 
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In divan, again similarly to Demain, Akerman’s stylistic choices do not collude to 
present characters entirely devoid of an interior world. The idea that Beatrice and Henry 
have an internal domain of thoughts, emotions, and hopes is manifested in the film in 
their love for one another. Beatrice and Henry fall in love when they first meet; within a 
day of their meeting, they are professing their love – Henry to his friend Dennis, and 
Beatrice absentmindedly blurting out ‘I love you’ in front of Henry (he does not hear 
her). Typically, classical Hollywood films treat love as dependent on the specificities of 
individuals’ unique, singular internal worlds; characters are portrayed as loving each 
other in their knowledge of one another, of who the other is. In this way, the ‘romance’ or 
‘romantic comedy’ genres celebrate the notion of a knowable interior world – a 
celebration which takes the form of one character’s attraction to the singular, internal 
world of another. divan alters this depiction of love, however. The way in which 
Akerman puts forward the notion of romantic love here instead references the ‘limits of 
knowability’ of a human being, and the positive effects of recognizing the other in their 
unknowability and opacity. 
 When Henry and Beatrice first meet, they fall in love without speaking to each 
other at length: prior to meeting Beatrice, Henry tells his friend Dennis about his plan to 
confront Beatrice – he will simply walk in, tell Beatrice who he is, and take back his life. 
When he arrives in Beatrice’s office, however, and sees Beatrice sitting with her back 
turned to him, Henry says nothing. He supplies his fake name, ‘John Wire,’ and sits on 
the couch. Beatrice, expecting Henry to begin talking about his life (as all the other 
clients have done), becomes dismayed when Henry will not begin speaking. The two 
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characters sit for the entire appointment in almost total silence – Beatrice’s occasional 
“uh-huh?”s coming to no avail. After the appointment, they face each other in the hall; 
entranced by one another, they stare at each other longingly, hardly able to make 
sentences. Henry, evidently having forgotten all about his plan to retrieve his life, insists 
on coming back the next day to see Beatrice; Beatrice agrees. It is clear to the spectator 
that, as these characters will announce in the film shortly, Beatrice and Henry have fallen 
in ‘love.’ 
 Akerman here gives the spectator a representation of love which is not about 
‘knowing’ the other. Beatrice and Henry do not ask anything about the other, and they 
receive no information about what the other thinks, what they feel, what their everyday 
lives are like. Instead, the concept of love as found in this scene is about the specific, 
unique presence of the other person. Henry and Beatrice are overwhelmed by the 
presence of the other person. This is not to say they are attracted by the physical 
appearance of the other. Facing away from each other during the ‘appointment,’ neither 
character really sees the other’s appearance until they meet in the hallway, and at this 
point each character already seems enchanted with the other. Akerman’s conception of 
love in divan presents characters enthralled with the singular bodily presence of another 
character. 
 Akerman’s focus on her characters’ individual, physical presence again 
foregrounds the limited nature of self-knowledge. Butler describes the connection 
between the physical body and circumscribed self-knowledge in Giving an Account of 
Oneself: working from the ideas feminist philosopher Adriana Cavarero outlines in her 
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work Relating Narratives: Storytelling and Selfhood,183 Butler describes this notion of 
human beings’ specific, unique presence, illustrated by Akerman in divan, in the concept 
of ‘exposure.’ Butler notes that our individual bodies are perpetually exposed in the 
public sphere; that human beings are 
fundamentally exposed, visible, seen, existing in a bodily way and of necessity in 
a domain of appearance. This exposure that I am constitutes, as it were, my 
singularity. I cannot will it away, for it is a feature of my very corporeality and, in 
this sense, of my life.184  
Butler explains how this aspect of humanity is part of our fundamental inability to know 
ourselves: our own exposure in the public sphere is something we cannot witness and 
cannot know. This exposure is unnarratable and, as such, designates a facet of the 
ungroundedness, or unknowability, of ourselves.185 And, although Butler is careful to 
differentiate this conception of the singularity of exposure from “existential romanticism” 
or a “claim of authenticity”,186 she further argues that “it still matters that we feel more 
properly recognized by some people than we do by others”187; in other words, because 
individuals can recognize, be open to, and care for other specific individuals, the 
operation of social norms does not make humans the same. As Butler herself points out, 
this understanding of exposure limits the extent to which individuals are interchangeable. 
                                                
183 Relating Narratives: Storytelling and Selfhood. Trans. Kottman, Paul A. New York: Routledge, 2000. 
184 Butler, Giving an Account of Oneself, 33. 
185 See 38-39 of Giving an Account of Oneself.  
186 Butler notes that this singularity is without content, and therefore to some extent still constitutes a 
substitutability, “that singularity has no defining content other than the irreducibility of exposure, of being 
this body exposed to a publicity that is variably and alternately intimate and anonymous.” 34.   
187 Giving an Account of Oneself, 33. 
107 
188 Though norms operate on and through everyone, humans are not substitutable – one 
cannot be exposed in the place of another.  
In divan, Akerman presents love as a form of recognition very similar to that 
which Butler describes. Love here takes the form of Henry and Beatrice’s recognition of 
the unique exposure of the other. By having her characters fall in love as they do (almost 
silently), Akerman shows that Henry and Beatrice, though they live under the influence 
of massifying social norms which limit their ability to know themselves, are not 
interchangeable with other characters. Henry and Beatrice each have a specific 
unrepeatable presence, which the other recognizes, or loves. Because Akerman fashions 
love as dependent on the recognition of the exposure of the other, she emphasizes the 
way in which love requires recognition of something about which the other cannot know: 
their exposure in the world. Beatrice and Henry love a quality of the other – their specific 
presence – which is not known, and cannot be known, by that other. Through this 
presentation of love, as the attraction to the unknowable exposure of the other, Akerman 
depicts the acceptance of such limits as positive; that accepting the other in their 
unknowability may result in a (possibly reciprocal) recognition, or love, of the other. A 
further assessment of Akerman’s presentation of ‘love’ in divan will reveal more of the 
nature of this concept. 
Other aspects of divan help construct the film’s specific conception of ‘love.’ 
These aspects concern the film’s illustration of the aim to know the other as futile. As 
mentioned earlier, the film’s two main characters make it their job to be able to explain 
others. Henry is a psychoanalyst, Beatrice thinks she is one, and Henry’s patients and 
Beatrice’s friend Anne all seem to be quite knowledgeable about the terms and tropes of 
                                                
188 See 32-35 of Giving an Account of Oneself.  
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psychoanalysis. divan regularly satirizes these characters’ aim to know one another, to be 
able to explain, to categorize, to predict the other. This is particularly evident in the 
character of Beatrice. Akerman presents Beatrice as humorous in Beatrice’s ardent, 
unaffected belief that a) she has somehow become a psychoanalyst and b) this enables her 
to deduce the entirety of someone’s identity, largely through an understanding of their 
relationship to their mother. When Beatrice first ‘analyzes’ Henry (or ‘John Wire’) and 
he says nothing the entire time she concludes, “You’re different. Different from my other 
clients. You’re secretive, more closed-up. You must have a traumatism, that goes back 
further! It is buried in your deepest depths. That’s the reason!” That Beatrice makes such 
an extravagant induction about John Wire’s personality solely from his lack of verbosity 
evidences divan’s view toward psychoanalysis: the film shows that the belief that 
psychoanalysis can explain someone’s subjectivity or interior world is absurd, and 
unhelpful. While Beatrice may not be an ‘actual’ psychoanalyst, Henry is, and he has not 
been able to help his patients either; they are in dire straits until they come into contact 
with charming Beatrice (who cures them seemingly through her presence, without 
speaking to them or about them). In this manner, Akerman depicts the drive to know 
another human being, to explain a human being as psychoanalysis claims to, as folly. 
The aim of knowing someone in their entirety is undone in another manner in 
divan. This is the film’s reference and homage to Ernst Lubitsch’s The Shop Around the 
Corner. In that film, Klara Novak (Margaret Sullavan) loathes her fellow shopkeeper 
Alfred Kralik (Jimmy Stewart). She is unaware that his is actually the anonymous penpal 
with whom she is madly in love, and whom she claims to know better than anyone. 
Kralik is also in love with his penpal, though he realizes early on that she is Novak, and 
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he proceeds to orchestrate their eventual romance. The narrative of divan mirrors much of 
The Shop Around the Corner. In divan, information about characters is found in the 
domestic traces they leave on their apartment rather than in letters, and Beatrice falls in 
love with the present man rather than the absent man, but otherwise the plots proceed in 
much the same way. Beatrice comes to believe that she knows Henry Harriston 
completely, analyzing his apartment, his dog, his fiancée, his patients, even his clothes; 
she does not loathe him, but rather feels sorry for him. As Beatrice believes she is coming 
to know Dr. Harriston completely, she is simultaneously falling in love with ‘John Wire.’ 
Like Klara Novak, Beatrice cannot see that the two men are really one. 
The character of Beatrice speaks as though she knows everything about Dr. 
Harriston, and yet she is unable to realize that she has met and fallen in love with him. 
This incongruity serves to utterly destabilize any belief that psychoanalysis or any other 
system can enable one to perfectly know and capture the other. Beatrice’s 
pronouncements of all of the deductions she has made about Dr. Harriston are mocked by 
the fact she cannot realize who he ‘really’ is, that she is often giving these 
pronouncements to Dr. Harriston himself. Beatrice’s guesses about Henry, while often 
apparently correct, cannot reveal the man himself – they cannot account for the human 
being in front of Beatrice. Akerman denies any equation of the outer, surface aspects of 
Henry’s personality, his clothes, apartment, job, with his singular presence and identity. 
While this references the unnarratability of the exposed body – it is an aspect of Henry 
that Beatrice cannot describe – Akerman is here again showing the spectator the futility 
of the aim to fully know the other: Beatrice may be able to learn everything about Henry 
Harriston’s day-to-day life, but she, quite literally, does not know who he is. Through this 
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narrative device, Akerman shows that there are limits to what can be known about the 
other. 
 
Unknowing Love: An Ethical Relation 
 
As the characters in divan cannot entirely know the other, Akerman further 
emphasizes that these characters cannot know themselves. Like Akerman’s presentation 
of language as a social norm which works on the characters, divan also presents ‘love’ as 
a force which works on and through Henry and Beatrice, contributing to their limited 
self-knowledge. Akerman’s promotion of love as a norm is evident in Beatrice and 
Henry’s behavior. Upon meeting, Henry and Beatrice feel love for each other, but they do 
not understand those feelings: Henry attempts to tell Beatrice who he really is on a 
number of occasions, but, for no apparent reason, he cannot speak the words; when 
Beatrice first meets John Wire, she attempts to ask him not to return (as she could not 
‘help him’), but she changes her mind; she later tell her friend Anne “I don’t know what 
got into me. Something impelled me, a force. The words came out, I asked him to come 
back.” Akerman gives no narrative or diegetic reasons as to why, for example, Henry 
cannot reveal his identity, and Beatrice agrees to see Henry again. As such, the spectator 
must assume that the characters’ behavior results from their ‘love’; that ‘love’ is working 
through the characters in a way not available to their conscious comprehension – that 
love is, as Beatrice says, ‘a force.’ 
Akerman presents Beatrice and Henry as characters who know they love each 
other, but who do not know why; in this way, Akerman downplays the idea that love is 
111 
related to knowing the other, that we love the other for their specific interior world, their 
history, and their stories. Akerman’s total denial of any mention of sexuality in the film 
further supports the idea that Beatrice and Henry cannot comprehend the operation of 
‘love’ on and in them: as Frédéric Strauss, in his review for Cahiers du Cinema, astutely 
notes, Akerman’s avoidance of sexuality has the effect of making Beatrice and Henry 
seem like children, playing at or ‘trying on’ the roles of adulthood189 – as though Beatrice 
and Henry are unconsciously ‘trying on’(or being themselves tried on by) the preexisting 
normative role of being in love. Beatrice and Henry’s love for one another is not 
explained by a physical attraction or desire for the other – their love remains an aspect of 
themselves that they do not understand, as it is a role that does not issue only from them. 
In divan, Akerman links the idea of romantic love to an encounter with the 
singular, unique, physical presence of the other. The characters in divan fall in love with 
each other without learning anything of the other, anything of their thoughts, desires, or 
history. In addition to this, Akerman further underscores the characters’ inability to fully 
know either themselves or the other. She does this through a comedic undermining of the 
psychoanalytic claim to be able to explain a human being’s interior world; as well, 
Akerman illustrates that though one may have extensive knowledge of someone’s life, 
habits, and relationships, one is still not be able to know that person fully – just as 
Beatrice cannot apprehend that Dr. Harriston is actually John Wire. In these ways, 
Akerman proposes that ‘love,’ as a caring relation to the other, is not dependent on 
having knowledge of that other’s subjective viewpoint or their interior collection of 
feelings and thoughts. ‘Love,’ as found in divan, does not require the other to explain 
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themselves; rather, as Beatrice and Henry love an aspect of the other that the other cannot 
know – their exposed presence in the world – this conception of love relies on an 
acceptance of the other’s limited self-knowledge. Akerman’s advancement of this idea of 
human relation is, taken in conjunction with Butler’s understanding of ethics, an ethical 
act. As Akerman puts forward this view of ethical human relations – relations which 
relinquish the expectation to know the other – she gives the spectator the opportunity to 
consider the same.  
It is necessary finally to distinguish divan, and its ethical implications, from the 
arguments of philosopher Stanley Cavell. In Cavell’s writings on classical Hollywood 
film, he proposes the existence of a genre of films termed ‘comedies of remarriage.’190 
He claims that the romantic relationships in these films present a model for human 
relations, a model which promotes acknowledgement of the other. In Cavell’s view, 
acknowledgement refers to knowledge which an individual already has (usually 
concerning the existence and nature of the other) but which they repress.191 For example, 
in The Shop Around the Corner, one could argue that Klara Novak has known all along 
of her attraction to Alfred Kralik but has denied it, masking her attraction in her devotion 
to her pen-pal. Once Klara acknowledges what she already knew (that she hoped for her 
pen-pal to be Kralik), their romance and happiness can ensue unhindered. This notion of 
acknowledgement is not what Akerman is presenting in divan. Beatrice and Henry know 
that they love each other soon after meeting, and they do not repress that knowledge. 
Rather, they do not exactly understand the influence that love has on their behavior – an 
influence which often prevents them from expressing their love to the other. This 
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191 For a more in-depth discussion of Cavell’s views, see the Introduction, pages 7-9. 
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influence, rather than a need to acknowledge the other, stops Henry and Beatrice from 
expressing their love. divan is less concerned with the need to acknowledge knowledge 
we already have than to express the knowledge that there are limits to what can be known 




La Captive is Akerman’s loose adaptation of Marcel Proust’s La Prisonnière, the 
fifth volume of Proust’s novel Á la recherche du temps perdu. In Akerman’s film, the 
characters in Proust’s novel, Proust’s narrator and the object of his affections, Albertine, 
become Simon (Stanislaus Merhar) and Ariane (Sylvie Testud), one of many changes 
Akerman makes in her adaptation. Akerman’s modern-day adaptation of Proust’s work 
finds Simon living as a wealthy young man in Paris. Ariane, Simon’s lover, lives with 
him and his grandmother in their large apartment. Simon spends his days following 
Ariane and her friend Andrée around the city. When Simon is with Ariane, he questions 
her ceaselessly, desiring to know her completely. Simon’s jealousy begins to overwhelm 
their arrangement as he becomes convinced that Ariane is in love with another woman. 
He breaks off their relationship, only to change his mind when Ariane refutes his claims. 
She agrees to accompany him to a hotel by the ocean for a holiday. That night, Ariane 
decides to swim in the ocean and, in an ambiguous conclusion, dies either by accidental 
drowning, suicide, or possibly by Simon’s hand.     
 In discussing the ethical nature of La Captive, it is useful to reference the concept 
of ‘alignment,’ as outlined by Murray Smith in his work Engaging Characters: Fiction, 
114 
Emotion, and the Cinema.192 In his understanding of spectator-character interaction, 
Smith argues that there is a level of character engagement which he terms Alignment; in 
this level a spectator is positioned to see the world of a film ‘through’ a character. This 
positioning occurs in the use of techniques like point of view shots or voice-over 
narration. Here, though aligned with a character, the spectator is not necessarily 
emotionally attached to that character or would claim to have ‘identified’ with them. 
Smith describes such an emotional attachment as another level of character engagement: 
allegiance. Allegiance typically requires alignment because, Smith argues, a spectator 
must have reliable access to a character’s thoughts and feelings (as provided by 
alignment) in order to ally his or herself with, or feel for, that character. Smith claims that 
allegiance depends on a moral judgment of the character, for which access to the 
character’s interior world is necessary. Smith’s astute description of alignment and 
allegiance, and the fact that the two levels of identification are not one and the same, is 
applicable to La Captive; as will be shown, much of the ethical nature of Akerman’s 
films rests on Akerman’s particular alignment of spectator and characters.  
 The next sections look at the way Akerman constructs the characters of Simon 
and Ariane. In La Captive, Akerman presents Ariane as seemingly emotionally blank, 
and possibly devoid of an interior world of thoughts and feelings. Akerman upends this 
presentation in the final section of the film, however, showing the spectator that Ariane 
does have an internal world of desires and hopes (albeit a world about which the 
spectator knows almost nothing). This section will also address Akerman’s alignment of 
the spectator with Simon for much of the film; despite this alignment, however, Akerman 
also employs certain devices to deny the spectator access to Simon’s thoughts and 
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feelings, maintaining Simon’s opacity. In addition, as we will see, Akerman depicts 
Simon and Ariane as individuals who do not know themselves, who do not understand 
their own feelings and desires. Through the presentation of these unknowable characters, 
Akerman alludes to the view that there are limits to what can be known about a human 
being – a view which Judith Butler describes in Giving an Account of Oneself as having 
ethical valence. She writes, “[i]s there in this affirmation of partial transparency a 
possibility for acknowledging a relationality that binds me more deeply to language and 
to you than I previously knew? And is this relationality that conditions and blinds this 
‘self’ not, precisely, an indispensable resource for ethics?”193 This section argues further 
that Akerman, in her specific illustration of an ambiguous and terrible event in La 
Captive’s final moments, provides the spectator with the opportunity to bestow the kind 
of recognition which, Butler argues, may result from accepting the limits of human 
knowability. The recognition Butler describes entails suspending condemnation and 
apprehending the value of the unknowable other, and seeing the interdependent 
relationship between self and other. An examination of the way such recognition is at 
work in La Captive will constitute the final part of this section. 
  
Ariane: An Apparent Automaton 
 
As in Proust’s novel La Prisionnière, the plot of La Captive follows Simon’s 
jealous quest to unravel Ariane and her internal world, to know her completely. Ariane is 
an enigma to both Simon and the audience: she seems to have no will of her own, always 
responding to Simon’s perpetual queries or demands in a submissive, vaguely evasive 
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manner; when Simon asks her for her thoughts, she often replies that she has none. 
Actress Sylvie Testud performs Ariane as though she has no feelings about anything; the 
character speaks in a monotone which implies nothing but passive compliance. As a 
result, Ariane seems to the spectator, in the most extreme example of the Akerman’s 
characters addressed thus far, to be a figure without an interior world. In addition to 
Ariane’s outright denials of having any desires or thoughts, another of Akerman’s 
techniques for bracketing or downplaying the interiority of her characters is at work here 
again – that of repetition of language. Ariane repeats words and phrases, notably “au 
contraire” and “If you like,” to such an extent that she seems to be something of an 
automaton.194 In an impression equivalent to that of Demain and divan, it seems as if 
these responses have been programmed into, or somehow externally exerted upon, 
Ariane. Her repetitive responses appear to the spectator to have little, if any, relation to 
her (possible) internal world. 
Akerman additionally underscores the spectator’s lack of access to Ariane’s 
interior world in one of her major departures from Proust’s La Prisionnière – her choice 
to eschew period representation and set the film in the year 2000. In the novel, 
Albertine’s dependence on Simon is clearly financially motivated; by setting the film in 
modern-day Paris, Akerman effectively removes Ariane’s characters’ major motivation 
for living with Simon. There is no mention in the film of Ariane’s financial situation. The 
                                                
194 Ariane’s apparent automatism provides a connection to Akerman’s 1970s films discussed in the 
previous chapter. As part of her discussion of Akerman’s ‘aesthetic of homogeneity’ in Nothing Happens, 
Margulies discusses the nature of Akerman’s characters in term of filmmaker Robert Bresson’s cinematic 
style and use of ‘models,’ or non-professional actors. Margulies notes, “In this […] form, the filmic body as 
well as the performances are suffused by a sense of the mechanical, by an automaton quality resulting from 
massive stylization and from processes of textual inscription.” Margulies goes on to say that, in Akerman’s 
‘corporeal cinema,’ “this quality is transferred onto characters and performers, and accounts for an 
awkwardness of rhythm (of movement and speech) that is distinctly other.” (64) The further connections 
between Ariane and characters like Jeanne Dielman are discussed in the last section of this chapter. 
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spectator is given no explanation initially as to why Ariane chooses to live with a man 
who jealously attempts to control her. Without any reference to financial motivation,195 
with what amounts to an absence of expression of affection or any other emotion toward 
Simon, and with Ariane’s almost complete lack of self-driven or self-motivated action, 
Ariane seems in the early parts of La Captive very much like the characters of Akerman’s 
1970’s cinema: she is odd, impenetrable, and possessing a private, possibly non-existent, 
internal world. In the first half of the film, it seems that the spectator is in the same 
position as Simon, fascinated by Ariane and following her in an attempt to understand 
her. There are exceptions to this description of Ariane’s character, however, which occur 
in the final third of the film. In order to address the implications of Akerman’s 
construction of Ariane’s character (and the further connections between Ariane and the 
characters from Akerman’s 1970s films) it is necessary to first examine the character of 
Simon. 
 
Simon: Incomplete Alignment 
 
Under the rubric of Murray Smith’s model of character engagement, it is clear 
that, for the first two acts of La Captive, the spectator is ‘aligned’ with the character of 
Simon. The spectator is temporally and spatially connected with Simon, gaining 
information about the world of the film through his presence in that world. This 
alignment between Simon and the spectator would appear to support the critical claim 
                                                
195 Akerman’s removal of this reasoning for Ariane’s choice to live with Simon provided, interestingly, a 
point of complaint for those critics upset by the opaque nature of Akerman’s film. See Ginette 
Vincendeau’s review for Sight and Sound particularly: Vincendeau, Ginette. “The Captive.” Sight and 
Sound. 11:5 (May 2001): 45-46. 
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that the world of La Captive is actually a visual and aural representation of Simon’s 
subjective viewpoint; that the spectator, in effect, is seeing everything through Simon’s 
eyes. In their article, “Filming Jealousy: Chantal Akerman’s La captive (2000),” Martine 
Beugnet and Marion Schmid discuss this view, examining the film as a representation of 
Simon’s idiosyncratic viewpoint in great detail. They argue that it is particularly the 
film’s temporal structure which enables Akerman to detail the “workings of an obsessive 
mind,”196 and further, that “the mise-en-scène and pace are less a means to locate 
characters and events than representations of an internal mental landscape.”197 The 
critical understanding of La Captive which Beugnet and Schmid are espousing then holds 
that Akerman is displaying Simon’s interior world for the spectator, that she is 
visualizing his subjective viewpoint. 
The notion that La Captive is constructed to depict Simon’s ‘internal mental 
landscape’ can be glimpsed initially in the relative absence of people in the film’s Paris: 
as Simon tails Ariane through the streets of Paris or follows her through a museum, there 
are almost no other human figures to be seen (a fact which lends the film an eerie, unreal 
quality). Related to this first observation, the second aspect of the film’s seemingly 
subjective nature is that, specifically, the film is almost entirely devoid of men, excepting 
Simon. Simon has a chauffeur, who may be male, but the chauffeur is never seen 
onscreen. There are brief glimpses of male housepainters in Simon’s apartment, and a 
male hotel employee in the final scenes, but otherwise the film is populated entirely by 
females – a disproportionate number of which appear to be friends of Ariane. This aspect 
of La Captive, of course, can be read as Simon’s fear that Ariane is a lesbian, and her true 
                                                
196 Beugnet/Schmid, “Filming Jealousy: Chantal Akerman’s La Captive (2000),” Studies in French 
Cinema. Vol 2 Issue 3 (2002): 157-164, p. 160. 
197 Ibid, 160. 
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desire is to be only with women; he perceives the world around him as full of threats to 
his primacy in Ariane’s life. Through her use of all of these various devices, then, it 
would appear that Akerman is showing the spectator Simon’s singular view on the world. 
The spectator’s alignment with Simon also functions as part of La Captive’s homage to 
Alfred Hitchcock’s Vertigo; both films depict the male lead’s point of view as they 
obsessively follow women around a cosmopolitan city. La Captive’s relation to Vertigo 
will be discussed in more detail later in this chapter.  
If it is true that La Captive presents Simon’s subjective viewpoint, however, it 
would seem to present a great departure from the nature of Akerman’s character 
presentation discussed thus far; if Akerman is presenting Simon’s interior view on the 
world, his ‘mental landscape,’ for the spectator to see, this would appear to contradict the 
claim that Akerman refuses to represent the interior world, the desires and motivations of 
her characters. However, despite the aspects of the film described above, it becomes clear 
upon closer inspection that Akerman is in fact troubling the spectator’s access to Simon, 
and his feelings and thoughts. The spectator’s alignment with Simon is not total. As we 
will see, Akerman radically departs from the style of Proust’s novel; whereas Proust 
describes his narrator’s thoughts, feelings, memories, and other mental actions in 
incredible detail, certainly implying the belief that the subjective world of a human being 
can be understood and captured, Akerman actually repudiates this sort of access to 
Simon, in spite of the film’s alignment to him. Similarly to both divan and Demain, it 
will become clear that Akerman’s denial of access to both Simon and Ariane’s interior 
worlds expresses the idea that there are limits to what can be known about ourselves and 
others. 
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Akerman denies the spectator access to Simon’s interior world of thoughts and 
feelings in different ways. The first is her presentation of Simon as inexpressive, almost 
as inexpressive as Ariane. Simon’s desire to ‘know’ Ariane completely is clear from the 
opening scene of the film, but beyond that desire, the spectator learns very little about 
Simon and his feelings. There is never any explanation of why it is Ariane that Simon 
wants, for example; Simon himself remarks that he might have been better off if he had 
chosen to love Ariane’s friend Andrée instead. Simon’s behaviour is also generally 
confounding: his refusals to join Ariane on outings, only to follow her from a distance 
instead, are a particular indication of this. This strangeness reaches its apex in Simon’s 
sexual behaviour. He only desires Ariane when she is asleep, and his love-making 
amounts to a frottage in which Ariane participates not at all. The most unsettling example 
of Simon’s contradictory and confusing behaviour arrives in a moment late in the film. 
Simon tells Ariane “as you know, I have no memory” and, of course, in the context of the 
film, this remark can seem only untrue; Simon obviously spends much of his time 
cataloguing and bringing up Ariane’s past comments and actions. Simon’s unusual 
behaviour and remarks make it difficult for the spectator to categorize Simon and to use 
that categorization to ‘fill in’ information regarding Simon’s motivations or desires. The 
spectator of La Captive is left with very little, if any, idea as to why Simon does the 
things he does and what exactly he expects to gain from them. 
Another avenue through which Akerman prevents access to Simon’s inner world 
is that of a subtle destabilization of Simon’s claims. Over the course of the film, Simon 
often makes remarks to Ariane designed to contradict her, to prove that she is lying to 
him. In an early scene in the film the spectator watches Simon investigate Ariane’s claim 
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that she had dinner with her aunt at a certain restaurant (which would appear to Simon 
and the spectator to be untrue); he later questions Ariane concerning her claim. As the 
film progresses, Simon continues to make such questioning, insinuating remarks to 
Ariane; Akerman, however, no longer presents the scenes which might support Simon’s 
claims. At the midpoint of the film Simon drags Ariane away from an opera reception 
and into his car. He interrogates her about her feelings for Leá (Aurore Clément), an 
opera singer. The scene, executed in a single take, is excruciatingly long, only broken up 
when Simon and Ariane exit the car for a brief walk; yet Akerman explicitly leaves out 
the scene that Simon is presumably referring to when he tells Ariane that he does not 
want her to have to lie, as “you just told me you loathe that.” This scene is the first 
indication that the spectator is not aligned with Simon fully.  
Akerman’s refusal to present the scenes which support Simon’s claims becomes 
most conspicuous in the latter half of the film, when he has become convinced that 
Ariane is a lesbian. Simon visits two women, Sarah and Isabelle; they are presumably old 
friends of Ariane’s who are now romantically involved. Simon questions them about 
Ariane’s desires. When he returns to a sleeping Ariane, however, he mentions seeing not 
only Sarah and Isabelle, but also Leá; he reiterates this to Ariane later, as they drive to 
her Aunt’s house, claiming that Ariane forced him to go and see Leá. That Akerman does 
not show us these scenes separates us from Simon: perhaps he is recounting these 
exchanges accurately, but perhaps not. If he is recounting these things truthfully, and not 
inventing them, the spectator’s alignment with Simon is undermined regardless: he sees 
and hears things we do not. He goes places we cannot follow. The structure of the film 
may resemble the mind of a jealous human, Akerman may show us much of what Simon 
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sees, but that does not mean that we ‘know’ Simon. There are parts of Simon the 
spectator cannot see – Simon is still opaque. The opaque nature of both Ariane and 
Simon is oft commented on in negative reviews of the film: Ginette Vincendeau writes 
that Akerman “[reduces] the characters to ciphers”198 and Peter Bradshaw states that “the 
emotional lives of Simon and Ariane are a mystery.”199 Such reactions to the film 
indicate that, despite the spectator’s seeming alignment with Simon, Akerman does not 
provide access to Simon’s interior world of thoughts and feelings. 
 
Vertigo: A Change of Alignment 
 
Akerman deftly employs yet another device to deny the spectator access to 
Simon’s internal world. This is a device which many critics have commented on, though 
none have followed the implications of Akerman’s choice through to their full 
conclusion.200 This device is that of the film’s reference to Vertigo. The most obvious 
parallels between Vertigo and La Captive surface in the films’ shared narratives of a man, 
intent on uncovering a woman’s identity, following that woman around a city; both films 
are marked by long takes, shot from the man’s point of view, as he trails his quarry. But 
there is another important link between Vertigo and La Captive to be found in the films’ 
shifting point of view. Outlining the shifting alignment that occurs in Vertigo will provide 
                                                
198 Vincendeau, Ginette. “The Captive.” Sight and Sound. 11:5 (May 2001): 45-46, p. 46. 
199 Bradshaw, Peter. (2001, April 27). “Enter Brad Pitt, Riding Donkey.” The Guardian. 15-16, p. 16. 
200 Though she does not discuss it in terms of La Captive’s reference to Vertigo, Margulies does provide 
one of the only critical discussions of Ariane’s ‘resistance’ to Simon at the end of La Captive in “La 
Chambre Akerman: The Captive as Creator.” Rouge 10 (2007). 
<http://www.rouge.com.au/10/akerman.html> (accessed 11 Jan 2008). 
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useful material with which to address Akerman’s ethical presentation of character in La 
Captive. 
In Vertigo, for almost the entirety of the film the spectator is attached spatially 
and temporally to the character of Scottie (Jimmy Stewart). When Scottie is offscreen, 
the camera is aligned with Scottie’s physical point of view, and when onscreen the 
camera follows his movements as he follows Madeleine (Kim Novak). Through this 
alignment with the character of Scottie, the spectator is drawn into Scottie’s quest to 
discover who Madeleine is, to uncover the mystery of her identity. In Smith’s 
terminology, it could be argued that the spectator is ‘allied’ with Scottie; that he or she 
approves of Scottie morally and identifies emotionally with Scottie and his quest (as such 
allegiance may result from alignment).  
There is an important exception to this description of Vertigo’s alignment of the 
spectator with Scottie’s point of view, however: in the second half of the film, Scottie 
finds Judy (also Novak) and convinces her to accompany him to dinner. Scottie leaves 
and, for the first time in the film, the camera remains behind with Judy. The spectator is 
suddenly given unprecedented access to Judy’s internal world: she writes a letter to 
Scottie explaining the ruse and that she was never really Madeleine (a letter which she 
destroys). The film remains aligned, and possibly allied, with Judy for the next few 
scenes, revealing her unhappiness at Scottie’s attempts to recreate her as Madeleine. 
When Judy does ‘become’ Madeleine again, and Scottie solves the mystery, the film 
returns to Scottie’s point of view. Madeleine/Judy again becomes the distant and opaque 
figure of the first half of the film. The spectator remains aligned with Scottie until the end 
of the film; although, of course, this final alignment with Scottie cannot be as distinct as 
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it was originally – the spectator is now somewhere between the characters, allied easily 
with neither.  
In terms of the film’s structure, La Captive operates in a strikingly similar manner 
to Vertigo. Following Simon’s actions in and his viewpoint on the film’s world, the 
spectator is singularly aligned with Simon until the final third of the film. At this point, 
Simon, convinced that Ariane is a lesbian, tells Ariane one morning that they must end 
their relationship and that she will be happier as a result. The scene, which takes place in 
Ariane’s bed, marks the beginning of the film’s subtle shift to Ariane’s viewpoint. For the 
first time in the film, Akerman repeatedly shows Ariane in close-up. These close-ups, 
while not giving immediate or substantial access to Ariane’s interior emotions by 
showing her facial expression (in this scene, the actress, Sylvie Testud, retains the largely 
impassive performance style that she has used until this point in the film), minimally 
indicate that Ariane is not pleased with this turn of events. Further, these close-ups place 
Ariane, for the first time, on equal visual footing with Simon; he is the only figure who 
has appeared in the film thus far in close-up. Furthermore, Ariane, departing markedly 
from her earlier pliant self, contradicts Simon in giving her own opinion: when Simon 
proclaims that he and Ariane now sense they will be unhappy, Ariane retorts, “Don’t say 
‘we.’ It’s you alone who thinks that.” 
That Akerman has now aligned the spectator with Ariane becomes clearer as the 
next few scenes, in which Simon drives Ariane to her aunt’s home, progress. As the two 
characters drive in Simon’s convertible, Akerman continues to present Ariane in close-
up; now, however, these close-ups are no longer part of a shot-reverse shot structure 
taken from Simon’s point of view (in the earlier sequence, the close-ups are diegetically 
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justified by the cramped space of Ariane’s bed) but are simply an indication of the film’s 
shift in focus to Ariane. These close-ups enable the spectator to witness Ariane’s 
frustration as Simon pesters her with questions about her love for him. Again, in a novel 
moment, Ariane speaks at length in response, indicating her view that Simon’s form of 
love is a destructive, negative thing: 
You want to know all, as if that changed something. Me, I ask you nothing. 
Neither what you think, nor dream. And if you told me all I feel I’d love you less. 
I love you because there’s a part of you I don’t know. I imagine you’ve this world 
that I cannot enter. It intrigues me.  
Ariane’s speech makes a clear reference to the ethical views found in Akerman’s films; 
here, Ariane explicitly states that love lies in the acceptance of the limits of what can be 
known about others; earlier in the scene, she also claims that Simon’s demand for her to 
perpetually explain herself simply cannot be fulfilled, forcing her to lie to Simon on 
occasion. As well, in Ariane’s speech, as further evidence of the existence of Ariane’s 
internal world of desires and beliefs, Akerman orchestrates Ariane’s movement to the 
fore-front of the spectator’s attention; Ariane’s view on the world is the one to which we 
are now drawn, and Simon’s wants and needs recede to the background.   
When Ariane and Simon arrive at the Aunt’s house, Simon nonchalantly changes 
his mind about their parting. Instead, he asks Ariane to accompany him on a holiday by 
the ocean, to which she agrees. The film’s attention is still on Ariane in this scene: the 
spectator can see that Ariane is upset and annoyed by Simon’s questions and discussion 
of future plans, though the spectator is not given any clear explanation as to why Ariane 
is upset. Her agitation increases once the couple is in their hotel room, and she once again 
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replies to Simon’s inquiries only with ‘If you like.’ Akerman has again put the spectator 
in the dark about Ariane’s feelings. There are no more close-ups of Ariane, and she 
explains nothing of her emotional state. The moment she agrees to stay with Simon, the 
spectator’s access to Ariane’s emotions and beliefs disappears; like Judy re-becoming 
Madeleine, Ariane is inscrutable again. We have no answer to the pressing question, if 
being with Simon is now making Ariane unhappy, why did she agree to stay? 
Accordingly, Akerman’s camera returns to Simon: Ariane tells Simon she wants to swim 
before they eat and exits into the dark night; the film remains with Simon as Ariane 
leaves, following his movements around the hotel room. While this shift presumably 
indicates a resumption of the film’s earlier structure, that is not entirely the case. As in 
Vertigo, the spectator is now aligned with neither character, distanced from both. La 
Captive’s movement away from Simon in its final third disrupts the conclusion that this 
film is a straightforward representation of Simon’s interior world. The spectator’s access 
to Simon’s ‘mental landscape’ is not nearly as unfettered as the first half of the film may 
tempt us to believe. 
 
Without Condemnation: an Ethical Address 
 
As in divan and Demain, questions of the spectator’s access to a character’s 
interior world here have ethical implications. In La Captive, these implications surface in 
the conclusion of the film. Simon, on his balcony, presumably watching Ariane swim, 
yells out her name. The film cuts to Simon running into the dark sea. He catches up to a 
thrashing Ariane, who yells out, but what exactly is happening in the water is unclear to 
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the spectator. In the next shot, it is morning and a small boat in the distance slowly moves 
towards the camera. Eventually it becomes plain that the boat contains only a shocked-
looking Simon, and Ariane is nowhere to be found. The spectator is left with only 
questions about what may have happened and why: did Ariane kill herself? Was she 
somehow driven to it by Simon? How could it have been an accident when Ariane was 
such an accomplished swimmer? Etc. It is here where La Captive’s relation to Akerman’s 
1970s cinema, particularly Jeanne Dielman, is especially clear.  
Like the stabbing in Jeanne Dielman, a violent death occurs in La Captive. In 
both films, the spectator sits in a position which, under different circumstances, could 
enable judgment of those characters involved in the violence. However, because 
Akerman has so thoroughly refuted any access to the interiorities of the characters in both 
films (while also confirming that these characters do have internal desires and beliefs 
which drive them), judgment is impossible. In La Captive, we do not know why Simon or 
Ariane have done what they (may have) done, and without any explanations or 
justifications, we are not in a position to determine if their internal reasons ameliorate 
their actions. In the moment Simon, floating in the boat, slowly approaches the screen, 
Akerman gives the spectator the opportunity to recognize Simon and the absent Ariane 
rather than judge them.201 La Captive asks the spectator, can you accept the specificity 
and humanity of the (representations of) human beings here and lost – can you feel for 
them – without knowing what they feel? Without knowing if, perhaps, Simon was 
relieved when Ariane died, or if Ariane ended her life out of love for Simon? In 
                                                
201 While La Captive is of course less forceful than Jeanne Dielman in its encouragement of the spectator’s 
recognition of Jeanne (that film provides seven minutes to stare at Jeanne and ponder these questions), it is 
also an easier prospect to contemplate recognition of the characters in La Captive, as the spectator has not 
been confronted with actual images of them performing violence to themselves or others.  
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addressing the spectator in this way – in asking spectators to feel for, or ally themselves 
with, a character while accepting their limited ability to know that character – Akerman is 
referencing the ethical need to recognize the other as a being of limited self-knowledge, a 
need described by Butler. As Butler astutely notes, “recognition sometimes obligates us 
to suspend judgment in order to apprehend the other.”202 Analyzing another aspect of the 
final section of La Captive will further explain the ethical function of Akerman’s address. 
Akerman disallows the spectator any knowledge of Simon or Ariane’s internal 
reasons as to the things they have done, but there is another aspect of the possibility of 
recognition which Akerman puts forward. Akerman makes it clear to the spectator that 
Ariane and Simon may not know themselves why they have done what they have done. 
Simon does not understand his all-consuming drive to know Ariane (exampled in his hint 
to Andrée that his choice of Ariane as love-object was arbitrary), and, for the majority of 
the film, Ariane is pliant and seemingly devoid of motivations or desires. That Akerman 
constructs these characters in this manner certainly presents the notion to the spectator 
that these characters cannot and do not understand exactly what causes them to do the 
things they do. Because Simon and Ariane appear so genuinely mystified by their own 
desires – take, for example, Simon’s desire to be with Ariane despite the pain it causes 
him and vice versa – and the fact that their actions directly cause Ariane’s death, it is 
difficult to condemn them. The possibly of judgment and condemnation rely on the belief 
that, upon understanding someone’s reasons for behaving a certain way, one can declare 
some reasons adequate and others inadequate – that some accounts can be deemed 
understandable and humane and others unintelligible and inhuman, monstrous. By 
                                                
202 Giving an Account of Oneself, 44. 
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making clear that these characters are not able to give such an account, Akerman troubles 
the possibility of condemnation, of separating these figures from oneself. 
Akerman’s denial of the possibility of condemning the characters of Simon and  
Ariane evidences another ethical facet of La Captive: the promotion of the need to 
acknowledge the shared qualities of human nature; that, as the other is unknowable, so is 
the self. Judith Butler describes this need in terms of condemnation and judgment: 
Condemnation becomes the way in which we establish the other as 
nonrecognizable or jettison some aspect of ourselves that we lodge in the other, 
whom we then condemn. In this sense, condemnation can work against self-
knowledge, inasmuch as it moralizes a self by disavowing commonality with the 
judged. Although self-knowledge is surely limited, that is not a reason to turn 
against it as a project. Condemnation tends to do precisely this, to purge and 
externalize one’s own opacity.203 46 
The realization that Butler outlines here – of the need to accept the other as limitly 
knowable rather than turn away from them – is what Akerman is offering in the final 
moments of La Captive, and what accounts for the truly haunting sensation of those last 
moments. In the spectator’s alignment with Simon, Ariane, and then neither or both, there 
are surely, for the spectator, moments of familiarity in the realization of Simon and 
Ariane’s self-opacity. There may be a recognition of the feeling that one’s own reasons 
for behaviour are perhaps not always clear. Akerman’s obfuscation of the final events of 
La Captive – and the spectator’s resulting difficulty in castigating either character – 
disallows the spectator any possibility of purging this suspicion that they are themselves 
opaque, that this familiar opacity is something they can externalize and condemn in 
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Simon or Ariane.204 There is another aspect of Butler’s ethical view which Akerman 
manifests here in her address of the spectator: that a moment of recognition of another is 
possibly a painful affair. 205 The acceptance of an other as a valuable being, and yet 
limited, not entirely knowable, necessitates an undoing of the self – thinking of the 
limited other as valuable, in the manner one desires to be thought of, entails an 
understanding of the similarity between self and other, and, thus, a realization of the 
limits of the self. But it is this realization which contains the possibility of a new ethical 
understanding of human nature, of self and other. Akerman presents this realization and 
ethical possibility in both her characters and the ways she addresses the spectator through 
those characters. In La Captive, Akerman address us, the spectators, as individuals 
capable of bestowing recognition on others and, possibly, ourselves.  
  
                                                
204 Clearly, not every spectator of La Captive takes the opportunity for recognition that Akerman presents 
here. The desire to turn away from the film and declare La Captive’s characters unrealistic (or un-human) 
because of the inaccessibility of their interior/emotional worlds in evident in the reactions of the film’s 
detractors. See Vincendeau, Ginette. “The Captive.” Sight and Sound. 11:5 (May 2001): 45-46; Bradshaw, 
Peter. (2001, April 27). “Enter Brad Pitt, Riding Donkey.” The Guardian. 15-16; Andrews, Nigel. (2001, 
April 26). “Where Tom and Jerry Meets Proust.” Financial Times. (no pagination).  
205 See p. 136 of Giving an Account of Oneself particularly. 
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Conclusion: Akerman and Ethical Cinema 
 
In Film and Ethics: Foreclosed Encounters (2010), Lisa Downing and Libby 
Saxton provide an overview of the current state of film criticism and its relation to 
current philosophical considerations of ethics and ‘the ethical.’ Downing and Saxton 
argue that recently, the influence of continental, poststructuralist thought has produced a 
‘turn to ethics’ in the Humanities. This influence finds its roots in the work of “ethical 
philosophers such as Emmanuel Levinas, the later work of Jacques Derrida (itself 
borrowing from Levinas’ theory), and the ethical dimensions of Lacanian psychoanalysis, 
feminist thought, postcolonial studies and queer theory.”206 Downing and Saxton’s book 
works to explore the ways these philosophers and schools of thought have affected film 
theory and, though each critical avenue differs greatly in its understanding of ethics, to 
propose some productive arguments about how notions of ‘the ethical,’ competing and 
contradictory though they may be, may shed critical light on different theoretical 
understandings of film. 
Downing and Saxton point out that the understanding of ethics found in 
poststructuralist theory differs greatly from questions of morality or moral codes. A 
moral code or guideline requires the subject to ask questions of itself like “what ought I 
to do in a given situation?” The belief in such questioning construes the subject as a 
unified self, an “ethically capable ego.”207 It is this notion of the self – that the self is a 
unified agent – which continental theory denies. As such, the theories of ethics that 
Downing and Saxton address move away from moral concerns: “Ethics in its continental 
                                                
206 Downing, Lisa and Libby Saxton. Film and Ethics: Foreclosed Encounters. New York, NY: Routledge, 
2010, 1. 
207 Ibid., 2. 
132 
sense and in its application for a critical engagement with cultural products can perhaps 
be most profitably be seen as a process of questioning rather than as a positivistic 
exercise of morality.”208 The ‘process of questioning’ Saxton and Downing mention here 
refers to considerations of the interaction between human beings and the centrality of 
those interactions to the ethical. Further, they write that “[ethics] designates a way of 
responding to the encounter between self and other/s, while suspending the meaning of 
the subject-object relation, with its implicit dynamic of dominance and subordination.”209 
Though different theorists or critical schools approach the encounter between self and 
other differently, it is an over-arching concern of Film and Ethics to point out the 
importance of this encounter to current conceptions of ethics. 
In light of this understanding of the ethical – that a consideration of the interaction 
between self and other is a defining aspect of any notion of ethics – Saxton and Downing 
work to reveal the ways in which ethics is relevant to film criticism. They argue that, like 
other critical fields in the humanities, film criticism has been influenced by the ‘ethical 
turn’ of poststructuralist theory; however, in film studies, “this concern with ethics has 
generally remained implicit.” Downing and Saxton point out, for example, that the 
theoretical concern with ‘the look’ – found in feminist, postcolonial and queer 
approaches to film – is essentially ethical, as it addresses the nature of the subject-object 
encounter.210 Over the course of Film and Ethics, Saxton and Downing consider a 
number of different films, ranging between documentary and fiction films and classical 
Hollywood and avant-garde films, in order to explicitly address the different ways in 
which ‘the ethical’ may illuminate both those films and established film theories. Overall, 
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they argue for the necessity of including considerations of ethics in discussions of film-
viewing and filmmaking, as the ethical is already present in those acts: 
Rather than devising a system of values in which films can be classified as 
‘ethical’ or ‘unethical’, we contend that the ethical is the context in which all 
filmmaking takes place, since the creation and reception of a work of art always 
already engage desire and responsibility (for both artist and audience). Whenever 
we negotiate between desire and responsibility, we place ourselves in the arena of 
ethics.211 
This understanding of film, in which both the filmmaker and film spectator are inevitably 
drawn into the ethical through their desire for, and responsibility toward, the other, 
provides a useful backdrop for my own discussion of Akerman’s work. I have argued in 
this thesis that Akerman’s films present an ethical spectatorial address. As a final 
illustration of this argument, and as a way to examine the ethical nature of Akerman’s 
self-presentation in her films, the following section will analyze Akerman’s recent film 
Là-bas (2006) in relation to the larger arguments I have been making concerning 
Akerman’s films. 
 
 Là-bas: Akerman as Character 
 
Chantal Akerman’s career spans thirty-five years of filmmaking practice. This 
practice has encompassed many different film styles and focuses, including structuralist 
avant-garde cinema, classical Hollywood cinema and experimental documentaries. The 
diversity of Akerman’s work is difficult to categorize or summarize. Throughout this 
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thesis I have tried to delineate an overarching quality of Akerman’s films, which I 
identify as Akerman’s distinctive approach to characters and human beings. On the one 
hand, the characters in Akerman’s films are similar to those found in classical realist 
cinema, in that they maintain diegetic recognizability as representations of ‘real’ people. 
On the other hand, they depart from the classical rules of character presentation in that 
they are psychologically or emotionally unreadable. Akerman not only denies the 
spectator information about characters’ motivations, goals, emotions or desires, but also 
troubles the spectator’s ability to formulate his or her own conjectures about them. 
Akerman’s films, in effect, present characters that are ‘unknowable.’ As I have tried to 
demonstrate throughout this thesis, Judith Butler’s Giving an Account of Oneself (2005) 
presents an enlightening framework through which to assess the ethical nature of 
Akerman’s character treatment.  
In her book, Butler turns to the question of ethics, bringing post-structural 
understandings of identity into conjunction with questions of responsibility. Butler 
proposes an ethics heavily influenced by Emmanuel Levinas’ idea that the self has 
inescapable responsibility toward the other. Butler’s ethical formation places great 
emphasis on the unknowability of the self and of the other, arguing that the demand for 
others to explain themselves cannot be met, and is thus unethical. In Butler’s view, an 
ethical approach to the other accepts the other as unknowable, and aims to recognize the 
other as invaluable in its singularity and irreplaceability. Recognition here constitutes the 
moment when we understand our need for the other and the value of a specific individual, 
in spite of our inability to fully know the other. In Butler’s parlance, these moments in 
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which one may bestow recognition on the other constitute ‘moments of unknowingness,’ 
and it is in these moments that the ethical exists.212  
Akerman’s films work to bring the spectator to these ‘moments of 
unknowingness’ Butler posits. Her films place the spectator in a position to contemplate 
individual characters at length and either to ultimately recognize them, becoming undone 
themselves somewhat in accepting the character’s unknowability, or to turn away from 
the character, condemning the character for his or her opacity. Through the systematic 
avoidance of psychological or emotional insights into her films’ characters, Akerman 
addresses her spectator in an ethical manner, asking the spectator to contemplate his or 
her own consideration of the unknowable other. In many of Akerman’s films, Akerman 
asks the spectator to consider not just characters Akerman creates, but Akerman herself. 
Akerman appears in several of her films, namely Saute ma ville, Je tu il elle, News From 
Home, D’Est, Sud, and De l’autre côté. She is sometimes present only as an offscreen 
voice or voice-over; sometimes she features as a character or (as in the documentary 
films) as an unseen figure behind the camera.  
In Nothing Happens: Chantal Akerman’s Hyperrealist Everyday, Ivone Margulies 
notes that Akerman’s self-presentation in films213 works to present a “non-fixed 
identity.”214 For Margulies, “[b]oth the serious and the comic films mock the possibility 
of grafting a fixed identity into a film, whether through [Aurore] Clément’s presence [as 
Akerman’s alter-ego] or through Akerman’s own. Rather, the thematics of exile provide a 
clue to a basic direction of Akerman’s work – away from a fixed image of the self.”215 In 
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an article examining Akerman’s ‘chambre’ films, that is, the films which foreground a 
single room as their setting, Margulies adds that “the Akerman-chamber is neither 
conducive to psychodrama nor propitious to self-exposure. Akerman’s presence in the 
films has a performative purpose rather than a referential quality.”216 Margulies’ remarks 
underscore the ways in which Akerman’s self-presentation shares similarities with 
Akerman’s presentation of fictional characters: neither presentation offers fixed, or 
‘knowable,’ identities. The remainder of this section will examine Akerman’s self-
presentation in detail to further draw out this connection. While a detailed discussion of 
each of the films in which Akerman appears is, unfortunately, a larger project than can be 
undertaken here, I will concentrate on Akerman’s recent film Là-bas (2006) in order to 
assess the nature of Akerman’s self-presentation and its effects on Akerman’s ethical 
address, as it has been discussed so far. 
Là-bas recounts Akerman’s visit to Tel Aviv. The visual track of Là-bas consists 
largely of interior, fixed camera shots of the window of Akerman’s darkened apartment. 
The camera looks out, through the blinds, onto the balconies and streets outside. While 
Akerman slightly varies the position of her camera (closer to or further from the window, 
etc), the film’s visual track is predominately made up of images of Akerman’s neighbors 
engaged in various activities on their balconies. Occasionally, these interior shots are 
juxtaposed with exterior shots of Tel Aviv – these include exterior sequences in which 
Akerman takes her camera to the beach and films individuals there, or in which she 
positions her camera on her balcony. In contrast to the visual track, we receive 
information about Akerman almost exclusively through the soundtrack. We hear her 
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phone conversations with friends and relatives and listen to the monologues she speaks in 
voice-over. It quickly becomes clear during the film that Akerman only rarely leaves her 
apartment. This state of affairs is evidently exacerbated when, as Akerman tells us, she 
walks to the beach to buy cigarettes and discovers that she has very narrowly missed a 
suicide bombing which killed four people.  Avoiding explicit analysis of this incident or 
the larger political situation in Israel, Là-bas instead, like so many of Akerman’s films, 
focuses on questions of identity and representation of identity. 
In Là-bas, Akerman presents herself to the spectator in a manner which 
emphasizes the opaque nature of identity: she does not know herself fully, and thus the 
spectator cannot ‘know’ her, her thoughts, feelings, reactions, etc. She accomplishes this 
presentation through a number of different stylistic devices. Most obviously, her almost 
total lack of appearance onscreen denies the spectator any avenue through which to ‘read’ 
Akerman – we cannot discern her state of mind by examining her facial expressions or 
body language. Rather than displaying herself onscreen, Akerman instead provides 
endless images of other people – strangers. In this way, while remaining present by 
constantly speaking over the image, she visually associates herself with unknown others. 
Greg Youmans points out that Akerman’s camera set-up in the film does not ‘suture’ the 
spectator’s view to Akerman’s view, but rather points out the separation between the two: 
“Akerman conveys her message to us, not through identification or the suturing of our 
gaze to her own but rather, through the perpetually restaged denial of any such 
identification or suture.”217 Even Akerman’s constant speech over the image does not 
provide the spectator a way to read Akerman – she delivers her speech in a monotone 
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voice, denying her words any inflection that might indicate to the spectator that Akerman 
is experiencing any specific emotion. 
A second avenue by which Akerman troubles the spectator’s access to her 
subjective viewpoint is through the promotion of contradictory or conflicting identity 
traits. A device common to Akerman’s fictional films, Angela Stukator describes 
Akerman’s promotion of “internal differences, contradictions and tensions which could 
potentially blur the boundaries of a category”218 as a way to disrupt the ‘logic of identity;’ 
this is a logic which maintains that identity is coherent, unified and whole.219 By 
foregrounding conflicting elements of her characters’ identities, Akerman avoids 
representations of identity which can be easily read, interpreted, and ‘known’ by the 
spectator, as the spectator brings his or her own associations to bear on that identity.  
In Là-bas, the information Akerman provides to the audience about her 
subjectivity cannot be placed within any reductive category of identity: for example, the 
spectator sees repeated shots of Akerman’s darkened apartment – evidence of the 
seemingly solitary, inactive life Akerman leads. As such, the spectator may be tempted to 
label and thus know Akerman as ‘fearful’ or agoraphobic, or as having some other 
psychological infirmity. As the film progresses, however, Akerman disrupts such a 
labeling: she does go outside for periods within the film, using her motionless video 
camera to film individuals as they walk along the beach and, on one occasion, filming 
briefly on her balcony; when Akerman’s friends and relatives call her on the phone, she is 
curt and politely refuses their invitations to meet, again leading the spectator to think of 
her as an anti-social person. In the last few minutes of the film, however, Akerman again 
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upturns this reading when she reveals that she is sad that a cousin with whom she has 
been spending time is leaving the next day – “It’s too bad,” Akerman says. “I like having 
my cousin near me. She seems to know how to live.” Akerman’s reticence to talk to her 
family and friends on the phone is also contrasted with the prolonged, often rambling 
monologues which Akerman speaks to the spectator in voice-over, further disallowing 
any easy reading of Akerman as a quiet or withdrawn individual. 
Akerman’s particular use of language in Là-bas constitutes another aspect of 
Akerman’s opacity to the spectator. As Margulies discusses in Nothing Happens, 
Akerman works, in her use of dialogue, to downplay the referential nature of language; 
she does this in various ways, including her use of cliché and monotone or sing-song 
voices.220 In Là-bas, like her other films, Akerman drains her speech of its meaning by 
repeating phrases – she says many times in the film, for example, “I read complicated 
books about the Jews” or “It’s complicated.” She also discusses tangential details at great 
length. At one point in the film, she describes in detail the employment history of her 
cousin in Belgium; at another point, she recounts all the things she will need to do in 
order to replace a loaf of bread she has eaten out of her landlord’s freezer. Though she 
talks a great deal in the film, Akerman disrupts the notion that this talking expresses 
anything meaningful about her interior world. She contradicts herself, repeats herself and 
speaks so much as to both exceed the requirements of and overwhelm the possibility of 
communication.  
When Akerman does speak directly about her feelings in Là-bas, she only 
describes the ways in which she is detached from others: “I’m just disconnected from 
practically everything,” she says. “I float.” Or, when speaking about herself, Akerman 
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accentuates her opacity to herself. She says, “If my father is a descendent of the Rabbi of 
Belze, then so am I, I tell myself. I search within myself to see if I can feel it. Yes, yes I 
feel it. No, no I can’t anymore. What is it to feel it anyway? I don’t know.” While one 
might assume in Là-bas that Akerman’s Judaism or her connection to Jewish history 
provides an avenue through which to understand or know Akerman, she entirely dispels 
this possibility in remarks like these. She tells the spectator that her Jewish identity 
confounds her, constituting an aspect of her unknowability to herself – an aspect which 
is, of course, reflected in her feelings of isolation and disconnection from Israel. In this 
way then, again, Akerman presents herself to the spectator as unknowable, both by 
herself and others. By stressing her own unknowability to the spectator, Akerman is 
articulating Butler’s argument that one cannot fully know the other. 
Returning to Judith Butler’s argument in Giving an Account of Oneself, we can 
see that Akerman’s emphasis on her own unknowability has ethical implications. By 
confronting the spectator with the mutability and inconsistency of her own identity, 
Akerman points to Butler’s claim that  
the question of ethics emerges precisely at the limits of our schemes of 
intelligibility, the site where we ask ourselves what it might mean to continue in a 
dialogue where no common ground can be assumed, where one is, as it were, at 
the limits of what one knows yet still under the demand to offer and receive 
acknowledgement: to someone else who is there to be addressed and whose 
address is there to be received.221  
For Butler, the ethical lies in this act of acknowledgement or recognition, and it is this 
that Akerman, through her self-presentation as unknowable, asks of her spectator.  
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Akerman in Là-bas fashions herself as disconnected from others, hidden away in 
a dark apartment. Though this may seem to imply that there can be no ethical encounter 
between Akerman and another in this film, the opposite is true. Though some of the 
verbal track of Là-bas consists of Akerman’s phone conversations with family and 
friends, much of the voice-over is Akerman telling her thoughts to the spectator. 
Akerman’s speech about herself (which is, of course, revelatory only up to a certain 
point. Akerman’s aforementioned use of language and self-attribution of contradictory 
identity traits prevents the spectator from using Akerman’s speech to create a full picture 
of Akerman’s identity – to fully ‘know’ her) requires the spectator as addressee, as 
something separate and other from Akerman, to gain meaning. As Akerman speaks 
perpetually to the spectator, she is revealing her need for recognition from the spectator. 
Her address is dependent upon us for acknowledgement; as Butler writes, “If I have no 
‘you’ to address, then I have lost ‘myself.’” Despite Akerman’s withdrawal from others, 
and her visual withdrawal from the spectator, Là-bas depicts Akerman as having constant 
concern and care for other human beings, whether these are the strangers she watches or 
her impenetrable aunt who committed suicide and whom Akerman discusses repeatedly. 
Akerman is asking us whether, similarly, we can care and feel for Akerman without 
knowing her, without knowing what she feels. 
In the final minutes of Là-bas Akerman verbally recounts a meeting in her 
apartment between herself and ‘the man from the university’ (she gives no further 
description of the man). This is the only time in the film that Akerman describes a 
prolonged encounter between herself and another person during her time in Tel Aviv. Her 
description of their conversation intimates an ethical exchange of recognition; an 
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encounter not about knowledge, but about seeing the value and singularity of the other, 
and being seen in return. Akerman mentions to him that she is concerned about cleaning 
and otherwise restoring her apartment to its previous state. She tells us, “he smiles. He 
rises and opens the drapes. The air, the light pours in. For a few seconds, I’m blinded. 
Then, I can see again. He says, ‘it’s hard to get out of prison. Especially your own prison, 
but you do get out.’ I don’t dare ask how. Another time, maybe. But when he leaves, I 
realize he has done me good…He’s calm, and he knows. He knows exile, prison, inside, 
outside. Well, I think he does.”   
Shortly after Akerman’s description of this encounter, she breaks the visual 
pattern of Là-bas as we have seen it thus far: cutting away from the ubiquitous shot of the 
window, Akerman cuts to a frenetic montage sequence including shots of the sky, the 
beach, the city. There is camera movement in each shot, and Akerman has sped up the 
video to increase the feeling of dynamism and activity. This sequence is both jarring and 
ecstatic in its departure from the stillness of the rest of the film. Is this sequence 
emblematic of Akerman’s desire to burst out of the apartment? Out of herself? Is it a 
visual analogue of emotional turmoil? Of the sensation of being recognized by another? 
There are no answers to these questions – Akerman’s ethical address lies in the way she 
directs us to contemplate our feelings about her, despite the lack of answers. Akerman’s 
ethical address places the spectator in a position to apprehend the specificity and 
irreducibility of another, while also confronting our inability to investigate and know that 
other. After the montage, Akerman returns us to our previous position within her 
apartment. Now, however, we realize that something has changed: we can see Akerman, 
obscurely reflected in a mirror to the right of the window. She is brushing her teeth. This 
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change brings us not quite face to face with this woman with whom we have spent so 
much time; Akerman is here unknowable, perhaps, and though the spectator may or may 





In this thesis, I have endeavored to uncover the connections between the films of 
Chantal Akerman and the conception of ethics presented by Judith Butler in Giving an 
Account of Oneself; I have argued that Akerman’s films are, in their spectatorial address, 
ethical. Analyzing the films Jeanne Dielman, 23 Quai du Commerce, 1080 Bruxelles and 
Les rendez-vous d’Anna, I have shown that Akerman utilizes various filmic devices in 
order to present the characters of Anna and Jeanne as opaque, or ‘unknowable.’ Though 
she denies her spectator access to Anna and Jeanne’s interiors worlds for the majority of 
the films, Akerman, in the latter parts of Jeanne Dielman and Les rendez-vous d’Anna, 
confronts her spectator with the existence of the characters’ interior world. In this 
confrontation, Akerman places her spectator in the position to consider the feelings of the 
other, the character, without knowing what that other feels. I have illustrated how, 
according to the paradigm Butler lays out in her work, the form of character Akerman 
presents in these films thus models an ethical address.    
In chapter 2, I examined the changes in this ethical address which result when 
Akerman presents characters that are dramatically different from those found in her 
1970s films. The characters in the films Un divan à New York, La captive and Demain on 
144 
déménage differ from the quiet, distant characters of Anna and Jeanne – they are, instead, 
talkative, proximate and physically expressive. However, through an analysis of 
Akerman’s use of dialogue and her attribution of contradictory and confusing identity 
traits to her characters in these films, I have argued that the characters Akerman presents 
in these films retain the opacity and unknowability found in the earlier films. She 
achieves this opacity by emphasizing, to her spectator, the characters’ opacity to 
themselves. Looking at the depiction of love in Un divan à New York, the presentation of 
family and the references to the Holocaust in Demain on déménage and the switching of 
alignment, or point of view, in La Captive, I have outlined the ways in which these films 
present and re-formulate the ethical address found in Akerman’s 1970s films. Finally, 
analyzing Akerman’s recent film Là-bas, I have discussed the ways in which Akerman 
presents herself as unknowable to her spectator, mining the presentation of her own 
identity as an ethical resource for her films. 
My purpose in this thesis has been to contribute to the literature on Chantal 
Akerman’s films, as well as to the critical project of delineating the interactions between 
the study of film and ethical philosophy. The originality of my discussion of Akerman’s 
films is found in the act of bringing ethical considerations to bear on Akerman’s work, 
arguing both that Akerman’s films have an inherent ethical quality and that, as a 
filmmaker, Akerman’s understanding of the ethical informs the entirety of her 
filmmaking project. While books like Film and Ethics: Foreclosed Encounters consider 
individual films in relation to different ethical theories, addressing the overall work of a 
filmmaker through the lens of a specific ethical theory constitutes a new approach. 
Bringing Judith Butler’s discussion of ethics into conjunction with the study of film has 
145 
also provided a novel approach to both Akerman’s work and larger considerations of the 
nature of the interaction between film and spectator. I have attempted to show in this 
thesis that Akerman’s films present an ideal paradigm of the ethical possibilities of film, 
foregrounding the responsibility of the spectator towards a film and the world represented 
in that film. My over-arching aim in this thesis has been to address the astounding work 
of Chantal Akerman, and to show that Akerman’s attention to her spectator, and her 
construction of certain kind of interaction between spectator and character, marks 
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